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This dissertation asks how rural populations accepted and adjusted to 
Azerbaijan’s neoliberal restructuring under IMF guidance from a mainly agricultural 
Soviet economy to an urban-based petroleum exporter of the world. The answers draw 
a history of changing land-use patterns, livelihood strategies, and mind-sets in rural 
Azerbaijan, illuminating ideological aspects of what Michael Woods called “rural 
globalization”—of how rural places are remade with globalization.
This work will show how breaking the rural resistance to the IMF-designed 
restructuring of post-Soviet Azerbaijan has depended on igniting hopes in the bounties 
of the market system, the individualization and disintegration of rural communities 
through land reforms, and rural migration.
The spread of hopes in the market system as the just distributor of resources 
and as a road to prosperity through organized government efforts was a crucial first 
step and involved a redefinition of prosperity from long-term communal goal to 
immediate personal goal. Land reforms, held in hopes of self-sufficient prosperity, 
individualized and disintegrated rural communities, diminishing their ability to stand 
up against the land manipulations and enclosures that followed. Finally, rural 
migration was instrumental to the transformation of rural Azerbaijan, not just in easing 
social tensions but as a key channel through which the ideas and values of the market, 
specifically seeking individual material interests, travelled to the countryside and 
began to be accepted as normal.
Rural areas’ acceptance of the neoliberal development of post-Soviet 
Azerbaijan rested on a profound and massive moral transformation, which furthered a 
specific model of individual–community relationship, and thus helped marketization 
succeed.
Globalization has often been presented as a transnationally orchestrated 
process against which locales have been helpless. Yet, as this dissertation reminds, the 
expansion and deepening of the global market crucially rests on building wider 
consent to market values as legitimate guiding principles of life.
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1CHAPTER 1:
WHAT AZERBAIJAN CAN TELL US ABOUT GLOBALIZATION
Introduction
Between 1995 and 2005 the post-Soviet republic of Azerbaijan underwent 
rapid market reforms designed by the IMF that restructured the country as a petroleum 
exporter of the global economy and earned it praise as the “star performer” of the post-
Soviet market transition. The changes were destructive for the countryside of this 
formerly agricultural Soviet republic and were resisted by the rural populations before 
1995. By 1995 the resistance quietly disappeared, and impoverished rural areas were 
surprisingly smoothly integrated into the global-market-oriented, urban-Baku-based 
new economy of Azerbaijan.
How did this happen? How did rural communities in Azerbaijan come to 
accept and adapt to the IMF-led neoliberal marketization? This dissertation grew out 
of seeking answers to these questions.
These questions are also essentially questions about rural globalization (how 
rural places are remade with globalization) and about consent to globalization—two 
areas this dissertation brings together.
Globalization and the global-local antinomy
Globalization—the expanding and deepening global marketization of social 
organization—has been pointed out as a profound shaper of the world we live in, from 
national policies through the worlds of production and consumption to local livelihood 
conditions and culture (McMichael 1996; Sites 2000; Kellner 2002; Coburn, D’Arcy, 
and Torrance 1998; Stiglitz 2002; Laurell and Arellano 2002; Bakker and Gill 2003; 
Brodie 2003; Harvey 2003; Sassen 2007; Robinson 2008; Gereffi 2011).
2In this age of global capitalism, we are told, governments around the world are 
under pressure to increase avenues for profitmaking and to assume the costs of capital 
accumulation. We see states around the world cutting back on corporate taxation and 
social spending, privatizing previously closed areas of their economy, and liberalizing 
trade. This combination of measures is referred to as neoliberal restructuring. While 
neoliberal restructuring is rooted in the belief that unregulated, free market is the 
optimal mechanism for organizing production and consumption, it is shown to leave 
states with less control than ever over their national economies, and ordinary people 
with acute social insecurity (Stiglitz 2002; ; Laurell and Arellano 2002; Bakker and 
Gill 2003; Fudge and Cossman 2003). 
Neoliberal restructuring was pioneered in the developed countries by the 
Reagan government in the US and the Thatcher government in the UK, characterizing 
1980s. Subsequent waves of restructuring in other countries across the globe were, in 
essence, a reintegration of these countries into the new global circuits as aids of global 
capital accumulation versus protectors of local social security. The developing 
countries are said to be pressured into the restructuring by the IMF, the World Bank, 
the World Trade Organization, transnational corporations, and global financial capital 
through denial of lending, unfavourable investment ratings, sanctions, and capital 
flight (Stiglitz 2002)1. Neoliberal restructuring was said to mark the end of the age of 
development, and the start of the age of globalization (McMichael 2005).
The manifestations that have come to characterize globalization since then—
global commodity chains, financial flows, labor migrations—were all crucially 
dependent on and stemmed from neoliberal restructuring of national economies. It was 
                                                
1 Petroleum-rich Azerbaijan discussed here, however, while classified as a developing country, has 
partnered with the IMF and embraced neoliberal restructuring voluntarily, a choice that has 
strengthened the country’s authoritarian regime.
3with and through neoliberalism that an international world economy transformed into 
a transnational or global economy. Built on the foundation of economic policies 
committed to capital free from national regulations, globalization has simultaneously 
and essentially been a deepening of capital accumulation through marketization, and 
commodification of new areas of social life as arenas for profit-making.
The deepening reach of global capital through neoliberal measures and the 
retraction of the welfare functions of the states did not equally affect the inhabitants of 
those states. Instead, these macroeconomic trends directed at recovering productivity 
moved costs disproportionately to those most marginalized in society—women, racial 
and ethnic minorities, immigrants (Kingfisher 2002; Lister 2002; Brodie 2003;
Condon 2003; Stasiulis and Bakan 2003; Fudge and Cossman 2003; Ewig 2008). The
deepening of inequalities and internal divisions within a society along class, gender, 
race, and ethnic lines during neoliberal restructuring is argued to be crucial to how and 
why the accumulation by those at the top succeeds (Federici 2004).
The restructuring is also said to redefine the very notions of citizenship: with 
states’ abandonment of the social security role, citizenship is now “premised upon 
consumers who pay taxes—as opposed to politically active citizens with the potential 
to struggle for greater rights and security. The new discourse tends to individualize 
problems and solutions and displaces collective norms of universal entitlement by 
emphasizing privatized service provision and individual self-reliance (for example, the 
reliance on non-profit volunteer organizations)” (Di Muzio and Roncallo 2003:45). 
These theories of globalization can provide invaluable insights, explaining 
many individual, community, and national experiences in the context of the neoliberal 
‘millieu’, using C.W. Mills’ term. Yet, globalization theories are criticized for 
conceptually overpowering structures (of globalization). 
4The caveat, stressed by J. K. Gibson-Graham (1996), is that social reality is
never just described: it is imagined, constructed, and constituted at the same time. 
Moreover, how the reality is responded to depends a great deal on how it is imagined. 
Talking of globalization as a mega-force sweeping over helpless populations carries 
normative implications, limiting imaginations of social change.
The problem with the view of globalization as imposed upon helpless 
populations is not just normative. Such a conceptualization is simply utterly 
incomplete. The deepening of capital accumulation through marketization is located in
the “web of social life,” not outside it (Harvey 2006:77–90). David Harvey, a scholar
known for his illumination of the regularities—the “law-like character”—of the 
market-based system of accumulation, himself has criticized the “artificial” separation 
of these regularities from everyday life, the separation of the abstract strands of theory 
from the concreted (ibid.). The exercise of such separation, Harvey (2006) argued, is 
an ultimate discarding of the most valuable legacy Marx left to social theory: namely 
that the abstract does not exist except in its concrete manifestations. Therefore, 
concrete manifestations of how the deepening commodification was ascended to are
crucial to our understanding of the spread of the global market. 
The global–local antinomy is (together with the related structure–agency, 
macro–micro antinomies), as Immanuel Wallerstein (1997) argued, a reflection of
ages-old debate about determinism versus free will. Marx’s adage that “people make 
their own history, but not under the conditions of their own choosing” suggests itself 
as a solution to the antinomy (Harvey 2011; McMichael 2008), but leaves a 
demonstration of what this means to concrete studies (modeled by Marx’s own “The 
18th Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte”). 
Agency—individuals’ capacity to act independently and make free choices 
within a given social context (Barker 2005:448)—is to be illuminated by the social 
5theorist of structures/processes like globalization. If the task is not done carefully, 
mega structures and processes, which only come to life with and through people’s 
actions, will be seen as omnipresent and overpowering forces of their own.
Philip McMichael in “Globalization: Myth and Realities” (1996) shows how 
neoliberal globalization has indeed been a ‘project’ pushed forward by a powerful 
group, a transnational elite comprising proponents from national leaders to corporate
powers.2 McMichael (2006) also shows how neoliberal globalization is resisted 
through his case study of collectively organized groups such as the Landless Workers 
Movement (the MST—Movimento dos TrabalhadoresSem Terra) in Brazil and the 
Via Campesina, a transnational movement of peasant organizations.
But what about the role of the millions and billions, who are neither in the 
positions of power and influence, nor are organized into anti-systemic struggle 
organizations, as “people” in the making of “their history”? 
One strand of scholarly attempts to come to terms with this has called attention 
to the “enactment” of globalization. The concept was put forward by the feminist 
scholar Carla Freeman (2000), who argued against “entering” local individuals, 
communities, and hierarchies (such as gender relations) as passive recipients of 
macro-processes of globalization. Freeman’s alternative was to build the story from 
the bottom up, taking space-bound “social and economic processes, and cultural
meanings” as the pillars / building blocks of globalizations. In Freeman’s study, Afro-
Caribbean women incorporated into a Barbados site of a transnational high-tech 
industry strive to create and maintain “modern professional” identity and to separate 
                                                
2 Many other great works illustrate the personalities and the dispositions of the powerful elite behind 
neoliberalism, exposing the global market as historical, rather than as an inevitable structure. Thatcher 
and Reagan, as in Prasad (2006), are obvious examples; but also making history are the group of 
European bankers who together with Gorbachev were instrumental in bringing down state 
socialism(Van Der Pijl 2001), and rigid neoliberal directors of the IMF and the World Bank pushing to 
open up much of Africa and Asia to neoliberal structures (Stiglitz 2002).
6themselves from factory workers through dress and lifestyle choices, which involve 
shopping and recreation trips to the USA. Using this Caribbean case study, Freeman 
argues that individual actors are “local subjects living across and within a globalized 
terrain,” but also simultaneously “agents of globalization.” Such individual actors’ 
participation in global production and consumption networks furthers “translation of 
tastes and desires,” and business practices. Space-bound local individuals and their 
practices are thus the very fabric of globalization. They are “enacting new modes of 
globalization, they are not merely its effects.” But how come people choose to enact 
globalization? Freeman’s story describes people who embraced opportunities brought 
by globalization as ways to live “modern professional’s” life. Crucial to Freeman’s 
interviewees’ enactment of globalization is their values for ‘modern’ identity, 
‘modern’ consumption, which gives value to globalization, in their eyes, as 
opportunities. What Freeman did not ask was the history of development of these 
values.
Harvey addressed the role of these masses in the making of the global history 
using the concept “the construction of consent.” In A Brief History of Neoliberalism 
(2011), Harvey documents how the advent of free marketization–neoliberal policies in 
the US and the UK were a result of not just a united act of these countries’ capitalist 
classes, and of Ronald Reagan’s and Margaret Thatcher’s individual commitments to 
the neoliberal ideology, but also a planned coaxing of the middle and working classes. 
In the US, this involved building wider support for freer market policies through 
exploitation of the historical tension within the Left between the individual-freedom 
and social-justice proponents; a strategic marriage of neoliberal economic ideology 
with the Christian Right, seizing on and appealing to the cultural prejudices and the 
sense of moral righteousness of the white working class; and the fiscal disciplining of 
independent municipalities, such as the City of New York. In the UK, Thatcher’s 
7tactics included iron assault on labor unions and democratic municipalities (including 
revoking the latter’s right to raise their own taxes, and thus making them vulnerable to 
financing and fiscal disciplining by the state and the banking sector), think-tanks and 
research institutes propagating free-market ideas taking advantage of the popular 
mockery of networked class relations—including union bureaucrats’ class 
privileges—and general scepticism about politics of the UK. Across the spectrum, the 
“carrot” of flexible employment and greater freedom and liberty of action in the labor 
market was used. It was through this range of collaborated efforts of appeal and 
disciplining that free market institutions and ideas sprang up from the US and the UK 
to take over the world. 
Around the world, Harvey (2011) argued with shorter examples, the expanding 
reach of the market similarly involved a mix of government and business elites’ 
political, military, and financial commitment to establishing a population’s 
dependence on and vulnerability to the global market with coaxing of the middle and 
working classes. This coaxing involved strategies that Harvey identified as 
consumerism, benefits of flexible employment, and the lure of capitalist culture as an 
escape from the harsh constraints of patriarchal and family regulations. Thus, in the 
Brief History of Neoliberalism, Harvey painted a picture of the global capitalist in 
which structures very much depended on the coaxing of free will. From this 
viewpoint, local negotiations leading to the acceptance of and / popular support for the 
neoliberal / free-market order are not marginal to the construction of the global market 
system by the “forces from above,” but instead are the very heart of this construction.
With this work Harvey brought Antonio Gramsci’s insights into the understanding of 
neoliberal globalization.
Gramsci (1971) introduced the term “hegemony,” which is, as Gitlin (1980:9) 
succinctly summarized, domination by the ruling class through ideology and the 
8shaping of popular consent. Gramsci criticized the notion that ideas and values are 
secondary to material structures and manifestations of social relations (such as global 
commodity chains in our time?). Instead he suggested a view of social 
hierarchy/domination whereby populations’ acceptance of leadership’s ideas—about 
rule, economy, and, crucially, culture/life conduct—were at the very heart of systemic 
power. Gramsci showed how hegemony is reproduced through a nexus of institutions, 
social relations, and ideas; and he called attention to the “manufacture of consent” 
through cultural life. ‘Consent’ for Gramsci meant subordinate classes’ acceptance of 
the basic ideas and worldview central to the functioning of the dominant system, as 
“common sense”, natural, and in their own interest. Gramsci argued that this cultural 
hegemony is the first task of a system of domination.
Manufacture of consent and hegemony for Gramsci were not only about ideas 
but also, essentially, about values and moral steering. He called “ethico-political 
history” “an arbitrary and mechanical hypostasis3 of the moment of hegemony, of 
political leadership, of consent in the life and activities of the state and civil 
society.”4Ethico-political history—the actual, historical play of power struggles, 
importantly between moral worldviews--was for Gramsci the underlying substance of 
hegemony, a process by definition never complete. What Gramsci did essentially was 
to expose the dependency of a dominant system on the coaxing of free will—the 
agency of populations—to continue its rule.
This dissertation happens to confirm Gramsci’s insights while thinking about 
rural transformation in the age of neoliberal globalization. It will show how rural 
Azerbaijan’s acceptance of neoliberal transformation depended on convincing rural 
                                                
3 Underlying substance, essence, fundamental reality.
4 Prison writings, p. 194 in The Gramsci Reader,edited by David Forgacs (1988).
9laborers of the superior and beneficent nature of market-based economic organization, 
and on redefining the purpose of human life in material terms, with profound 
implications for the cohesion of village communities. This work will show how—
through which processes and adaptations—the construction of consent to neoliberal 
marketization succeeded in rural Azerbaijan. With this, my dissertation will add to the 
developing understanding of rural globalization.
The term “rural globalization” was introduced by the geographer Michael 
Woods (2007). Woods pointed out urban bias in globalization studies, and suggested 
the “global countryside” as a hypothetical space that “represents the outcome of 
globalizing processes,” although unevenly, in rural locales across the globe 
(2007:485).
Interestingly, the changes made in the name of neoliberalism produced 
characteristics of the “global countryside” in rural Azerbaijan: separation of 
consumption from production, corporate concentration and integration, dependence on 
migration, rise of rural resorts, counter-urbanization-led property investments, 
commodification of nature, spread of the symbols of global consumer culture, social 
polarization, and transformation of political authority.
The connection between consent to neoliberal restructuring and globalization is 
worth elaborating on here. Globalization is inseparable from and is premised upon 
neoliberal restructuring. Questions about the establishment and functioning of 
neoliberal market policies—such as how neoliberal reforms were accepted by and 
adapted to rural Azerbaijan—are simultaneously questions about the lifeblood of 
global commodity chains/production, and global consumption. The ‘big’ questions of 
global transactions, transportations, productions require ‘smaller’ questions of how 
those developments were negotiated, accepted, and enacted by people—questions of 
the establishment of neoliberal marketization and consent to it, central to imaginations 
10
of global change.
History of Neoliberalism in the post-Soviet space
Globalization in the post-socialist space, like elsewhere, entailed 
marketization, but here this meant a fundamental transformation of the social economy 
based on the state command and redistribution system. Opening up to the global 
market here was proposed as a way to eliminate inefficiencies, to better allocate 
resources, and, in the long run, to improve livelihood conditions.
According to advocates of economic liberalism, deregulation of the economy 
would set free the market forces of demand and supply to bring about the most optimal 
distribution of resources in a society. Demand from buyers for a particular product in a 
given context of supply would determine the price. Because buyers would be willing 
to pay more for a product when it is in short supply, their demand would facilitate
increased prices and the entry of new suppliers of the profitable product into the 
market. The increased competition between suppliers would drive the most cost-
effective production and, together with the increased supply of the product, would 
bring the price down until it reached an equilibrium where demand and supply 
balanced. Thus, unhindered market interaction between demand and supply would 
ensure the most efficient distribution of resources in a society, eliminate waste, and 
move the economic power to the buyers. The disempowerment of buyers and the 
inefficiency of a state-regulated economy—two characteristic maladies of state 
socialism—were seen as much in need of this treatment. The economic historian and 
expert on post-socialist transition Anders Aslund wrote in How Capitalism Was Built: 
The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia (2007):
The essence of a market economy is economic freedom—the freedom of trade, 
prices and enterprise. Liberalization transformed a shortage of goods and 
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services to a scarcity of money, which is the predicament of capitalism. The 
sellers’ market became a buyers’ market, transforming economic power from 
producers to consumers. (P. 82)
To function properly, this market mechanism—specifically, its key component, the 
drive for profit—required private property and the rule of law to protect it. So on the 
road to the most efficient system of resource distribution, a corollary to deregulation 
was the replacement of state dictatorships with the rule of law backed by democracy:
Communist dictatorships had to give way to democracy, pluralism, and 
individual freedom, replacing vertical state commands with horizontal market
signals, and public ownership with private property. Communism had rejected 
the very idea of a rule of law, which now had to be established. (Aslund 
2002:2)
Although in theory the political transition to democracy was recognized as the process 
of “replac[ing] vertical state commands with horizontal market signals,” in practice, 
structural changes to the economy instituted private property and market pressures 
well before the establishment of a rule of law. Aslund notes that post-socialist 
reformers were united on the need for marketization. What divided them was the 
question of whether the reforms should be rapid or gradual. Yet, hindering the 
transition to the system of most efficient distribution of resources was not the chosen 
speed of reforms, but the propensity of reformers to utilize the reforms for maximized 
rent-seeking (Aslund 2002). In the context of systemic rent-seeking, market 
deregulation went hand in hand with strict regulation of certain sectors to enrich a 
privileged few. Rent-seeking proved itself to be the most serious and initially 
underappreciated obstacle to economic liberalism in the post-Soviet space, which 
turned into a center of rent-seeking states (Aslund 1996, 2002, 2007).
What this history inadvertently demonstrated is the crucial need of the most 
efficient system of resource distribution for a concomitant ideology—a firm belief in 
the superiority of the market mechanism, knowledge of how it works best, a 
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commitment to maximizing profits only through the market mechanism. The 
establishment of the market system required, apparently, not only deregulation and 
structural reforms, but a change of mind, institutions of the beliefs in the supremacy of 
the market as the channel for maximizing profits.
Hopes for the future of free markets in the post-Soviet states did not wither 
away. Rent-seeking states are still market economies, Aslund contended. Competitive 
market pressures and intense fighting between oligarchs would crowd out rent-seeking 
with time (Aslund 2002). But this very crowding-out would itself require a politically 
substantial commitment to competition over rent-seeking, a change of mind. 
Uzbekistan, under the leadership of a former high-ranking Communist Party official, 
Islam Karimov, for all twenty-three post-Soviet years, has yet to see some signs of the 
crowding-out of rent-seeking by competitive market pressures. In contrast, Azerbaijan, 
which itself topped the charts for rent-seeking and corruption in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States5 until 2004, has indeed seen the encouragement of market 
competition and a channeling of oligarch rivalries to this arena under the nine years of 
leadership by the younger Ilham Aliyev, who openly committed to Western-style 
progress together with his wife, Mehriban Aliyeva.
A history of the rise, spread, and institution of ideological commitment to the 
market in the post-Soviet space is lacking. The change of mind from the Soviet belief 
in a planned economy to a belief in the superiority of market self-regulation was not a 
small thing, nor was it natural or automatic. This change of mindset or its lack, not just 
among the leadership but also among the wider population, powerfully shaped the 
specificities of post-Soviet countries’ integration into the global market.
                                                
5 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS; in Russian Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv, 
SNG) is a regional organiation whose participating countries are former Soviet Republics, with the 
exception of the Baltic states, Turkmenistan, and, after 2009, Georgia.
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One contribution of this dissertation will be showing how marketization in 
post-Soviet Azerbaijan depended on the invitation of the rural population to this 
change of mind and the peculiarities of this process. But, fundamentally, such a 
change of mind was also a change of heart. The market mentality, the profit-
maximizing mentality—a socially, historically cultivated trait in the post-Soviet 
context—entailed a new vision of individual–community relations, one that was both 
individually and collectively destructive.
What the Globalization Story Can and Cannot Tell Us about Azerbaijan
The history of Azerbaijan’s post-Soviet transition has been told as another story of
neoliberal restructuring and globalization. After the consolidation of power by the 
former Soviet high-ranking official Heydar Aliyev in 1994, Azerbaijan’s transition 
was characterized by trade liberalization, privatization, a cutback in social services, 
and a move towards economic reorganization around raw petroleum extraction.
Trade liberalization. The law on Liberalization of External Trade was passed 
in 1994, and Azerbaijan received its first credit from the IMF under the systemic 
transformation facility (STF) in 1995 (Bagirov 2003:226; IMF 1995). To qualify for
this IMF credit, the government had to eliminate the state order system, liberalize the 
trade regime, abolish subsidies on bread, and adjust energy prices towards 
international levels (IMF 1995).
Privatization. The year 1995 was also marked by the ratification of a new
constitution of Azerbaijan that guaranteed the right to own private property. The 
parliament controlled by Aliyev also passed the first legislation on small enterprise 
privatization in that year (Kaser 1997:163). Privatization of medium and large state
enterprises followed right after, and the Land Law was passed on July 16, 1996, which 
created the legal framework for a land market.
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Cutbacks in state expenditures and social services. An important result of the
post-1995 reforms was the virtual abandonment of social protection and welfare 
restructuring. Liberalization measures, and with them the destruction of the former 
social safety net, topped the priority list of the IMF loan conditions. The nation’s pre-
existing social safety net was effectively eliminated through the abolition of subsidies 
and wage compensation and the liberalization of prices. Mere planning of an 
alternative social safety net was to be completed by 1999, so there was no social safety 
net during the reforms (IMF 1995, 1997). Meanwhile, the government was to speed up 
the transition to a market economy, prioritize the development of the country’s oil 
resources, liberalize capital account transactions (ensuring the free transfer of savings 
abroad), and broaden the tax base and improve tax collection rates (IMF 1997). 
“Highest priority” areas, such as “banking reform, [and the] privatization and 
termination of the government’s heavy involvement in production and trade” (IMF 
1996:2), were seen as more urgent than people’s ability to satisfy their basic 
subsistence needs.
From domestic-needs production to oil-exports specialization. The IMF, the 
partner and funder of Azerbaijan’s economic reorganization, insisted on a comparative 
advantage route—specialization in raw-oil extraction—for Azerbaijan’s capitalist 
transition (IMF 1997). Azerbaijan used to be a predominantly agricultural member of
the former USSR (Lerman and Sedik 2010), and a Soviet-era manufacturer of
diversified consumer products (Ayyubov 2003; Hasanov 2003). This country was
transformed into an exclusive raw-oil exporter within 10 years of the post-Soviet 
transition (Figure 1.1).
In the last years of the USSR, Soviet Azerbaijan’s share of oil extraction, 
combined with the production of intermediate inputs and processed petroleum 
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products, accounted for 60% of industrial production6 (Hasanov 2003:164). In 2003, 
after 8 years of “comparative-advantage”-based reforms, the ratio of extraction to all
forms of processing in Azerbaijan had become 80:20 (Hasanov 2003:174). In 2003, 
with 8 years of the systemic transition in progress, the capital city Baku accounted for 
93% of all the taxes collected, while the rest of the country, including big cities like 
Naxchivan, Gence, and Sumqayit, contributed only 7% (Imanov 2003:147).
The share of the oil industry in the economy increased from 16% of GDP in 
1995 to over 50% of GDP in 2006, while agriculture decreased from 25% of GDP in
1995 to less than 10% in 2006 while overall economy was growing (Lerman and 
Sedik 2010:50). The oil industry currently accounts for 70% to 80% of total foreign 
investment and 85% of Azerbaijan’s exports. Oil-related revenues make up nearly 
50% of budget revenues (Bayulgen 2003).
                                                
6 This did not include agricultural production.
16
Figure 1.1. The dynamic of production in the extraction and processing sectors, 
1990–2000. Reprinted, with permission, from Ayyubov (2003:204).
As Azerbaijan became more deeply integrated into the global economy as a 
raw-oil supplier, it was hailed by experts as the “showcase,” and “star performer” of 
the post-socialist transition (Aslund 2007). In terms of its integration into the global
capital networks, Azerbaijan had indeed been a star. Azerbaijan’s ability to attract 
foreign investment into the oil sector had been remarkable. The oil contracts signed by 
Azerbaijan in September 1994 with 33 companies from 15 countries were valued at 60
billion dollars (Bayulgen 2003). Over 4 billion dollars were actually invested in this 
period to start oil exploration and extraction (Bayulgen 2003). The speed and scope of 
Azerbaijan’s attraction of FDI was remarkable in comparison to other resource-rich 
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post-Soviet countries, specifically Russia, which did not attract comparative amounts 
of FDI relative to its size and resources (Bayulgen 2003).7
Despite the praise from international institutions for Azerbaijan’s transition, its 
integration into the global capital networks did not bring widespread prosperity. 
Specialization in the capital-intensive oil industry did not create the jobs promised and 
expected in the IMF–Azerbaijan reform plan (Ayyubov 2003). The period was 
characterized by aggressive policing of contending political orientations, 
incarcerations, gross human rights violations, and governmental control over labor 
unions (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports on Azerbaijan, 
various years). The only independent labor union in the country, the union of oil
workers, was taken over by the government-created Union of Oil and Gas Industry 
Workers without a vote of union membership in 1997 (Icon Group International 
2000:62–63). Unemployment increased, as did regional inequality within Azerbaijan,
while health and education indicators declined (IMF 2000:36–37).8 In 2000, the IMF
officially acknowledged that “existing social safety nets are not effective in keeping 
people out of poverty”9 and declared that “poverty reduction has recently assumed a 
more important position in the reform agenda in Azerbaijan.” Azerbaijan’s 
authoritarian government was underspending in social services, specifically 
                                                
7 Bayulgen argued, “The ratio of FDI to Azerbaijan’s proven oil reserves is 0.57 meaning that for each 
barrel of its proven reserves, Azerbaijan received 57 cents of FDI during this period. For comparative 
purposes this number for Russia is 0.08, seven times less than Azerbaijan’s” (2003:219).
8 These indicators of massive general socio-economic decline provided a curious background for the 
increasing conspicuous consumption of government elites. The poverty of the country grew in parallel 
with the increasing number of high-walled palaces with gardens and artificial waterfalls in and around 
Baku, eye-tickling Versace and Armani stores, and the latest Mercedes models decorating the central 
streets of the capital city. Although not matching the lifestyle of the governing elites, those involved in 
the oil sector also enjoyed increasingly luxurious lifestyles.
9 An example of social protection measures in 2001 was the “monthly basic child allowance” 
amounting to 2 USD per child per month for families with income below 4 USD per month. 
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healthcare, despite sufficient resources and the World Bank’s own urging to spend 
more (World Bank 2005).
Azerbaijan’s integration into the global capital networks has also been argued 
to have come at the expense of long-term political and economic development 
(Bayulgen 2003). The attractive environment for foreign capital was created through a 
special Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) regime, at the expense of important 
political concessions without bringing broad economic benefits.
Azerbaijan’s PSAs gave the contractors “sole and exclusive exploration, 
development and production rights,” a predictable tax liability independent of the 
general tax regime of the state (including protection from future taxes, including 
import-export taxes), and the ability to hold the state liable for the breach of contract 
(Bayulgen 2003:212). Bayulgen (2003) pointed out:
. . . Instead of a generic PSA law, each contract after being ratified by the 
Azerbaijanian parliament assumes the force of law and prevails over any other 
existing or future law whose provisions differ from or are in conflict with the 
contract. . . .
Overall, then, with this PSA regime, the government of Azerbaijan has 
provided contractors with numerous guarantees, including but not limited to: 
exclusivity of rights to the contract area; protection against any infringement 
by the government in the rights and interests of the contractors; the right to full 
and prompt compensation of any right, interest and property of contractors 
expropriated, nationalized or otherwise taken by the Government; 
enforceability of the PSAs according to the terms thereof; obligations of the 
government to provide the contractors with licenses, approvals, visas and with 
any other permissions necessary for the investors to carry out their activities in 
Azerbaijan; and the right of contractors to access onshore construction and 
fabrication facilities, supply bases and all necessary transportation and 
infrastructure facilities. PSAs also stipulate that all rights to sovereign 
immunity are waived by the government. (P. 212, emphasis added)
Azerbaijan was able to offer these terms to the investors, crucially, because its 
authoritarian regime, headed by Aliyev, controlled the parliament, and the State Oil 
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Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) crushed any political opposition and 
precluded the contestation of the terms of the oil contracts (Bayulgen 2003).
Inversely, the inflow of capital enabled by the authoritarian regime reinforced 
the regime by generating significant oil rents to finance it. 10 “Moreover, positive 
reinforcements from the investors regarding the investment policy legitimize the 
importance of the political regime in the eyes of the ruling elite and give them 
incentives to entrench their power even further” (Bayulgen 2003:216). Analyzing this 
situation, Bayulgen (2003) argued that the Azerbaijan case demonstrates a dilemma 
“between short-term goals of integrating into the global networks of capital and the 
long-term goal of political development” (Pp. 209–10).
The peculiar story of Azerbaijan shares many similarities with other 
transitional societies in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Supported by international 
organizations like the IMF and transnational corporations, neoliberal measures—
liberalization, privatization, the shift to export production, and the replacement of the 
state’s regulatory role with market regulation—enable freer movement of capital, 
goods, and services across national boundaries, deepening the global market. 
Accompanied by the flexibilization of production and the informalization of work 
worldwide, the listed processes are seen as parts of an effort to increase/restore 
profitability while shifting the risks and costs from capital to societies and individuals 
(Peterson 2003).
                                                
10 “Aliyev designed tax laws that gave the top echelons of government maximum control over the 
awarding and subsequent distribution of oil rents. Thus the ratification of each PSA allowed the 
government to increase its own leverage over society” (Bayulgen 2003:217).
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The Rural Puzzle
The globalization story describes structural economic and social policy changes in 
Azerbaijan, but does not tell how these changes remaking Azerbaijan as a new 
member of the global economy actually went forward.
Azerbaijan was predominantly an agricultural country under the Soviet regime, 
despite its relatively diversified economy: the share of agriculture in net material 
product (NMP, the equivalent of GDP in socialist national accounts) fluctuated around 
30% (Lerman and Sedik 2010:49). Together with its related food-processing industry, 
agriculture accounted for 40% of NMP (ibid.). Food processing was both the largest 
and fastest-growing industry in Azerbaijan until independence, accounting for 25% of 
industrial production in 1980 and increasing output by 9.4% per year between 1957 
and 1987 (Lerman and Sedik 2010). Agriculture also employed over 40% of 
Azerbaijan’s labor force (World Development Indicators online database).
The dissolution of the USSR disturbed both supply and export channels and 
affected agriculture together with the other sectors of the economy, but the heaviest hit 
to agricultural production came with the market reforms and switch to oil extraction 
after 1995 (Lerman and Sedik 2010:50). Agriculture’s role declined despite 
Azerbaijan’s land reforms, which effectively dismantled the collective and state farm 
system and transferred the land to individual ownership between 1995 and 2006.
While Azerbaijan’s economy has reorganized around raw-oil exports as agreed 
upon with the IMF, agriculture has continued to employ around 40% of Azerbaijan’s 
labor force, whereas the oil industry uses less than 1% of Azerbaijan’s labor force 
(Lerman and Sedik 2010:58). The work of this 40% of Azerbaijan’s labor force, the 
agriculture sector, accounted for 6.1% of the GDP in 2009, less than the contribution 
of the transportation and communication sector (8.7%) and the construction sector 
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(7.2%) to the GDP (The State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan11). With the
neoliberal policies that integrated Azerbaijan into the global economy (liberalization, 
privatization, and specialization), the largest economic sector that provided work and 
livelihoods to nearly half the country’s population was obliterated, and no alternative 
livelihood options were generated by the growing oil sector.
What happened in the countryside? How were changes that nullified 
agriculture, and left the countryside socioeconomically idle, pushed forward rapidly, 
with little resistance or explosive crisis, in a largely agricultural country?
How were these changes negotiated with people? Through which adjustments 
in beliefs and expectations did people who a few short years before protested the 
Soviet government en masse in response to low living standards go on to accept much 
harsher poverty and income uncertainty?
These issues are essential aspects of how Azerbaijan reintegrated into the 
global economy under its IMF partnership terms, as a specialist in oil extraction.
These are questions, essentially, about how globalization proceeded in Azerbaijan.
They are also necessary for understanding rural globalization.
As geographer Michael Woods pointed out: “compared with urban studies of 
globalization there is a lack of place-based research that would allow the disparate 
strands of the literature to be drawn together into a more comprehensive analysis of 
how rural places are remade under globalization” (2007:486). A theoretical 
understanding of rural globalization is still being developed (Woods 2007, McCarthy 
2008). What is needed is research “that might not only adopt an integrated perspective 
in examining the impact of different forms and aspects of globalization in a rural 
locality, but that might also explore precisely how rural places are remade under 
                                                
11 http://www.stat.gov.az
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globalization, and start to account for the different geographies of globalization across 
rural space” (Woods 2007:490).
What Azerbaijan’s story can tell us about rural globalization
This dissertation will show that Azerbaijan’s integration into the global economy as an 
exclusive oil supplier was carried out through a specific set of politico-economic and 
moral negotiations struck in the countryside: rural outmigration; institutional 
corruption, individualization of land, and disintegration of village communities; and 
promises of self-sufficiency and the bounties of the new order.
It will tell us how the free distribution of collective and state farmland and the 
abolition of Soviet-inherited taxes on household production were channeled to hopes 
of self-sufficiency with the system and opened the countryside to the market reforms.
It will tell us how the hopes for individual self-sufficiency and the 
individualization of responsibility for failure came to replace the demands from the 
state for better livelihood conditions.
It will tell us how the loss of opportunities for sustainable/profitable 
engagement in agriculture was channeled to massive outmigration in order to release 
social tension in the country. It will tell us how imaginaries of “modern” life were 
essential to this process, which supplied rural migrant workers to Azerbaijan’s own 
capital city in order to staff the booming construction, trades, and services sectors of 
the new oil economy.
It will tell us how land reforms broke down village communities, 
individualizing the discontent with the system.
In this way, rural livelihoods in Azerbaijan will tell us a bit about 
globalization. They will tell not only of how rural space was reconstituted with the 
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advent of the neoliberal market structures, but how the very establishment of the 
neoliberal market relations were premised upon the specifics of very local processes, 
notably a multi-dimensional coaxing into individualism, local reactions to it, and 
ensuing community disintegration and moral transformation.
I will show how underlying the success of the neoliberal transition in 
Azerbaijan are deliberations about the purpose and role of a human in relation to 
society/community. This purpose and role of the individual in relation to society has 
been redefined from service to community to service of self (interpreted as both 
individualistic profit maximization and seeking comforts/consumerism) with 
deliberate discursive change and coaxing by the government, but also with the 
communally destructive effects of the acts of those who hurried to jump on the “serve-
yourself: your-efforts-are-the limit” bandwagon. I will demonstrate how the 
dissolution of rural communities owing to individualistic self-seeking opened up rural 
commons to land manipulation by Azerbaijan’s new oligarchs, and rendered these 
communities unable to address massive private plundering of rural infrastructure. I 
will also show how rural migration was both a plunging of the masses into the ideals 
of self-service through fierce labor competition in the city inducing means-to-end 
rationality and through lures of consumption possibilities, as well as a channel through 
which market rationality traveled to remote rural areas through the migrants. In sum, 
consent to globalization in Azerbaijan entailed a massive moral transformation. 
This moral transformation was characterized not so much by explicit support 
of the market institutions as by paralyzing indecisiveness about them induced by 
large-scale subscription to the idea that the purpose and role of an individual was 
above all service to one’s own “interest”—comforts—and that one’s worth was 
defined by the results of striving for this goal. The subscription fundamentally 
24
legitimized the workings of a very fierce form of market-justified appropriation 
marking post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s integration into the global economy.
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CHAPTER 2:
ON METHODOLOGY AND SITES
Local Livelihoods—Forgotten Explanation Points for Globalization
Livelihoods are the site at which the global, the national, and the local come 
together. Livelihoods are the birthplace of simultaneously laborers, consumers, and
citizens/subjects of the state. In the conditions of livelihoods is the key to both the fuel 
of the global economy (docile laborers and ardent consumers) and its political pillar—
consent to the global economy. Given conditions of local livelihoods must be and are 
taken into account by both the state and transnational actors. Livelihoods are where 
the local becomes more of a global, and the global becomes more of a local.
Using livelihoods as a starting point of inquiry into the changes associated with 
globalization, it is easier not to lose the sight and role of the state. For example, at the
level of livelihoods, financial austerity, seen as an IMF imposition in the globalization 
story, is experienced as the state’s cutback, the state’s financial policy, no matter how 
high the popular awareness of the IMF’s role. Looking at changing conditions of 
livelihoods can provide crucial insight into how larger hierarchies, such as 
globalization, are built and ascended to12.
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The idea of using local livelihoods as a prism into larger hierarchies is not new. For 
instance, key concepts of what is conventionally viewed today as the formal economy—such as profit 
and cost of production—were analyzed together with reproduction of labor, with the historical 
conditions of livelihoods by classical economists David Ricardo and Adam Smith. Picchio (1992), who 
examined Smith’s and Ricardo’s work on this matter, reminded us that surplus, a key concept for 
analyses of profit and wealth (and for Marx, also power), had been defined as the difference between 
production and the costs necessary for production, mainly laborers’ subsistence (P. 133). The cost of 
laborers’ subsistence, in turn, is tied to channels and arrangements for procuring everyday subsistence 
and biological reproduction, but also what is viewed as necessary for its living by the population. 
Ricardo, for example, viewed “general habits and tastes of the laboring population” as central to 
determining the price of labor (Picchio 1992:17).
Like Ricardo and Smith, another classical scholar, Karl Marx, did not disdain the conditions of 
local livelihoods for understanding larger events and hierarchies. The conditions of livelihoods of 
French peasants, their hopes and aspirations, were a central element of Marx’s explanation of the re-
establishment of the Second French Empire by Napoleon III (“The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte”).
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With this said, the organization of labor’s reproduction (livelihoods), including 
what is considered necessary for maintaining livelihoods in a particular historical 
space, how the work of livelihood-making is performed and by whom, are not “just” 
“local” matters, subordinate to the larger “real” economy of global forces and national 
management. Instead, these are issues through the negotiation and manipulation of 
which the hierarchies of surplus appropriation and power are built.13
Studying changes in local livelihoods historically and how these changes are 
negotiated can reveal the building blocks of a larger hierarchy such as the global 
economy, at the intersection of local, national, and global actors. A study of the 
negotiations of changes in local livelihoods between the state and local communities 
can demonstrate how globalization, in essence, proceeds.
Searching for Answers
The field research leading to this dissertation evolved around two questions: (1) how 
livelihoods, and beliefs and expectations about livelihoods, have changed with 
Azerbaijan’s market reforms and independent reintegration into the global economy; 
and (2) how these changes were envisioned, negotiated, and conditioned by state 
bodies and policies.
Livelihoods are best learned about from those who actually live them. The 
questions motivating this study concerned the changes of the last 20 years, so I had a 
                                                                                                                                            
13 Feminist scholars have built on this line of argument: If power relationships in a society are 
structured through the mechanisms of surplus extraction, if surplus is the difference between production 
and the costs of production, mainly the costs of subsistence and reproduction of human labor, then what 
has been called “the work of maintaining existing life and reproducing the next generation” (Laslett and 
Brenner 1989), or the “fleshy, messy and indeterminate stuff of everyday life” (Katz 2001:711)—how it 
is done and by whom—is not a subsidiary attachment to the theories of power and wealth in a society, 
but an integral component of it.
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chance to have access to the generation living the change. Therefore, interviews with
rural residents, and with state representatives involved in the rural reorganization, 
suggested themselves as a unique source of data. I sought to hear about the 
transformation of rural livelihoods from two viewpoints: that of rural laborers and that 
of the makers and implementers of rural reforms.
In this chapter, I outline the reasoning behind choosing interviewees and 
organizing the interviews in order to gather fruitful data. Then I discuss the selection 
of the sites, as general economic regions from the map of Azerbaijan and as specific 
villages in each chosen economic region. I describe the specificities of the livelihood 
and the actual flow of interviews in the chosen villages. I conclude with a description 
of the post-interview data analysis.
Interviews with Rural Laborers
When it came to interviewing those who had to earn livelihoods in Azerbaijan’s 
countryside in the last 20 years, the question was “Whom to interview?” Rural 
communities are not homogenous. Soviet rural collectives were composed of 
collective farm managers and laborers, Communist Party activists and non-activists, 
men and women, and more, depending how one looks at it. A person’s experience of 
social reality is always from her place in the social hierarchy. So how could I go about 
acquiring an enhanced understanding through the interviews?
Nancy Hartsock argued in her book Money, Sex, and Power: Toward Feminist 
Historical Materialism that those at the bottom have a more direct experience of how 
subordination, exploitation, and other forms of power work in their society. Thus, for 
example, it would be harder for a worker in a capitalist society to see that society only
in terms of demand, supply, and competition. These terms (supply, demand, and 
competition) would suffice to a much greater degree for a middle-level entrepreneur as 
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a description of the social reality in which his work and life takes place. A woman 
would add to the mainstream understanding of social reality (say, of demand, supply, 
competition, inequalities of wage relation) her experience of gender hierarchies. In 
Hartsock’s view, the experience of those at the bottom of the social hierarchy could be
looked to for a more complete understanding of the power structures of society. This 
does not mean that those at the bottom of a social hierarchy have an all-encompassing, 
clear, comprehensive view of its structures of domination, but that they experience the 
weight of those structures in their daily lives, and that this experience will imbue their 
narrative of social reality. Appreciating this insight, I wanted to gather my data on 
rural transition from those at the bottom of social hierarchy, so that I could hope to not 
lose sight of the social inequalities as experienced and expressed by the interviewees
in my final narrative. I decided to ask about the post-Soviet changes in rural 
livelihoods first of rural women, who had been ordinary laborers on the Soviet-era
collective farms.
The gendered division of labor—both in industry and in households—has been 
pivotal to Soviet accumulation, with effects stretching well into the post-Soviet period.
The Soviet state viewed women as perfect for tedious, manual, and unskilled work, 
while pushing their mass entry into the labor force. Women were seen as less 
pretentious, more docile, more disciplined laborers (less likely to have problems with 
alcoholism) than men. Thus, in using women as cheap and more disciplined labor in 
the basic consumer goods industry (agriculture, food processing, textiles), the Soviet 
state extracted surplus from consumer goods production to re-invest in the military-
industrial complex (Filtzer 1996; Zhurzhenko 2001a, 2001b). This re-direction of 
surplus resulted in the continuously labor-intensive nature and low development level 
of the basic consumer goods industry. The underdevelopment of the consumer goods 
production translated into the extremely labor-intensive nature of household work—
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the sole responsibility of women—requiring 6 to 7 hours a day on average across the 
USSR (Zhurzhenko 2001a, 2001b). The problem was exacerbated even more in rural 
Azerbaijan after the USSR’s fall, because the shortage of drinking water and problems 
with running water in the post-Soviet period added even more hours to daily 
housework—just to getting the water necessary for household work (Sabi 1999).
The gender ideology supporting the exclusive responsibility of women for 
household work was tacitly accepted and supported by the state (Marody and Giza-
Poleszczuk 2000; Gal and Kligman 2000; Heyat 2002). Special benefits and privileges 
provided by the Soviet state were not directed to all women rewarding their household 
work, but were directed specifically to working mothers, explicitly acknowledging, 
praising, and supporting the biological reproduction role of women through generous 
maternity and childcare benefits (Marody and Giza-Poleszczuk 2000; Gal and 
Kligman 2000; Heyat 2002; Zhurzhenko 2004). Women’s place in the Soviet social
hierarchy was thus interesting: their “glorious duty” was highly praised in the official 
Soviet media, while they worked more and were assigned to the unpaid, least-paying, 
and least prestigious jobs in the USSR.
The breakup of the USSR removed the value-giving “glorious duty” aspect of 
women’s work while keeping them solely responsible for housekeeping. What 
women’s work inside and outside the house now meant for post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s 
rural economies I was to discover. I wanted my data on post-Soviet rural livelihoods to 
be substantially based on the narratives of women manual laborers of former state and 
collective farms.
Looking for interviewees
My strategy to enter the field revolved around the season. This research was 
conducted during the summer months, and it is not unusual in the summer in 
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Azerbaijan for city dwellers to visit rural regions and to randomly ask in a village for 
families who are renting out a part of their house—a private room or a floor of the 
house, depending on the construction specificities. In each of my rural research sites 
(see “Choosing Sites”), I stayed with a family renting out a room to summer visitors. I 
located such families and houses not randomly (by just visiting the village and asking 
the first person I met), however, but through acquaintances in Baku who either had 
grown up in the area or had relatives and/or close friends who knew the area. I 
introduced my research to the family that hosted me, or to the neighbors during our 
first acquaintance. I explained that I study how women’s lives in the rural areas have
changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that I sought to interview women 
who worked for the collective and state farms, specifically in the fields, during the 
USSR era. Because I had been introduced by someone the hosts had had a relationship 
with for some, I was treated less as a complete stranger and more as someone who had 
been “entrusted” to them for help.
The hosts and the neighbors usually turned out to be my first interviewees. 
They also introduced me to other women they knew (neighbors, relatives, 
acquaintances) who had also been kolkhoz/sovkhoz14 workers. Sometimes they took 
me to village gatherings (a baby shower or an all-female evening tea party) where I 
could meet more interviewees.
Occasionally, a woman interviewee asked me to interview her husband for a 
more “exact timeline” and for an insider’s view of the village’s stance on certain 
transition policies. During my research I interviewed two such men.
                                                
14 Kolkhoz—Soviet collective farm; Sovkhoz—Soviet state farm. Plurals are kolkhozy, and sovkhozy, 
accordingly. Kolkhoz was the shortened version of kollektivnoe khozaystvo, meaning collective farm or 
collective economy in Russian. Sovkhoz was the shortened version of Sovetskoe khozaystvo, Soviet 
farm in Russian. Kolkhozy and sovkhozy were the two components of the socialized farm sector in the 
USSR.
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This sampling method carried some characteristics of a snowball sampling, 
whereby one person—my host in a given village—connects the interviewer to other 
interviewees. But the sampling was at the same time targeted, since the profile of the 
interviewees sought was middle-aged and older women who had worked as lay 
laborers under the collective farming system and who were mature adults (25 and 
older) in 1991, at the time of the USSR’s fall.
Interviews with State Officials
I sought to interview state officials about how they planned the rural livelihood 
changes, what they wanted to achieve with their policies. These interviews were 
planned to illuminate the rural livelihoods as processes and belief systems negotiated 
at the intersection of the global, the national, and the local. The state is an 
irreplaceable target for inquiry here, as it tries to manage both the imperatives of 
participating in the global economy and the pressures of governing the local. During 
the Soviet period, the local communities were to an important degree shielded from 
the direct experience of the global. During the post-Soviet period, these communities 
were “globalized” through the medium of the state. These communities’ participation 
in and experience of global flows and structures were shaped by the state’s policies 
molding the post-Soviet period.
Probably the pivotal state organization in the transformation of rural 
livelihoods in Azerbaijan was the State Committee for Land (SCL), which was 
overwhelmingly in charge of both planning and implementing the land reforms. The 
chair of the SCL, Garib Mammadov, who has headed the reforms under President 
Aliyev since 1995, is also a member of both Azerbaijan’s Parliament and the 
Academy of Sciences. He was approached for an interview to represent a view of the 
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rural transformation and land reforms from both policy drafting and implementation 
vantage points at the top level. He agreed to be interviewed.
I also interviewed a number of researchers and administrators at the SCL.15
These interviews were very valuable. They illuminated the process of thinking and 
action characterizing the implementation of the land reforms from SCL’s Baku office 
through SCL’s regional/rural offices to the individual officers’ demarcation and 
distribution of the land plots in the villages.
Another key state actor in Azerbaijan’s rural reforms are the local executive 
governments. Local executive offices are representative organs of the state’s executive 
branch sub-centralized at rural centers. For example, SCL officers always had to work 
in coordination with the local executive offices. Moreover, while the SCL’s 
responsibility was only the division and distribution of formerly collective and state 
lands, local executive offices have been in charge of governing the rural areas in the 
broader sense. The latter’s concerns encompassed the general social situation in the 
rural areas, including employment and available livelihood options, and local security, 
that is, the police. Local executives are direct representatives of the state’s executive 
apparatus, and are directly accountable to the president. As mentioned above, I sought 
to interview the head of the local executive government and officers at different levels 
of the local executive government in each of the sites. In the section “Choosing Sites” 
I explain in more detail the results of my search for the narratives of rural local 
executives on the rural transformation.
Interviews with the state officials promised to show how changes in rural 
livelihoods in the midst of economic reforms were imagined and negotiated at the 
intersection of the global economy and local control considerations. Interviews in the 
                                                
15 Some of these interviewees requested anonymity. For this reason, the number and names of SCL 
interviewees are not disclosed here.
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rural communities can show the other side of how these negotiations and changes 
proceeded.
Open-Ended Questions
I attempted to gather narrative histories of the last 20 years from villagers and the state 
officials to compare and contrast.
The interviews with rural women were organized around three open-ended 
questions. I asked them (a) about themselves, their families, and how they earned a 
living; (b) how they earned a living during the Soviet period; and (c) how they came 
from their Soviet occupation to their current situation. This structure was intended to 
build the history of the passage from the Soviet period to the current.
I found myself using two prompt questions in interview after interview within 
the above structure.
The first was the question of land. These interviews were taking place after the 
completion of what is regarded as the most successful land decollectivization process 
in the former USSR. The lands of the former collective and state farms had been 
divided among the rural population, and all of the interviewees should have received 
their land shares. (They indeed had.) Yet not one interviewee mentioned this land 
when talking about how they make a living. I had to ask about the land shares: I asked 
if they had received their share, and what they did with it. At this point they 
remembered that they had this land and then shared how they did or did not use their 
land shares. These land shares were not regarded as central to their livelihoods, but 
talking about how this had become so provided some of the most valuable insights 
into this dissertation’s subject area.
The second prompt question I found myself asking was about the relationship 
with the state. When interviewees described the difficulties of the early transition 
34
period (which was a universal experience), I asked them whether they addressed their 
grievances to the government. When interviewees described the outmigration of their 
close male family members, I asked whether the government had done anything to 
prevent their migrating. These prompts solicited invaluable information on the beliefs 
about the nature of the state, community organization and the role of women in it, and 
the perceived location of responsibility for difficulties in making ends meet.
The interviews with state officials were organized around open-ended 
questions as well. I began the interviews by saying that I was trying to understand the 
agrarian change in Azerbaijan after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and how rural 
populations’, specifically women’s, lives have changed since the dismantling of the 
collective farm system. I asked the interviewees to tell me about their experiences with 
the transition tasks, what they intended to accomplish, and how these goals were 
reached.
This opening invariably solicited a lengthy description of the state of the 
country and economy, after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the failure of the 
early independent governments (when the Heydar Aliyev regime had just come to 
power), and a listing of the tasks accomplished. The opening also seemed to relax the 
interviewees, who, with just one exception, had met me with a noticeable reserve, 
uneasiness, and distrust. My interpretation of this initial distrust is that they were 
expecting an inquiry into the corruption and the authoritarian methods that 
Azerbaijan’s government is infamous for.16 They were prepared for a confrontation 
until the tone of the discussion was set by the open-ended question about “livelihood 
changes,” “dismantling of collective farms,” “agriculture,” and “women.” It is 
important to note here that Azerbaijan’s government officials, like most women with 
                                                
16 Rasizade (2002) has even called corruption an institutional feature of the Aliyev government in 
Azerbaijan. 
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whom I talked, viewed “livelihood changes,” “dismantling of collective farms,” 
“agriculture,” and, especially, “women issues” as non-political, safe matters, and 
hurried to share their experiences, memories, and opinions. Yet for me, there was a 
wealth to be learned from these “non-political” discussions.
The second question I asked the government officials was “What were the 
difficulties that you faced in the implementation of the reforms in your duty as . . . 
regarding agrarian change/etc.?” and “How did you overcome these obstacles and
successfully complete the reforms?” These probably were the most useful questions in 
the government interviews. This brought up a wealth of information without pressure, 
including information pertaining to corruption and political control, for example, when 
a lower-level officer recalled villagers’ negative reactions to him because of their
misgivings towards the person holding his position before him, or when an 
interviewee complained of the behaviour of another state organization’s official during 
the reform process. Officials talked of villages where residents resisted reforms with 
rakes; of predecessors who changed positions because of the inability to deal with the 
villagers’ claims; of the need to be simultaneously diplomatic, soft, and firm to push 
the reforms forward; of the importance of having good communication with the top 
leadership and knowing that one’s actions are backed up by the top, and more.
Side by Side with the Interviews
I supplemented interviews with materials from statistical and secondary reports, trying 
to see individual stories in the larger picture. I collected statistical reports from the 
State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, and also used the multitude of tables they 
have made available online. I consulted journalistic accounts, research, articles, and 
non-profit reports pertinent to Azerbaijan’s post-Soviet rural transformation, accessing 
the materials in Azeri through the central M. F. Axundov library in Baku city.
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Choosing Sites
To seek answers to the posed questions I chose two areas of Azerbaijan, the Lenkeran-
Lerik and Shamakhy regions, with quite different geographies and types of 
agricultural activity. This was for comparative reasons.
Lenkeran is the most densely populated rural area in the country, and the land 
shares distributed per person during the reforms are the smallest in the country here.
Bordering Iran in the south, Lenkeran has a humid, subtropical climate conducive to 
the growth of citrus fruits, tea, and warmth-loving garden vegetables like tomatoes and 
cucumbers. Indeed, it was supplying the USSR with these crops prior to independence. 
Since independence, trade with Iran and Russia also figures large in the region’s 
economy.
In the Shamakhy region, the amount of land distributed per person was the 
national average. Shamakhy is also located in the central, Shirvan area of the republic. 
It has been the capital of historical states in Azerbaijan (Shirvanshah, Agqoyunlu, 
Qaraqoyunlu dynasties) for 1,007 years, and figured widely in the works of Azeri 
poets and writers from the Middle Ages to the 20th century.
Why Lenkeran and Shamakhy? I wondered how differently my questions 
would be answered in the most densely populated rural area of Azerbaijan (Lenkeran) 
and in the region representing the center, median, average of rural Azerbaijan 
(Shamakhy) in terms of both its land-share size per person and its geography. I hoped 
that the commonalities observed in such different locations would be more likely to be 
found elsewhere. For the same reason, within each of these rural administrative and 
socio-geographic districts (Lenkeran-Lerik and Shamakhy), I sought to visit villages 
organized around different livelihood strategies.
37
Local Governments in Lenkeran and Shamakhy
In Shamakhy, the head of the local executive office himself agreed to be interviewed. 
The interview with him lasted over one hour, and he also instructed the lower-level 
officials in Shamakhy’s executive government to assist me with any questions I might 
have. I interviewed two of these officials, and one was the guide through whom I 
learned about and visited a large private grape plantation in Shamakhy. I also 
interviewed the general manager of a large grape field in Village 1, as well as the 
field’s three male workers. I interviewed one man, a former schoolteacher in Village 
2.
Because of the local government’s open approach to my research, I could stay 
and research in more villages in Shamakhy than in Lenkeran. In Lenkeran, I was not 
able to get an interview from the local executive government or to receive an official 
“go-ahead” for my research. Because of the common knowledge of tight government
watch over “idea-transfers” in rural Azerbaijan and the rural local governments’ 
mistrust of “outside visitors asking questions and stirring rural populations,” I did not 
risk traveling to more than two villages in Lenkeran.
Villages in Lenkeran. In July 2009 I lived in and interviewed women in two 
villages in the south Lenkeran and Lerik regions of Azerbaijan. The villages where I 
conducted my study were very different. Village 1 had about 7,000 inhabitants, was 
about 15 kilometers from the central town of the region, and was very close to a state 
highway. Trade—within the region, with the capital city, and with Iran—was 
important to the livelihoods of this village’s inhabitants. Village 2 was high in the 
mountains and had about 40 households and about 180 inhabitants. The roads leading 
to it were mountain roads of small stones, more passable on foot or on animals than by 
car. The roads rendered the village almost completely isolated from outside contact in 
the winter months. Correspondingly, the surrounding forests, gathering nuts, and fruits 
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and cultivating for subsistence were especially important to the livelihoods in this 
village.
I interviewed 22 persons in Village 1 (7,000 inhabitants) and 3 persons in 
Village 2 (about 60 inhabitants) in Lenkeran-Lerik. All of these informants were 
women, except for one man in Village 2. He was referred to me by one of the women 
respondents (he was her husband), to clarify dates and provide more details on 
responses to the reforms. The discussions with women took place in the absence of 
men.
Villages in Shamakhy. Shamakhy’s territory can be divided into two parts: the 
dry plains that one enters when driving from Baku, and the mountains that follow the 
plains. The mountains are very scenic, and the air is not humid. According to local 
narratives, in the Soviet period some pediatricians brought children with certain 
respiratory diseases for a stay in the mountainous part of Shamakhy as part of their 
treatment. In the post-Soviet period, with the accumulation and concentration of 
wealth in Baku, these mountains of Shamakhy posed an attractive recreation area for 
the new wealthy. The construction of villas followed. As narrated by the locals 
residing in the mountainous areas, and confirmed by the representatives of 
Shamakhy’s executive government, “all of the high level officials have villas in [the 
mountainous area of] Shamakhy.” This includes the current president, Ilham Aliyev, 
whose residence erected at the top of one of the higher mountains is visible from miles 
away and is pointed out by local residents.
The “discovery” of upper Shamakhy as a recreation area was not confined to 
the ministers and the president but also encompassed the new upper-middle class from 
Baku—department heads at government ministries, university rectors, hospital heads, 
restaurant and mall owners, and so on. Those who could afford to, purchased land in 
upper Shamakhy to build their own villas. Others a bit lower on the income scale 
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frequented the region in the summer months, renting houses, often from the locals 
themselves, who moved to their basements for the summer. The flow and interest from 
moneyed Baku drove the land prices sky-high in the upper Shamakhy region, 
especially in contrast to the region’s very own roadside dry plains. One “sot”17 of land 
was valued between 10,000 and 12,000 USD in the upper Shamakhy and cost just 200 
USD in the lower Shamakhy’s villages.
In Soviet times, prior to Gorbachev, the lower Shamakhy region specialized in 
grape production and boasted of the large State Farm Number 6, which oversaw the 
collection of grapes from the region, and a wine factory. However, as a part of
Gorbachev’s anti-alcoholism crusade, hundreds of hectares of grape fields were cut 
down completely. This brought the entire region, but especially lower Shamakhy and 
its population, face-to-face with a radical change in their work and livelihoods. After 
the early 2000s, when recreational tourism and summer residences hugged upper 
Shamakhy, nothing much in terms of a new economic niche had happened in lower 
Shamakhy. In 2007, three grape fields were started from scratch in lower Shamakhy, 
“facilitated by the central government’s interest in rejuvenating the region” and 
“funded and owned by individuals,” according to the local manager of one of the 
enterprises. This did not mean a comprehensive change in lower Shamakhy’s 
economy, though, but it provided the populations of a few lower villages with seasonal 
local employment.
I asked my research questions in four villages, moving from lower Shamakhy
to upper Shamakhy.
                                                
17 “Sot” or “sotka” is a name for are, a metric area measure, used in common language throughout the 
post-Soviet space. One “sot,” or 1 are, is equal to 100 square meters. “Sotka” derives from “hundred” in 
Russian.One sot is 1/100th of 1 hectare. 1 hectare = 10,000 square meters.
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Village 1 was in lower Shamakhy, Village 2 fell somewhere in between, 
Village 3 was in the lush and well-connected part of upper Shamakhy, and Village 4 
was high in the mountains in upper Shamakhy, and had a very bad, washed-up road 
connection.
Village 1 comprised about 50 households, was one of the most active 
collectives of the former State Farm Number 6, and was near one of the new grape 
fields. Grapes were the life work of this village’s residents in Soviet times. About their 
life and work in the post-Soviet period you will learn more below.
Village 2 comprised 42 households, and the residents here also remembered 
State Farm Number 6 with a yearning for the past. What distinguishes this village is its
history as a rural social services center. This small village has a kindergarten, a health 
clinic, and elementary, middle, and high schools. The kindergarten, school, and clinic 
continue to function as state entities, although serving a much smaller clientele than in 
the Soviet period. These organizations are an important part of the livelihood 
strategies in this village. Over half the households have members who are either 
employed at one of these social service centers or receiving pensions for past work 
there.
Village 3 is in the heart of upper Shamakhy. Boasting all the beauty of 
mountain scenes, it is also conveniently located close to the regional roads. A rare 
occurrence in the region, the village has natural gas and electricity. In this village, 
where 1,000 to 1,500 people reside in the summer, only about 180 people are native 
residents. The rest are “Dachniki,” or summer residents, as locals name seasonal 
residents (of both owning and renting varieties). Rents as well as groceries are more 
expensive than in the capital city of Baku, and the local store carries foodstuffs and 
delicatessen items that are hard to find even in the regional center—Shamakhy town 
itself.
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Village 4 is high in the mountains with washed-up roads. It is only five miles 
from Village 3, but it takes a 20-minute drive in an SUV to get from Village 3 to 
Village 4. The village comprises around 40 households. It was famous in the Soviet 
period for its blacksmiths and carpet weavers. The road leading to the village is 
covered by water in the rainy season, and the village badly needs a bridge. Rain and 
snow effectively isolate the village, and, as its residents say, “there are no comers and 
goers for 8 months a year.”
I interviewed seven women in Village 1, five in Village 2, five in Village 3, 
and five in Village 4. All women represented different households.
Table 2.1. The Proportion of Interviewed Households to the Total Number of 
Households in Each Village
Village 
Total no. of 
households
No. of women 
interviewed
Percentage of total no. of 
households represented 
among interviewed
S1 50 7 14
S2 42 5 12
S3 55 5 9
S4r* 18 5 28
L1 1,000 22 2.2
L2r* 12 2 17
Note. S = Shamakhy village; L = Lenkeran-Lerik village; r* = remote mountain village.
In summary, I conducted in-depth interviews with 22 women from four villages in 
Shamakhy and with 26 women from two villages in Lenkeran-Lerik.
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Although the number of interviews is not large, these numbers should be put in 
the context of the purpose and nature of the research project. While “the aesthetic 
thrust of sampling in qualitative research is that small is beautiful,” sampling in 
qualitative research, like in quantitative research, should be commensurate with the 
purpose of the study and with the nature of the information sought (Sandelowski 
1995:180). The purpose of the interviews was not to produce a statistical 
generalization of rural Azerbaijan, but to capture description-rich accounts of 
transition livelihood strategies and adaptations from socioeconomically distinct rural 
locales that could provide pointers for historical commonalities and guide a historical 
analysis of post-Soviet rural transformation. Open-coding interviews the same day I 
conducted them, I would decide to move on to a different village when I judged the
information collected to be rich and sufficient enough to sustain a comparative 
analysis with that from other villagers.
The chronological order of my interviews in these different villages will 
explicate the number of interviewees further: The very first rural site where I 
commenced data collection was the large Lenkeran village, L1 in Table 2.1. Here I 
started my coding for the first time, trying to identify in general concerns, issues, and 
themes in the descriptions of particular life events and situations. As Table 2.1 shows,
this village was where I conducted by far the greatest number of interviews. Here my 
ability to draw connections between the specific parts of the specific stories and the 
general concerns and themes was just beginning to be practiced, and my belief in 
having collected valuable, transferable information took time to develop. After the 
fifteenth in-depth interview here, however, I was more and more confident in that I 
was discerning certain commonalities, and after the twenty-second interview I decided 
to move on to the next locale with a feeling that the last two interviews added little 
valuable newness to the list of themes already identified. After this experience, in each 
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of the following sites I acquired twin feelings of (1) having obtained valuable 
information and description to be used comparatively in the next stages of research, 
and (2) hearing repetitions with much fewer in-depth interviews. The exception was 
the remote mountain village in Lenkeran, L2r* in Table 2.1, which I had to leave after 
interviewing two women because rumors spread in the village that I was collecting the 
information to submit to the government, and I did not want to conduct interviews in 
an atmosphere of perceived fear and role-playing.
Fieldnotes, Coding, and Data Analysis
I took shorthand fieldnotes during each of the interviews. Later the same day, while 
comparing these notes with the voice-recorded interviews, I produced extended 
fieldnote summaries of each interview. These extended fieldnotes were used for 
coding. Coding is the analytic processing of fieldnotes whereby the fieldworker 
attempts to capture general theoretical issues, aspects of particular events or situations 
(Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). I analyzed interview findings in three stages: open 
coding, theme selection, and focused coding. In the first stage I read the interview 
record, trying not to see it through the lens of my existing theoretical baggage, but 
instead using it to identify as many issues that could serve as a basis for categorization 
on their own. With each interview I tried to, first, code it with an open mind, and then 
compare it with the coding of the previous interview(s) for commonalities—this was 
how I identified themes for further analysis. Gradually, the following themes solidified 
in the women’s descriptions of post-Soviet livelihoods: “outmigration,” “resentment 
for lost community unity/ ‘people have become selfish,’” and “land shares don’t mean 
much for the household income.” These themes formed the basis both for the focused 
coding, where I went through the interviews again specifically trying to understand 
these themes better, and for my secondary data search, with which I tried to locate the 
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interview findings in the bigger picture in relation to historical statistics and 
journalistic, economic, or social reports of the phenomena. As a result of this 
sequence, the changing relationship to land shares, community disintegration, and 
outmigration came to form the topics of the three substantive chapters in this 
dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3:
HOPES
In this chapter I will show how hopes in the bounties of the market system were 
crucial to the introduction and consolidation of the new order’s structures. In 
Azerbaijan, hopes that the new regulations would bring greater economic freedom and 
prosperity, supported by the official statements that the old system was bankrupt, that 
the new system is the only workable system, have prompted lay villagers to try the 
new structures of the market economy. Alas, instead of self-sufficiency has come the 
instability of dependency on the market. But crucially, the responsibility for lost
dreams was individualized in this process, while the new relations solidified as the 
building blocks of the new economy.
Selling Hopes
Igniting hopes in the bounties of the new order, and presenting the restructuring as a 
step into the abundance of unseen opportunities, was a strategic tactic of Heydar 
Aliyev’s reform government. These efforts and their eventual success were crucial in 
opening up the countryside to the reforms.
Before even attempting to announce the rural reforms, President H. Aliyev
abolished Soviet-era taxation on individual household production for rural residents. 
The sparking of the hopes can be traced back to the effects of this decree, one of the 
first President H. Aliyev signed after taking office. The tax abolition came as an 
immediate relief and symbolically strategic announcement after decades of the burden 
of Soviet taxation on household production. In the Soviet period, a peasant’s “private 
production”—backyard produce, products of household dairy animals such as chicken 
and goats—had been kept under close check so as not to exceed a certain quota. 
Excesses were confiscated. An interviewee tried to explain how much this tax 
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exemption meant at the time by describing the yoke of the Soviet taxation system that 
preceded it:
They would come and demand money. One time I was so angry I said to the 
collector, “Why should I pay you?” The year had been good and these grape 
wines (showing the grape wine canopy over the small front yard bench and 
table) were heavy with fruit. He [the collector—S.R.] showed me the wines 
and said, “Don’t you see how much you have here?” Out of frustration I took 
the axe and cut the green, not-yet-ripe grape clusters down. I stomped on the 
fruit, destroyed it with the axe right in front of his eyes. “Here it is,” I said. “I 
don’t have anymore. If I don’t have it, you can’t have it.”
The ceiling and close watch on the “private” household production of rural residents 
was one of the key, unspoken, often unrealized grievances of the rural population 
against the Soviet regime in general, irrespective of a given locale’s relationship with 
a specific kolkhoz/sovkhoz manager or local government head. The exemption of the 
rural population from all taxes18 in this historical context was very significant. By 
freeing the rural population of all taxes soon after he took office, Heydar Aliyev had 
significantly softened rural laborers towards the upcoming land reforms, had created 
goodwill towards the role and intentions of the government regarding the countryside, 
and was probably pivotal in igniting hopes in the possibilities of unfettered private 
land use. Hostility was turned into curiosity about what was to come.
As a next step, soon after the exemption, President Aliyev ordered the 
organizing of nationwide conferences to discuss market reforms in general, and 
agrarian and land reforms in particular. These consultation conferences (mushavire) 
were the signature mark of Aliyev’s navigation through the difficult early 1990s: 
Aliyev had been invited to take the leading position in the government by the then-
president Elchibey in May–June of 1993 to stabilize the political volatility shaking the
                                                
18 Except the land tax, which is minimal, and which was not immediate at that time anyways. It was not 
going to be implemented until after the land had been distributed.
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state. Before the end of 1993, H. Aliyev had already held three nationwide 
consultation conferences dedicated to finance and trade, the socio-economic 
challenges facing the country, and the wheat supply problem and banking, 
respectively.19 In 1994 President Aliyev had held 12 nationwide consultation 
conferences: one devoted to the discussion of establishing private property, two on the 
social protection of the population, three on questions of the economy and government 
operations in general, and six on agrarian issues and reforms. By 1995 President 
Aliyev had established a functioning National Assembly and Cabinet, yet he continued 
holding nationwide discussion/consultation conferences. In 1995 President Aliyev had 
held four nationwide consultation conferences, two of them devoted to the issues of 
agrarian change, and two to customs regulations and privatization, respectively. Of the 
four consultation conferences held in 1996, three were devoted to agrarian change 
specifically, and one to privatization.
In his opening speeches for these discussions, President Aliyev stressed that 
the collective and state farming system was bankrupt, that it had been built on violence 
and the bloody dispossession of peasants in the 1930s. As a former Communist leader, 
he emphasized that he was not a part of the building of that system, but was a leader of 
his nation more than 40 years after the collectivization, who understood the 
shortcomings and the bankruptcy of the system even while being a member of the 
Communist Party.
Invited to these conferences were, together with the rural executive 
government heads and officers, outstanding farmers, with Soviet-era rewards for hard 
work, collective farm brigade managers, and agricultural scientists and specialists. 
                                                
19 The chronological listing of these conferences (1993–2003) and the full texts of president H. Aliyev’s 
speeches during them are available online at http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/az/2400331.html
(accessed January 9, 2013).
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President Aliyev listened to the farmers’ and specialists’ opinions attentively, and 
shared his opinions on the different reform models suggested. Stressing that the 
discussion was open to anyone wishing to participate, President Aliyev added his 
belief that with hard work the system would bring prosperity (Aliyev 1994a, 1994b, 
1995, 1996 ). He gave credit for any and all good in the countryside to the 
“hardworking peasant/villager” and blamed mismanagement by local executives and 
bureaucrats for the problems of the countryside and stunted reforms (Aliyev 1994b, 
1995, 1996). He also placed all the hopes for any good of the rural change on the 
“hard work of the lay villagers,” warning that change would not be easy or fast.
Wrapped in these statements was the message to rural laborers that the new 
system of organizing the rural economy was to be a system of liberation. The personal 
oppression by mismanaging bureaucrats was to be replaced by the avenues of 
freedom, where only a peasant’s own industriousness would limit his or her success. 
Importantly, “success” in this message was defined as material prosperity, very 
different from the Soviet definition of personal “success” as one’s contribution to the 
community. This invitation for cooperation extended to rural laborers was seductive.
Soon the outlines of the land reforms were solidified: the land was to be 
distributed to individuals free of charge, in equal portions. The dream of 
landownership, the ideas about what could be done with one’s own land and labor, 
took over the countryside. For people used to toiling for collective farms and 
collective returns, taking all the fruits of their hard labor for themselves was a sweet 
promise. As they viewed it, with free land and no taxes on production, only the extent 
of one’s own work set the limits to the future—and these people were not lazy. As one 
woman, a former field worker on a collective farm vegetable in Lenkeran, said, 
“Cultivating my own land was a cherished dream. It was the pinnacle of my dreams.”
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The desire for self-sufficiency is a powerful human emotion. From a child’s 
desire to do things on her own to an adult’s dream of economic independence, in its 
various imaginations and forms, self-sufficiency symbolizes freedom and happiness. 
Aliyev’s strategic policy turned the uncertainty of change into a promise of self-
sufficiency.
What happened was, in essence, a negotiation of livelihood conditions. Future 
benefits of individual landownership were promised in exchange for the “temporary” 
economic difficulties of the structural adjustment period. As the prices were 
liberalized, taxes on peasants were abolished. Diminished social protection “was 
necessary” for the diminished personal control of the local state bureaucrats. 
Abolished collectives meant the opening up of new opportunities for individual 
entrepreneurship. In the process, the government was relinquishing the responsibility 
for making agriculture a source of livelihoods for the 50 percent of the population still 
employed in agriculture. The government would divert its attention to the opening up 
of the markets, and to specializing in petroleum extraction for exports—the 
globalization policies. The responsibility for transforming agriculture into a source of 
livelihoods would be turned over to individual owners of the formerly collective 
farmland. The individual would-be owners of the land were grateful and hopeful. The 
hopes in self-sufficiency stemming from ownership of the land made this deal 
possible.
The hopes in the possibilities of self-reliance called upon the rural laborers to 
give it a try. Of course, not everyone was convinced, yet many were now giving 
marketization under the steering of Aliyev the benefit of the doubt: Maybe it would 
indeed prove to be a way to self-reliant, independent existence? This benefit of the 
doubt, fed by hopes in the bounties of the new system to come, was central in the 
countryside’s opening up to the reforms. Even partial support of the reforms in a local 
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community was enough to make a communal, collective stance on the matter 
indecisive. And this indecisiveness, this division, gave the government just enough 
ground to proceed with land privatization.
Buying into the hopes. It is important to talk about the socio-historical context 
in which the hopes in the market as a road to self-sufficiency took place. The 
difference between the interests of kolkhoz managers and kolkhoz workers, the latent 
tension in the relationship between the collective farm managers and rural laborers, the 
authoritarianism of the managers was a covered-up reality of the Soviet rural life 
(Abramov 1963, Bradley 1971, Wilson 2002). But the inequality of this relationship 
stood bare, and the tensions were uncovered when the Soviet idea of “everyone-toils-
for–the-same-common-good-from-their-different-position” dissolved. This uncovering 
happened in the interim period when the Soviet production system had broken down, 
and state ideology had been dismissed, but the new structures had not yet been 
implemented.
During the breakup of the Soviet Union, as Soviet-wide supply networks 
collapsed, some collective farm managers, or brigade heads, leased land (podrat) from 
their kolkhoz to continue agricultural production and ensure jobs for the workers, and 
as some say, in search of some gain. The podrat entrepreneurs hired the employees of 
the former kolkhoz to be paid from the profits of the podrat. The podrat manager took 
on to find buyers for the produce and organize the delivery, mostly to Russia, but also 
to Baku.
The arrangements however, did not work out smoothly most of the times. The 
early 1990s were a very fragile and chaotic period in the transitioning Soviet/post-
Soviet space. Business transactions were very risky even within any given former 
USSR republic. Trans-border shipments were vulnerable to lawlessness and seizure, 
especially so in the Northern Caucasus, where Azerbaijan-Russia border lay. 
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Shipments of vegetables could be kept at the border in open trucks for days, leading to 
high spoilage. The women workers of a podrat brigade were to be paid after the 
produce was sold, and very often they went without pay with the podrat manager 
claiming that there had been no gain.
The women interviewed for this research in Lenkeran were passionate and 
articulate about their experience of the podrat experiment20. They viewed their pay 
from the podrat system as the product of their labor doled out to them, or often denied 
on the grounds of “unsuccessful sales.” They believed that the podrat managers made
profits from sales in Baku, even after all the losses: “Otherwise they would have no 
interest in doing this again year after year.” With the privatization of land the women 
could be their own managers, or so they hoped.
After the privatization of land, the podrat managers offered to lease the land 
plots now owned by the female brigade workers. But as one interviewee, a former
podrat worker, said, “Cultivating my own land was a cherished dream.” As soon as 
they had legal control of the land, these female laborers mobilized their households to 
do what their podrat managers had done—they wanted to produce vegetables to sell in 
the Lenkeran city and in Baku.
The work was hard. The women described plowing and sowing the land share 
completely manually, “fuelled only by motivation,” in the first two years after its 
receipt. “Our dreams kept us going,” said one interviewee. She narrated how her son, 
who was of military-service age in the first year of their land-share receipt, begged the 
officers at the regional military-service center for a few months of delay in order to be 
                                                
20 To give a short background, Lenkeran’s climate is subtropical. Here, the soil has traditionally been 
used for citrus, tea, and vegetable growing under the Soviet Union. Garden vegetables, specifically 
tomatoes and cucumbers, grown here are indispensable to the Azerbaijanian table. Tomatoes and 
cucumbers require a lot of manual labor, and have traditionally been cultivated by the women workers 
of the Soviet collective and state farms. Unlike tea, they do not need costly processing and can be 
directly marketed to the buyers straight after/from harvest.
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able to help his family sow and harvest the land. Another narrated how they borrowed 
money with their very meager incomes, and “cut from their half-empty stomachs”21 to 
rent a truck to take the first harvest of tomatoes and cucumbers to the city. Economic 
self-sufficiency, depending on nobody but one’s own land and labor—this was the 
dream and hope driving their sacrifices and motivation.
However, the dream was not easy to realize. The female laborers, unlike 
podrat brigade heads, lacked access to the retailer networks that would guarantee the 
purchase of their produce. Their household land shares were too small to justify the 
renting of technology. Their shares were also too small to satisfy the demands of a city 
purchaser (even a small one like a mini-market) with a variegated flow of vegetables 
like a larger podrat could. Cucumbers and tomatoes spoiled fast, and the women could 
not arrange storage of their produce, unlike a brigade manager. Brigade managers had 
both relevant retail connections and economies of scale, when they organized the same 
produce trade. The women’s inability to do what the brigade manager did was a bitter 
realization. For some it took more than one year of trying. Alas, the unprofitability of 
the endeavour was clear.
Eventually, the land ended up as lease back in the hands of the original brigade 
managers, and the owners were hired as seasonal laborers on their own land. The 
prices of the land leased out were not high either. In 2009 a land share in Lenkeran—
once so hopefully anticipated—was being leased for a yearly fee between 50 and 60 
USD, for less than 6 USD per month. The managers were now confirmed in their 
potency over landowners-laborers as the ones who could make the land pay.
The women, who once cherished hopes of cultivating their own land but now 
worked as seasonal hired laborers on that land, no longer saw land shares as worth 
                                                
21 That is, decreased food spending with already poor diets.
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investing their labor in. As land cultivation was tested and shown to be unsustainable 
in the countryside, the trickling down of the oil money from the capital created new 
opportunities for growth of the construction, trades, and services sectors (this will be 
looked at in more detail in chapter 5). The male labor devoted to the manual care of 
land for uncertain returns could be spent for more immediate and less risky returns as 
wage labor in these newly growing sectors. “There are no free males in my household 
to work the land share,” said one interviewee.
In contrast to land shares, household plots continued to be cultivated, and were 
mentioned with pride as a “significant help” to household budgets. Land shares 
represented unfulfilled hopes and were mentioned dismissively. Crucially, the reason 
for the unfulfillment was often viewed as emanating from individual circumstances 
(no connections in Baku to sell to, no storage area to keep the vegetables, no sons 
wanting to stay and work the land). No one blamed the government for the failure of 
cherished dreams of an independent farmer’s life. The government’s policy of
concentrating on oil was not seen as related to produce prices, the produce market, and 
land. “What was the government to do?” I repeatedly heard in answer to my question 
about whether the government could help. “It divided the collective lands, and it was 
then up to individual families to make it work.”
From Hopes to Landowning Wage-Laborers: More Stories
In lowland Shamakhy, rural laborers’ realization of their inability to use land shares to 
attain market-based self-sufficiency provided labor for Baku oligarchs’ large-scale 
grape plantations in the area. The country’s oligarchs began investing in export-
oriented large-scale agricultural projects in Azerbaijan’s countryside in 2004. The 
choice of grapes for the Shamakhy area was related to the region’s history.
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The head of the executive government in Shamakhy attributed the creation of 
new grape plantations there to Baku officials’ realization that grapes were a product in 
which Azerbaijan had a comparative advantage internationally. Shamakhy had 
agricultural labor that was experienced and skilled in grape production since the 
Soviet period, specifically women with rapid manual grape-tree-tending and grape-
harvesting skills.
Shamakhy had been one of the centers of grape-growing in Soviet Azerbaijan. 
The grapes had mostly been used for wine-making, and started being cut down under 
Gorbachev’s anti-alcoholism crusade in the late 1980s. During the post-Soviet 
transition, the grape fields were categorized as property that every collective farm 
employee could get a share of. The fields were difficult to sell, impossible to irrigate
individually, and too expensive to cultivate collectively for impoverished rural 
communities. Much of the fields had been cut and used as wood fuel. In 2004, of the 
284 thousand hectares of Soviet-era grape fields, only 7.7 thousand remained (Table 
3.1). That same year, the government declared its support for grapes and wineries. 
Rural executive governments were instructed by the central government to support any 
investment in grape production. The investment in grape production here, in the 
Shamakhy executive’s words, would not just tap into the skills of the local laborers, 
but would “provide some livelihoods” to the population as well.
In 2006, into lower Shamakhy, famous for its Soviet-era grape producers, 
came a person, “a middle level bureaucrat working in one of the ministries in Baku,” 
who chose an area to establish his grape field. He partially bought and partially leased 
from local villagers 106 hectares of land, to be cultivated as grape fields from scratch. 
Before leaving, he hired a former collective farm manager to organize and oversee the 
work in the region.
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The brigade manager, experienced in overseeing grape production, hired 
laborers for the field. Men were hired as technicians and irrigation specialists, and 
women were hired for the seasonal manual labor of tedious care for the plants. To the
hired, this came as a fresh breath of air after years of joblessness and destitution. The 
initial seeds of the enterprise were sown, and an expensive irrigation system was put in 
place.
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Table 3.1. Grape Production: Total Area of Fields, Harvest, and Productivity, 
1984–2008
Years
Total area
(1000 hectares)
Total area of 
harvestable age
(1000 hectares)
Total harvested
(1000 tonnes)
Productivity
per 1hectares
(100 kg)
1984 284.1 210.0 2126.1 99.2
1985 267.8 218.0 1789.6 81.0
1986 214.2 207.6 1538.9 73.9
1987 197.0 175.2 1448.6 82.6
1988 195.4 169.2 1254.3 73.7
1989 188.9 163.1 1057.1 65.1
1990 181.4 156.1 1196.4 76.5
1991 171.0 148.6 1125.6 75.3
1992 146.3 132.3 607.0 45.8
1993 140.1 133.1 411.3 30.1
1994 110.3 105.1 313.8 29.8
1995 97.7 94.7 308.7 32.6
1996 83.3 79.1 275.0 34.7
1997 66.3 65.4 145.3 22.2
1998 35.1 34.4 144.2 31.4
1999 20.5 20.3 112.5 35.6
2000 14.2 13.9 76.9 35.8
2001 11.5 11.4 68.1 39.9
2002 8.9 8.9 62.1 43.8
2003 7.7 7.4 65.0 50.9
2004 8.0 7.3 54.9 38.9
2005 9.6 7.2 79.7 61.8
2006 10.0 7.5 94.1 76.7
2007 12.4 7.8 103.4 70.1
2008 13.3 8.9 115.8 74.0
Note. Source: The State Statistical Committee, 
http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/agriculture/az/049.shtml#s4
I was told that the grapes required an initial investment of 12,000 to 15,000 
USD per hectare for initial plantings, and 3 years to mature. This excluded land 
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purchase or lease costs. Grapes also required economies of scale to justify initial costs 
and a costly irrigation system. It was not rural capital that could invest in this high-
cost endeavour and afford to wait for 3 years for the first (uncertain) yield in post-
Soviet Azerbaijan.
The “middle-level bureaucrat from Baku” spent over 1.2 million USD in initial 
setup costs. In a country where pensions are around 70 USD, and upper-middle-level 
bureaucratic salaries are 700 to 1,000 USD, how a “middle level” bureaucrat had 
accumulated 1.2 million USD plus to invest in a grape field was a question not asked. 
The bureaucrat was said to be acting on behalf of a top government minister. He was 
responsible for the investment and came to the region once every few months to check 
its progress.
In 2009 the field was close to maturation. The work was organized under the 
management of a hired male brigade manager who oversaw his male technical experts 
and female manual laborers. The workers were paid quite a bit more than at a 
medium-size vegetable enterprise in Lenkeran. The new grape field provided the 
majority of women in the village with work paying 200, 230, or 350 USD a month, 
depending on the intensity of required work that month. This was 30 to 60 times more 
than the monthly payment for a leased-out land share, and 20 to 35 times more than 
the yearly income made by using one’s land shares to subsidize wheat farming (more 
on this later in this chapter). The women were aware of this, and were deeply grateful 
to have their jobs. Here as well, instead of the self-sufficiency emanating from land 
ownership, there was gratitude for the availability of seasonal work as manual 
laborers.
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On Proletarianization in the Countryside
The grape plantation in Shamakhy was not the only commercial large-scale 
agricultural project in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. As mentioned above, projects like these 
funded by the oil elite’s money mushroomed in the countryside with the progress of 
the land reforms. According to Lerman and Sedik (2010:93), about 25% of 
Azerbaijan’s agricultural land was in use by large-scale private corporate farms in 
2005. These large-scale agricultural endeavours found both land and labor to make 
them possible. Moreover, parts of the land used for these projects belonged to the 
laborers themselves, who had leased it out and had come to work as wage-laborers on 
it. The process by which Azerbaijan’s landowning peasants went to work as wage-
laborers—were proletarianized—on their own leased-out land requires a dialogue with 
Marx and his followers.
In volume 1, chapter 26 of Capital, “The Secrets of Primitive Accumulation,” 
Marx (1883/1994) argued that a producer’s separation from the means of production, 
specifically land, is a necessary precondition to that producer’s transformation into a 
wage laborer. He wrote:
The process, therefore, which creates the capital-relation can be nothing other 
than the process which divorces the worker from the ownership of the 
conditions of his own labour; it is a process which operates two 
transformations, whereby the social means of subsistence and production are 
turned into capital, and the immediate producers are turned into wage-
labourers. So-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the 
historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It 
appears as “primitive” because it forms the pre-history of capital, and of the 
mode of production corresponding to capital.
. . . Hence the historical movement which changes the producers into 
wage-labourers appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation from serfdom 
which alone exists for our bourgeois historians. But, on the other hand, these 
newly freed men became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed 
of all their own means of production, and all the guarantees of existence 
afforded by the old feudal arrangements.
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The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the 
soil is the basis of the whole process. (Pp. 296–97)
A person would only go to work for someone else if she or he lacked the means of 
procuring subsistence—most important, the land. What Marx did here was to 
extrapolate a general theory of human behaviour with regard to wage labor based on 
the specific historical experience of the European peasants’ transition from feudalism 
to capitalism. The peasants, whose experience Marx observed, had been producing 
primarily for subsistence, for generations. Their labor for and dues to a feudal lord 
were ensured through extra-economic coercion, precisely because they had the means 
and determination to procure their subsistence needs from the land. This had been the 
only form of livelihood-making they had known, and their transformation into 
voluntary laborers for someone else would indeed be hard to imagine as long as they 
had access to the land that had sustained them for generations.
In an apparent contrast to this model, villagers in post-Soviet Azerbaijan went 
to work as seasonal wage-laborers while fully owning their individual land plots. Two 
factors need to be pointed out here: (1) they did not come from the experience of 
subsistence production, and (2) their consideration of production for subsistence on 
their land did not take place because of the hopes placed on the returns of the market 
system.
The grandparents of Azerbaijan’s peasants had been separated from producing 
for subsistence on their land plots during Stalin’s collectivization. For generations, 
Azerbaijan’s rural laborers produced what was assigned externally (by USSR plans), 
collected from them (by state officials), and sent away (for state re-allocation). They 
then received what they needed for reproduction from the state allocation system, the 
same one to which the harvests of their labor were sent. The landowning wage-
laborers of post-Soviet Azerbaijan, met in the ethnographies above, had not known 
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how to procure their subsistence from land for generations. They were already wage-
laborers for the Soviet production system, and their post-Soviet turn to wage labor 
was, more accurately, a re-proletarianization. Yet, this re-proletarianization was in no
way prescribed by their experience. When the laborers became individual landowners 
with de-collectivization, the use of land for subsistence could be considered. (It was in 
fact considered by a few people whom we will meet in a little while.) But hopes in the 
bounties of production for market and in the justice of market allocation took the place 
of serious consideration of producing for subsistence. These chosen beliefs critically 
conditioned the re-proletarianization of Azerbaijan’s rural laborers: choosing to 
produce as individual families what they knew best for the market, they lost the 
competition with the producers, who utilized knowledge of markets, access to 
facilities, and larger economies of scale. The land, unable to provide for their 
livelihood—when used to produce for the market—was devalued in their eyes, and 
came to bear negligible significance. Insofar as land ownership means a source of 
subsistence income, these rural laborers were in effect landless when they took up the 
opportunities for wage labor. Yet, their landlessness—the devaluation of land in their 
eyes as a non-provider of livelihood income—was critically due to their choice of 
production for the market, bred by the hopes in the bounties of the market system and 
the justice of its allocation. A person’s separation from the means of his or her 
subsistence, from land—Marx’s primitive accumulation—could be as much an effect 
of mind as of forceful dispossession. David Harvey (2003) understood this void in 
Marx’s conceptualization when he wrote the following:
Critical engagement over the years with Marx’s account of primitive 
accumulation—which in any case had the quality of a sketch rather than a 
systematic exploration—suggests some lacunae that need to be remedied. The 
process of proletarianization, for example entails a mix of coercions and of 
appropriations of pre-capitalist skills, social relations, knowledges, habits of 
mind and beliefs on part of those being proletarianized. Kinship structures, 
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familial and household arrangements, gender and authority relations (including
those exercised through religion and its institutions) all have their part to play. 
In some instances the pre-existing structures have to be violently repressed as 
inconsistent with labour under capitalism, but multiple accounts now exist to 
suggest that they just as likely to be co-opted in an attempt to forge some 
consensual as opposed to coercive basis for working-class formation. Primitive 
accumulation, in short, entails appropriation and co-optation of pre-existing 
cultural and social achievements as well as confrontation and supersession. 
(P. 146)
Trying to address this incompleteness in the thinking about primitive accumulation, 
Harvey (2003) expanded the meaning of dispossession to include “coercions and 
appropriations of pre-capitalist skills, social relations, knowledges, habits of mind, and 
beliefs on the part of those being proletarianized.” The problem here is that “habits of 
mind, and beliefs” cannot really be coerced and appropriated.22 (E. P. Thompson’s 
“Moral Economies of the English Crowd” [1971] had intended to sensitize us 
precisely to “habits of mind, and beliefs.”) A crucial aspect of history-making—
human choice and complex negotiations of popular stance—is made invisible and 
irrelevant if the beliefs and habits of mind are coerced.
On Choice
People’s acceptance of the market as the just and best allocator of economic resources 
and mediator of livelihood-earning activities may be an essential part of the expanding 
reach of neoliberal appropriation structures in our age. The lure of the market as an 
impersonal allocator rewarding the shrewd and the hardworking can be especially 
strong in small communities where resource allocation had been tied to the subjective, 
personal decision-making, in the Soviet case, of kolkhoz/sovkhoz managers and local 
Communist Party chiefs. Yes, in Azerbaijan’s case, the Heydar Aliyev government 
                                                
22 Moreover, the view that the new (market-based) social structures of producing and livelihood-making 
take root by adjusting some of the pre-existing language and cultural forms ascribes a degree of local 
cultural determinism to individual behaviour that is neither justified nor satisfactory. 
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tried wisely and diligently to invite the rural population to become part of a market-
based livelihood-making. Yet, ultimately, it was the choice of individuals and
individual communities to accept the invitation, as the examples to come will 
demonstrate more fully. But nature-given acumen and hard work are not enough to 
win the good graces of the demand-and-supply mechanism, and market competition 
can dispossess as quickly as force and coercion. Crucially, though, the choice to give 
market structures a try meant the individualization of responsibility for making it or 
not.
Appreciation of the aspect of choice here cannot be underestimated. The 
choice of post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s landowning rural laborer to produce for the market
was not determined by their experience as former collective/state farm wage-laborers. 
Hopes and beliefs in the bounties of the market really cannot be coerced, only 
suggested. Multiple variations could come from this experience, as examples provided 
later in this chapter will demonstrate. But the hopes placed on the bounties of the 
market production/allocation replaced consideration of production for subsistence in 
many locales. The key word here is “many,” not all.
Occasional villages on the map of rural Azerbaijan stand together in not 
buying in to the hopes in the bounties of individual production for market. References 
to such villages started coming during my interviews with local state officials, who 
tried to grapple with/explain the incompleteness of the rural market reforms. The head 
of the executive government in Shamakhy said that some villages had devised their 
own, alternative ways and systems of production, but such were very few. Ivanovka 
village in the Ismayilli district, he said, chose to continue tending land collectively, to 
produce for their needs and to sell the excesses. Another village in northern 
Azerbaijan had chosen a similar path.
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At one of my research sites—the remote mountainous Shamakhy village—
some residents chose to put their land shares to use in subsistence farming. Many of 
my interviewees in this village expressed proudly that their land shares, although 
rocky and hard to plow, generously provided them with a yearly supply of potatoes—a 
staple of the Azeri diet—and all other vegetables. Potatoes and vegetables harvested 
from land shares, berries and nuts from mountain forests, and goats and sheep fed on 
the grazing fields of the commons contributed to fairly self-sufficient livelihoods. An 
elderly lady talking about her use of the privatized land share for subsistence stressed 
her independence from others: she was the one supporting her migrant children in 
Baku with produce, not receiving their remittances as a helpless villager.
Interestingly, other, unrelated parts of her interview came together to 
demonstrate her independence. She was a skilled carpet-weaver. Her handmade 
carpets had been taken to and won exhibitions in Moscow during the USSR era. At the
time of our interview, she told me about recently turning down offers to make carpets 
for the wealthy from Baku. The latest offer before our interview was two thousand 
dollars for a red carpet (she died the yarns herself with a juice made from certain 
mountain berries, and “the colors never faded, not like today’s machine-made 
carpets,” she said). She had turned the offer down and explained to me that she was 
busy and that the money was not worth her labor. The amount she had turned down 
was very significant by rural Azerbaijan’s standards, worth 24 months of the woman’s 
own pension payments. Moreover, opportunities to earn cash do not come easy in rural 
areas. This lady’s self-valuation of her non-cash-bringing labor was in striking 
contrast to other self-valuations of personal labor that I heard during my interviews. 
For many, many others, bringing in cash—engaging in market-oriented activities—
was the key measure of the labor’s value. This reflected the establishment of what J. 
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K. Gibson-Graham called the “capitalocentric discourse” (1996, 2006) in the hearts
and minds of Azerbaijan’s villagers. Gibson-Graham (2006) wrote:
Capitalocentrism is a dominant economic discourse that distributes positive 
value to those activities associated with capitalist economic activity, however 
defined, and assigns lesser value to all other processes of producing and 
distributing goods and services. (P. 56)
To Gibson-Graham, capitalocentrism was a key to the power of a capitalist system 
organized around market production and allocation. To understand this power required 
answering “How is it that waged labor, the commodity market, and capitalist 
enterprise have come to be seen as the only ‘normal’ forms of work, exchange and 
business organization?” (Gibson-Graham 2006:53). A part of the answer may be that 
presentation and acceptance of the market system as an impersonal, just adjudicator of 
human industriousness, and therefore a fair allocator of rewards, has an appeal for 
some people who had suffered in personal allocation systems. A market is a system, 
not a person; it is objective, and free from bias—these ideas continue to be presented 
and accepted, despite their exposure as fallacious.23 But such were the positive 
conceptions of the market put forward with the careful politics of President Heydar 
Aliyev to rural residents of Azerbaijan, accepted by many, and dividing those 
communities where not all subscribed. As livelihoods reorganized to depend on 
market activity and cash, it is not surprising that market and cash obtained positive 
values in human minds. The first aspect both required preliminary forms of the second 
and simultaneously perpetuated them.
In obvious contrast to the capitalocentric discourse, the Shamakhy highlander 
woman’s non-cash-bringing labor spent on procuring her own subsistence was 
valuable to her. The aim of this example is not to argue for the superiority of 
                                                
23 Probably most systematically in Polanyi’s The Great Transformation.
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subsistence production over production for market as the true road to independence 
and prosperity. (However, much as I would have loved to argue this, the material 
required for this argument is beyond the scope of this work.) Rather, the above 
example is intended to demonstrate that choices of alternative relationships to land, 
production, and surrounding people were a very real possibility in post-Soviet 
Azerbaijan.
Wheat Example
Wheat farming is another example of unfulfilled hopes for self-sufficiency coming 
from land ownership. Wheat is an important example, because it occupies about 60% 
of the total sown crop area in Azerbaijan (Figure 3.1). Wheat flour is the basis for the 
national staple, bread. Wheat can be stored in large quantities in the conditions of a 
peasant home relatively longer, even before processing (unlike, for example, tomatoes, 
cucumbers, and most other garden vegetables). Wheat does not require much (male) 
manual labor: preparing the land, sowing, and harvesting all are done with tractors, if 
it is sown on flat (not mountainous) land.
60%23%
12% 5%
Wheat
Animal feed
Potatoes and vegetables
Technical crops (cotton,
etc.)
Figure 3.1. Total sown crop area in Azerbaijan, 2008. Source: Azerbaijan State 
Statistical Committee, data available online at: 
http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/agriculture/az/023.shtml
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Much wheat is cultivated on individual land shares, by individual land share 
owners. In fact, wheat “farmers” are the essence of the “small farmers” category to 
which the Azerbaijan government and media often refer. However, this reference is 
not accurate. As I will show, wheat cultivation provides only a tiny fraction of a 
farmer’s income, about $12 a month, and it is only cultivated on land shares because
of the government subsidies. Low market prices for wheat due to competition with 
imported wheat, comparatively high technology rental costs, and the natural 
uncertainty of yield would make wheat a completely unprofitable endeavour for a 
household and the “small farmer,” if not for the government subsidies.
Shamakhy’s lower plains and weather happen to be well-suited to growing 
wheat. Here, however, the wheat “farmers” cultivating their land shares were as 
dismissive of the significance of their land shares as were their counterparts in 
Lenkeran. During the interviews I was presented with a simple, locally made cost-
benefit analysis of wheat cultivation as an explanation for the dismissiveness, as 
shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Yearly Costs of Cultivating Wheat on a 1-Hectare Individual Land 
Share as Laid Out by the Farmers in Shamakhy, 2009
Period Item
Cost
(Azeri manats)
Sowing Technology (tractor) rental 40 
Technology user (tractor driver) hire 12 
Harvesting Technology (tractor) rental 40 
Technology user (tractor driver) hire 12 
Annual cost 104 
Note. 1 manat is roughly equal to 1 USD.
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So, to rent the technology to plow the land and sow the seeds on one hectare of land 
costs about 40 dollars. Paying the person who knows how to use the technology is 
another 12 dollars per hectare. Similarly, a 52-dollar per-hectare cost for technology 
use is incurred during the harvest. So the cost of getting wheat from one hectare of 
land in a year is around 104 dollars, excluding the cost of the farmer’s labor. (The 
laborers did not count their labor as a cost when describing the value of wheat.)
One tonne of wheat costs 120 dollars on the market. The value of wheat 
cultivation on one’s land share depends on the yield. If one hectare yielded a tonne, 
the endeavour would give the “farmers” just 20 dollars to cover the costs of the several 
months of labor and seeds. But even a one-tonne yield is not guaranteed; it depends on 
weather. For example, in the Shamakhy area, in 2008, one hectare yielded only 0.7 
tonnes (700 kilograms) of wheat, 0.3 (300 kilograms) short of the one tonne in the 
previous year, meaning a clear loss for the cultivators. Like in Lenkeran, people here 
had tried and given up on the idea of obtaining their livelihood from the land. Before 
the government subsidies, including free seeds, were introduced in 2008, the stories of 
wheat farming in Shamakhy were painfully similar to those from Lenkeran: people 
had started to cultivate with enthusiasm only to find that their efforts did not bring 
self-sufficiency. One interviewee remembered the following:
The first year we sowed wheat [on their own land share after the reforms were 
completed—S.R.], the year was good. We took almost 2 tonnes from a hectare. 
The next year everybody in the village sowed wheat but the year was not good, 
pests attacked. The next year also was not good, it was dry. So people gave up 
sowing wheat. Nobody would be sowing wheat today, if the government did 
not start paying for the technology.
In 2008, as a part of its rural development and food security program, the government 
started offering rural residents about 50 USD at the beginning and at the end of the 
season for wheat cultivation on their land shares, plus free seeds. This was seen by the 
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villagers as paying for the technology costs. Moreover, one local villager, a male, 
mentioned about the subsidies: “It is like getting your wheat [bread] for free, thanks to
our women.” It turned out that seeing the wheat harvest as a “free” addition to a 
household’s budget fundamentally relied on the unpaid, counted-on-as-given work by 
the household’s women.
Being a technology-requiring crop, wheat is referred to as “male work” (“kishi 
ishi”) in rural areas because tractors, and agricultural technology in general, are 
operated by men. Interestingly, to be an addition to a household’s welfare, this male 
crop wheat needs to be processed through traditionally female work. Collecting the 
stems left in the field by the tractor after harvest to use as animal feed, and processing 
collected wheat—separating grain from the stems, drying the grain for the mill—are 
all done manually by women. Women’s unpaid work of baking bread every day turns
the flour into a consumable form of bread in the household. The actual work in the 
wheat field with the use of technology takes a few days, whereas women’s work of 
processing the wheat harvest, and then turning the flour into bread and meals to be 
consumed in the household, continues throughout the year. The very idea of the 
government’s food security program to get the wheat “free” to the rural population is
premised on the unpaid, invisible work of women, which turns the crop in the fields 
into food.
Azerbaijanian government officials and the Azerbaijanian media like to refer 
to wheat cultivators as small farmers. However, the role of wheat cultivation in an 
individual household’s budget is marginal even after government subsidies. If the 
yearly gain of 120 dollars from a woman’s wheat cultivation on her land share is 
divided by 12 months, the “small farmers” get about 10 dollars per month from their 
“farming” after government subsidies. This fact does not allow talking about small-
scale crop production as a central livelihood strategy. The “small farmers” are in 
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essence procuring their livings through very different livelihood strategies: one man 
may be a retired school teacher, another a seasonal bus driver, a third the owner of the 
village’s cigarette shop . . . The wife of the first “farmer” may sell dairy products and 
eggs, taking them one day a week to the village or regional market. The wife of the 
second “farmer” may be a cleaning and cooking helper in a local executive officer’s
home. A third may be just working on her household plot. As long as wheat 
cultivation is a job that requires involvement with rented technology and substantial 
subsidies a few days each season, villagers have incentives to add wheat to their 
arsenal of livelihood strategies based on flexible schedules. But cultivating wheat does 
not make them self-sufficient farmers—far from it. Like in Lenkeran, people have 
given up on land as a source of independence. Just like in Lenkeran, here the shares 
are remembered only if asked about, and mentioned in a dismissive tone. Moreover, 
nearly half of my interviewees in Shamakhy neither cultivated nor leased out their 
land shares.
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 Box 3.1. A Side Story of Cultivation Technology in Rural Azerbaijan
As Soviet collective farm workers, Azerbaijan’s villagers were used to having 
tractors to plow the land, and, in the case of crops such as wheat, to also sow and 
harvest. The head of the executive government of Shamakhy narrated that the 
collective farms used to have technician teams dedicated to the upkeep of 
agricultural technology. These technicians in high season would travel to the 
fields to fix any problems with the technology on the spot, to avoid time and crop 
loss, and were responsible for the maintenance of the technology off-season as 
well.
Collective and state farm tractors have been privatized as part of the 
property distribution program, and have been outdated with the collapse of 
institutional technical upkeep. Within the property distribution program, the price 
of the tractors of a collective/state farm were divided by the number of 
employees, and each employee received his or her “property share” in monetary 
form. The shares were insignificant and evaporated quickly in the struggle to
make ends meet in the countryside. Left behind was a mass of landowners with no 
cultivation technology. The Soviet-era technology depreciated very rapidly, 
especially now that there were none of the technical maintenance teams 
previously available at each collective/state farm.
The number of tractors in Azerbaijan has decreased more than twice since 
the late Soviet period. The same amount of agricultural land as in the Soviet 
period was now serviced with less than half the cultivation technology (see Table 
3.3).
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Table 3.3. Tractors and combine mower-thrashers in Azerbaijan, 1985–2005
Year
Tractors
No. of combines
(thousands)
Number
(thousands)
Total engine power 
(thousands of horsepower)
1985 38.8 2631 4.5
1990 40.9 2988 4.5
1992 37.3 2853 4.3
1993 34.8 2607 4.4
1994 33.5 2047 4.5
1995 33.2 2177 4.3
1996 32.9 2147 4.3
1999 29.5 2180 3.6
2005 14.9 1016 1.3
Note. Source: The State Statistical Committee, http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/agriculture/az/013.shtml.
Conclusion
The post-Soviet changes in the social structure of Azerbaijan’s countryside that have 
led people to be wage-laborers on their own land would not be possible without the 
hopes in the bounties of the new order.
Sweeping transformation was introduced with good doses of hopes: As the 
government liberalized the prices per IMF requirements, it also freed the rural 
population from all taxes. As the government restructured the economy around oil 
extraction, it distributed collective and state farmland free of charge, in equal share 
sizes to the rural population. With land and hopes, but no control over market prices or 
irrigation, storage, or technology, the new individual landowners tried hard to make a
living from the land. They failed. In the process, the government had relinquished 
responsibility for ensuring that agriculture was a source of livelihood under the new 
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landownership conditions. The responsibility for livelihood-making was 
individualized.
The negotiation of livelihoods under the new conditions, in this chapter 
explored through hope, was also a process by which new class relations characterizing 
the countryside shaped and reproduced themselves. As villagers were disempowered 
in their individual scrambles for self-sufficient livelihoods from the land, the new rich 
of Baku’s oil economy combining political and economic power rose to prominence in 
the countryside, with many former kolkhoz and sovkhoz leaders as their middlemen. 
Similarly, the gendered division of labor reminiscent of the Soviet farm work 
organization, where men managed and women did the manual work, was reintroduced 
and reproduced in the new mid- and large-scale private farms after the women had 
failed in their efforts to make an independent living from the land. These changes 
characterizing post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s countryside were not forced on women and 
men laborers; they were entered into voluntarily, with hopes, and then with the 
conviction of individual responsibility for unrealized hopes.
The distribution of former collective and state farmland in equal share sizes, 
free of charge to rural populations, facilitated hopes in the bounties of the impersonal 
market-based system. These hopes led to massive small-scale production for the 
market in the countryside that failed to be sustainable but individualized the 
responsibility for livelihood-making.
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CHAPTER 4:
COMMUNITY, INDIVIDUAL, AND LAND
Land Reforms: An Overview
Land reforms were a crucial aspect of the negotiation of rural livelihoods in 
Azerbaijan as the country transformed into the petroleum exporter of the global 
economy. The manifested adoption of self-interest-oriented behaviour in rural
communities individualized discontent and fragmented grievances against the reform, 
undermined trust in the potential leaders of rural communities, and served to 
disintegrate rural communities.
All land belonged to the state under the Soviet regime. Even the plots on which 
people’s houses stood, including their backyards, were by law state property used by 
the citizens. Gardening in one’s own backyard was subject to the government set 
ceiling on private production. The “excesses” of household production were taxed.
The right of the citizens to legally own land was introduced in Azerbaijan in 
November 1991, after the breakup of the USSR, with passage of the law on property. 
The law setting the ground for private peasant/farmer enterprises was ratified in 1992. 
The State Committee for Land (SCL) was established the same year. However, it took 
4 years from this legal and institutional ground to the beginning of the actual 
distribution of the land. The reasons for this delay according to Sabit Bagirov (2003), 
a leading executive cabinet member between 1992 and 1994, were “the difficulty of 
the tasks, the fear to implement the key steps of dissolving collective and state farms 
by many state officials in any way related to agriculture, the political events [coup 
d’état] of summer 1993, and the ongoing war in Karabakh” (P. 254, my translation and 
emphasis).
The actual reforms were put in motion after President Aliyev suppressed the 
coup attempts against him and consolidated his power in 1994. On February 18, 1995, 
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Azerbaijan’s parliament ratified the laws “About the Basic Principles of Agrarian 
Reforms” and “About the Reforms of the Collective and State Farms.” Two weeks 
later, on March 2, 1995, a presidential decree created the State Commission of 
Agrarian Reforms and required the following from the Commission: (a) within 30 
days to prepare the reforms program, recommendations, instructions, and other 
necessary documents for the reforms and submit these to the president; and (b) within 
60 days to prepare a list of the yet-unprivatized state property and submit this to the 
president.
Finally, in July 1996, the law “On Land Reforms” was ratified. It clarified the 
methods and mechanisms of enforcing the land reforms. As described in the previous 
chapter, President Aliyev had already softened the countryside towards the reforms by 
exempting rural residents from all taxes.
The law “On Land Reforms” established three forms of ownership: private, 
state, and municipal (Box 4.1).
The land reforms started in 1996. By December 1, 2006, of the 3,438,625 
persons entitled to land shares, 3,420,778 (99.5%) had received their shares in 
actuality and in documentation (interview with Garib Mammadov, Chairman of the 
State Land and Mapping Committee, 2009). This involved the liquidation of 2,032 
collective and state farms in the country (ibid.)
The State Committee for Land and Mapping was the central institution in the 
land distribution process. The SCLM examined the land area, determined its soil 
content and suitability for cultivation, categorized it (e.g., as pasture, land reserves, or 
                                                
24 Referring to Soviet-era collective and communal housing complexes. The individual apartment flats 
in some of these complexes could later be privatized, but the land area under the building remained 
municipality property. 
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cultivation land), issued ownership registration, and demarcated the borders between 
the entitlements of the different stakeholders.
 Box 4.1. Forms of Land Ownership in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan
Retained under state property were lands of (1) the government buildings, (2) 
state industries (e.g., mining, approved mineral deposit sites, power plants, pipes, 
transport, communication, defence, etc.), (3) summer and winter pastures, cattle 
camps and roads, (4) forests, (5) water reserves (including Caspian Sea’s 
Azerbaijan sector), (6) reserves under state protection for natural, and historic-
cultural significance, (7) research and education facilities, their pilot bases, testing 
stations, seed-growing and breeding farms, and (8) lands in permanent use of state 
organizations or demarcated for the construction of state facilities;
Municiple lands comprised (1) lands in common use (e.g., land area of 
city, town, or village dwelling units, local roads, squares, parks, stadiums, 
common pastures for locals’ livestock, forest strips planted to protect agricultural 
land, local water reserves, local hydro and utility infrastructure), (2) municipality 
reserve fund (lands for prospective development/expansion of dwelling areas), (3) 
additional lands not belonging to state or private owners, and municiple lands in 
use by physical and legal persons.
Lands transferred to private ownership would include (1) lands in legal 
private use of citizens as private houses, backyards, private, communal and 
cooperative gardens, garden lands of the state gardening industry; and (2) 
privatized shares from collective and state farms’ lands.
Source: Articles 6–8, Azerbaijan Republic’s Law “On Land Reforms”
Local executive governments had control over the lists of the people registered 
in local kolkhozs and sovkhozs and entitled to land. In the process of delineating 
individual land shares and their division among rural residents, the SCLM officers 
(dispatched to the rural areas from the capital city Baku) had to work closely with the 
local executive offices.
As detailed in Box 4.1, the land of the former Soviet Socialist Republic of 
Azerbaijan was divided into state-, municipality-, and privately owned land in post-
Soviet Azerbaijan.
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Private ownership encompassed (1) privatization of the land areas of houses, 
yards, and household plots; and (2) distributed shares from the former collective and 
state farm—kolkhoz and sovkhoz—lands. These two forms of privately owned land 
are referred to as (1) the household plot (heyetyani torpaq) and (2) the land share 
(torpaq payi or pay torpagi).
The first type of private land, the household plot, in the rural areas includes 
one’s house and adjacent land (front and backyard). A household plot is at one’s door, 
literally. Since Soviet times, household plots have been used to grow garden 
vegetables and/or fruit trees and to keep a few chickens and/or dairy animals. Under 
Soviet law, the household plot was legally owned by the state, and hence the excesses 
of household production were taxed. The land reforms privatized these household 
plots, passing their ownership from the state to the users without any payment.
The second type of private land, the land share, is a share of former kolkhozs’ 
and sovkhozs’ cultivation area. The land share of an individual is not in the village; it 
is often several miles away. Land shares can only be used for agricultural purposes as 
decreed by the law. Land shares were also distributed free of charge under 
Azerbaijan’s Law on Land Reforms, and were designed as an equalizing element of 
the land reforms. The privatization of household plots had carried over the owners’ 
Soviet-era social status: households with larger plots got to keep them, and households 
with smaller plots did not get any more at the expense of their neighbors. In contrast, 
land shares were equalized: land share sizes were the same for everyone in a given 
kolkhoz/sovkhoz area and were determined by dividing the kolkhoz’s or sovkhoz’s 
land area by the number of people working there at the time of the collapse.
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New Property Relations: Individual Farming?
According to Azerbaijan’s official narrative, continuously upheld in the state TV 
news, and to some international experts (Lerman and Sedik 2010), the key 
significance of the country’s land reforms has been the individualization of 
agriculture—a mass transition to individual farming in rural Azerbaijan. According to 
this view, livelihoods in Azerbaijan’s countryside are made by small farmers working 
on their individual plots producing for the market. The believers in this narrative may 
view as counterintuitive the narratives presented in the previous chapter: of people 
giving up to expect livelihoods from individual farming, of going to work as seasonal 
wage-laborers on their own land leased out to middle-size to large-scale farm 
enterprises, of actual individual farming of wheat providing a fraction of livelihood 
expenses after government subsidies. Yet these qualitative research findings are 
supported by the data of the same experts (Lerman and Sedik 2010), while their claims 
of success for individual farming in post-land-reform Azerbaijan stem from the failure 
to differentiate between household plots and land shares.
According to Lerman and Sedik (2010:93), of the 4.3 million hectares of 
agricultural land in Azerbaijan, 25% is used by private corporate farms (similar to the 
grape plantation described in chapter 3), about 40% are municipal lands (mostly 
pastures), and 35% are “individual farms.” These “individual farms” comprise 
“household plots and peasant farms” (Lerman and Sedik 2010:94).
What are peasant farms? According to Lerman and Sedik (2010):
Peasant farms, the second component of the individual farm sector, are 
substantially larger than household plots (151 hectares on average, with 11 
hectares of owned land) and accordingly they make much greater use of leased 
land. Virtually all peasant farms lease in land (95% of peasant farms compared 
with only 6% of households). Leased land accounts for 93% of the average 
peasant farm in the survey. (P. 108)
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An example of a land-leasing peasant farm is the garden vegetable enterprise 
organized by a former collective farm manager in the Lenkeran village described in 
chapter 3. These peasant farms, too large to be individually farmed, significantly rely 
on seasonal wage-labor, sometimes of the leasing individuals themselves.
Further, Lerman and Sedik (2010) explain that the bigger peasant farms rely 
more on agricultural income—on income made from the land—in contrast to small 
peasant farms, which rely primarily on non-agricultural income, such as wages, social 
transfers, and other non-farm income (P. 109). An example of such a small peasant 
farm is the individually cultivated wheat farm in Shamakhy described in chapter 3. 
While in fact engaged in small farming, these “farmers” earn the bulk of their incomes 
from other activities, including the sale of their services on the market.
Finally, Lerman and Sedik (2010) say:
In households that lease land, total land used exceeds land owned by a large 
factor (16 hectares compared with 3 hectares owned). On the other hand, 
households that do not resort to leasing use on average less land than they own 
(1.8 hectares compared to 2.2 hectares). (P. 108)
The fact that those who do not organize agricultural enterprises are likely to use less 
land than they own supports the observations in the previous chapter about the 
devaluation and cheap leasing-out of land shares by rural residents.
With this said about the nature of peasant farms, it is not surprising that 
Lerman and Sedik’s (2009 argument about the mass transition to small farming rests 
on the categorizing of household plots as small farms. But a household plot (heyetyani 
sahe in Azeri) is a backyard, literally. In fact, the State Statistical Committee of 
Azerbaijan uses the English word “backyard” for “heyetyani sahe” in the official 
translation of its survey tables (www.state.gov.az). There are serious problems with 
assuming that Azerbaijan’s rural population has switched to small farming because 
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they engage in household production in their backyards. First, if growing vegetables or 
keeping a few chickens in the backyard is what makes Azerbaijan’s rural population 
individual farmers, then Azerbaijan’s rural population were individual/small farmers 
even while they were collective farm laborers under the Soviet government. They 
were just heavily taxed because the backyards that they “individually farmed” were 
legally state property.25
Second, if, after nearly 3 million hectares of farmland have been 
decollectivized and passed to individual ownership, household plots are where 
individual farming takes place, then the land reforms have failed to bring about small-
scale farming on formerly collective and state farmland.
Household plots, or backyard farming, are indeed central to rural livelihoods. 
Table 4.1 shows that a majority of rural residents (97% in some regions) indicate their 
backyards as their main type of land. But this happens after millions of hectares of 
kolkhoz and sovkhoz land have been individualized, giving each family a land share 
10 to 30 times larger than an average backyard! Chapter 3 demonstrated precisely how 
land shares, of 1 hectare on average and distributed free of charge, came to mean less 
than much smaller backyards to the majority of rural people.
The true significance of the land reforms in Azerbaijan’s transformation into a 
global oil supplier was missed in the attempts to construct Azerbaijan’s countryside as 
a land of small farmers. The real significance of the land reforms lay in how they 
weakened local communities by individualizing.
                                                
25 In fact, if growing vegetables in one’s backyard makes one a small farmer, then a majority of the 
residents of North York, in the heart of Toronto, where I live while writing this, should be classified as 
small farmers, too, despite their full-time day jobs in various professions.
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Table 4.1. Azerbaijan’s Households and Land Use, 2009
Item
Administrative region
Nakhchivan
Ganja-
Gazakh
Sheki-
Zagatala Lenkeran
Guba-
Khachmaz Aran
Yukhary-
Garabagh
Daghlyg-
Shirvan
Kalbajar-
Lachyn
Households with plot of land (%) 90.2 84.2 96.2 93.7 98.7 80.6 84.5 99 16.5
Average size of main plot of land (1ha =100) 18.3 54.9 78.4 32.4 90.3 127.3 61.8 12.5 8.6
Type of main plot of land
Peasant 1.9 47.7 55.8 33.3 44.6 38.5 41.8 1.5 16.9
Farming 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.4 2.3 2.0 1.2 -
Backyard 97.6 51.3 43.9 65.9 55.0 57.8 37.5 97.3 53.5
Garden in summer house - - - 0.2 - 1.3 0.3 - 29.5
Other 0.3 - - - - 0.2 18.5 - -
Ownership of land plot
Own 99.7 97.5 97.8 99.4 99.1 96.4 38.6 98.1 56.7
Rent - 2.3 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 - 0.7 -
Use temporarily - 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.3 25.8 1.2 41.0
Other 0.3 0.1 - - - 1.7 35.6 - 2.4
What is primary use
Used just for rest, nothing grows - 0.2 0.9 0.2 - 2.7 0.2 0.9 -
For consumption but not marketing purposes 86.1 32.7 9.2 39.8 32.7 33.0 39.4 75.8 51.2
For consumption & marketing purposes 13.9 64.8 87.3 59.6 65.4 63.5 43.5 22.4 8.4
Only for marketing purposes - - 0.4 - - 0.1 3.6 - -
Just started exploitation - 0.4 - - - - - - 40.4
Other - 1.8 2.2 0.4 1.9 0.7 13.3 0.9 -
Note. Source: Azerbaijan State Statistical Committee Household Survey, Table 145.
81
Land Reforms, Individualization, and the Disintegration of Village Communities
As mentioned, land shares were distributed to people free of charge. The size of the
land shares per person in a given locale was equal. However, not all of a 
collective/state farm’s land was of the same quality. For example, some parts were 
closer to water sources, or were just more moist. In other parts, the land could be more 
rocky, dry, or salty. These differences mattered less when all the land was tended 
collectively, and the common harvest divided. However, with the division of the 
massive fields of formerly collective land into 0.6 to 1.8 hectare26 land shares, the 
question of who got which part rose to salience. As a local executive officer aptly put 
it during an interview, “You can’t please everybody in such a dilemma.” However, 
how some got pleased and others displeased with the division is worth attention.
Post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s state bureaucracy is still a system of “institutionalized 
corruption” (Rasizade 2002). Imanov (2003) has called the marriage of the political 
(the state bureaucracy) with the economic (wealth accumulation) the key problem of 
Azerbaijan’s social formation. The de facto sale of most government offices and the 
centralized demand for a continuous flow of “tributes” (Rasizade 2002) characterize 
Azerbaijan’s public sector, where there are strong incentives to use one’s post for 
private gain. In this context, if a villager with the ability to pay approached a state 
official with a request for a better section of the formerly collective land, there were 
all the incentives to “accommodate.” Hence the scramble began.
The people entitled to a land share were not asked to pay money to receive the 
land that was their due. But the members of the Agrarian Reforms Commissions and 
the local executives had incentives to maximize their individual gains through 
                                                
26 The size of a land plot per person was based on rural population per given collective farm area. For 
example, in densely populated Lenkeran, a land share was around 0.6 hectares, and in Shamakhy it was 
about 1 hectare. One hectare is equal to 2.471 acres.
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manipulation of their authority in land categorization and distribution. With the 
creation of the municipalities in post-Soviet Azerbaijan in 1999, the municipality 
heads joined the race for their share in this zero-sum game. The interests of the 
bureaucrats from the State Committee for Land and Mapping, of the local executives, 
and of municipality heads did not always coincide. In fact, conflicts over proportions 
of different “stakeholders’” “tribute shares” were endemic. For example, a local 
municipality head or an executive officer might have been paid to manipulate the lists 
of the people entitled to land shares in a given area. The list could include people who 
had left the area years or decades before and who thus were not formally entitled to 
land. The SCLM officer responsible for the area might not be told this fact to avoid 
paying him an appropriate sum as well. In one instance, an SCLM officer on duty in a 
village was approached by some villagers and told that the list of the people entitled to 
their collective farm land included persons who had died years ago. In another case, an 
SCLM officer might be paid to demarcate the land in a particular way. In one such 
instance, the villagers angry with the demarcation of land shares on their former 
collective farm went to the local executive head to complain about the SCLM officer 
responsible for the demarcation. In yet another case, when a majority of the residents 
in a village sensed grave injustice in the process, they resisted the demarcation of the 
shares, attacked the visiting land committee representative, and went to the SCLM 
headquarters in Baku to picket and complain.
As a result of this land reform implementation dynamic, people without 
connections in the Agrarian Reforms Commissions, without money to pay to the ARC 
or local executives as bribes, and without the propensity to fight and make trips to the 
national ARC in the capital city were the ones who got the least desirable pieces of 
land.
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As the land of the collectives was divided into individual pieces, land was 
redefined from common property (with correspondingly common issues of irrigation, 
infrastructure, and productivity) into a zero-sum pie, for a slice of which former 
collective members were now competing. When the better parts of the collective farm 
land were distributed according to connections and the ability to pay, the discontent 
with the process was not just with the government officials responsible for the 
distribution but was even more so with the fellow villagers who utilized the process to 
their individual advantage. The discontent with the reforms, therefore, was set as the 
discontent of individual recipients, not as an indicator of any collective injustice. The 
individuals disadvantaged by the reforms were systematically in the same social 
group: those without connections and money to navigate the reforms. Women 
household heads without connected male relatives27 were especially disadvantaged. A 
female household head’s ability to travel to Baku was more limited by her sole 
responsibility for the household, her lack of resources, and by social disapproval of a 
woman traveling and frequenting predominantly male government agencies alone.
The interplay of differing and overlapping authorities of separate government 
bodies (the SCLM, the local executives) fragmented the grievances against the system. 
In fact, there was no “system” experienced as such and causing discontent with the 
reforms. There were those interested in better pieces of land, those wanting to get 
more land (by registering long-relocated or deceased relatives as family members 
entitled to shares), and individual bureaucrats who had been “connected with” and 
“contacted.” The state was not experienced as a uniform entity with its representatives 
pitched against each other. For example, an SCLM officer was told by the local 
executive office to not personally appear in one village where, he was told, the 
                                                
27 Who had a desire to help, and did not seek, for example, to further increase his land share at the 
expense of the woman’s rights.
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villagers vowed to beat him up. It turned out that a local executive officer, who 
arranged a deal regarding that village’s land area, had placed the blame and 
responsibility on the SCLM officer.28
In many instances, the desire and ability of the contenders to travel to the 
capital could set things straight. The SCLM’s duty was to make sure that the reforms 
were completed, and the local executive governments were instructed by President 
Aliyev to assist with this process. “No local government head would like to stand out 
as the person stunting the reforms” (interview, SCLM officer, 2009). Moreover, a list 
of those entitled to land, including officially deceased people, would be a pretty grave 
violation if publicized. In some instances, an SCLM officer dispatched to an area who 
had tried to make “deals” with some local villagers was reported by the local 
executive government to the SCLM headquarters in Baku and removed from duty. In
other instances, an SCLM officer could “get alone” with the local executive 
government, and the two would act as a team. So who got pleased and displeased with 
the land division was shaped by this interplay of forces. But almost uniformly, the 
land reforms left behind villages transformed from collectively farm communities to 
communities of individuals pitched against each other.
Lost leaders
Those who could take advantage of the reforms were not just better connected but also 
often the more active, communicative, and outspoken (not shy) members of the 
community—those with some leadership qualities. The way they used their skills to 
harness the land reforms prevented the trust of the lay villagers in these “leaders’” 
                                                
28 Lack of clarity with regard to the relative autonomy and overlapping responsibility of government 
officials was observed by Joma Nazpary (2002) in post-Soviet Kazakhstan as well; Nazpary argued that
subjects’ experience of the state as “chaos” was actually a tool of governance. 
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desire to serve everybody. The trust between those who could organize the 
communities and the communities themselves disintegrated with the potential 
organizers’ exploitation of the land division to their own benefit, even if the benefit 
was small, such as the plot’s proximity to water.
The discontent of individual villagers with each other over the manipulation of 
land reforms disintegrated the community and its ability to stand together on common 
issues. For example, if a former collective-farm manager who had been able to harness 
the land reforms to his benefit suggested petitioning the government for irrigation 
assistance, many villagers viewed this as using the community to push a personal goal. 
They therefore did not want to devote much effort to such communal projects.
The divide that paralyzed the rural communities of Azerbaijan can accurately 
be named the divide between the economic ideology of self and the ideology of 
community or consideration for others. Those who had tried hard to utilize the land 
reforms to their own benefit viewed (and often voiced) their action as legitimate. The 
fact that this was at the expense of others was irrelevant to them, because the others 
could try to do what they did as well. “Bacarana bash qurban”—a saying very hard to 
translate literally, but meaning “The one able to get it deserves more29“—summed up 
this worldview. According to this mindset, it was the duty of each individual to strive 
for and protect his or her own economic self-interest; looking out for others was not. 
Others were seen as responsible for doing what they saw as necessary for their own 
well-being. Others could be expected to sacrifice your well-being to theirs. It was your 
job to protect youself to avoid being victimized. “Her kes ozunedir bu zemanede”—
                                                
29 This folk-saying in the Azeri language is actually older than the Soviet government in the country. In 
the Soviet Azerbaijan literature for youth, this saying and the mindset it represented were explicitly 
criticized. 
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“Everybody is to himself/herself30 in this age”—was another popular saying reflecting 
this worldview. Wealth and well-being, in this framework, were seen as results of 
one’s own efforts. Looking out for others—which could be a road to communal 
respect and even Party advancement in the Soviet period—would leave you “with 
nothing” in the new “age” (zemane). The land reforms were a lucid manifestation of 
the changing notion of self in community.
The new mindset was repeatedly brought up during my interviews without my 
prompting. This was a line of measurement, which some validated and sided with and 
others disassociated themselves from. But even those who disassociated themselves 
and disproved acknowledged this mindset as a road to wealth in the current period. In 
the words of a woman in Lenkeran:
To get ahead in this period you have to have a thick face [uzdu olmaq—i.e., 
have no shame—S.R.]. You have to think only about yourself. My husband is 
not that type of a person. Therefore, we are experiencing a lot of financial 
difficulties. (Interview, Lenkeran, 2009)
It is important to remember, however, that a mindset is not an omnipotent force 
taking over spaces. It is an idea, or a set of ideas, materialized when accepted and 
acted upon. The “new” mindset of “serve-your-self-interest” acquired power in the 
countryside because it was quite widely practiced. Moreover, as it was seen “working” 
(bringing results), it acquired more adherents, further breaking down the fabric of 
communal obligations and consideration. The personal greed of those who harnessed 
the land reforms had lethally damaged the coherence of Azerbaijan’s rural 
communities and these communities’ potential to counter the changes brought upon 
them by the strengthening oligarchs of the new petroleum-export economy plunged 
into the global transaction circuits.
                                                
30 The third-person pronoun has no gender in the Azeri language.
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Community and Enclosures
Enclosures of rural Azerbaijan’s commons started after the completion of the land 
reforms. They were both a result and independent manifestation of the communal 
divisions started with the land reforms, a playground of the ideology of self versus the 
ideology of community/consideration.
The enclosures connected individual contemplations about prioritizing self-
interest, communal divisions from the experience of land reforms, and new oligarchs’ 
adoption of a global trend with the progressive idea of turning the scenic natural 
beauty into cash-bringing ventures, namely private resorts. The non-agricultural land 
suitable for this purpose in rural Azerbaijan—forests and mountain meadows—was 
the property of either the state or municipalities. By law, either of these owners could 
lease the land out with a 99-year contract for legal use by a private party for officially 
nominal, very low prices (requiring unofficial befriending with much larger sums). 
The problem was that these gifts of nature—scenic mountain slopes, forests, and 
meadows—in need of “being put to productive use” were already in use and vitally 
important to local communities as additional sources of food (wild berries and nuts), 
and, crucially, as pastures.
As the hopes of self-sufficiency from land shares failed, the ability to keep a 
dairy animal in one’s own backyard without restrictions or taxes on household 
production offered a degree of self-reliance. Ownership of a dairy animal has been 
very important to rural livelihoods in the post-Soviet period. In Lenkeran, visiting 
outmigrants from this region joked that families do not sit down to dinner until the 
cow is back from the pasture and has been milked. Locals did not consider this funny, 
but a plain fact of life. In Shamakhy, sheep and goats are kept alongside cows. An 
important concern for the women I interviewed in both Lenkeran and Shamakhy was 
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the procurement of feed for these animals. The ability to procure feed for household 
animals depended on the availability of municipality land in a given village.
The size and quality of pasture land in a municipality defined the affordability 
of keeping a dairy animal for that municipality’s households. In densely populated
Lenkeran, where municiple pastures were scarce, some interviewees reported taking 
their cow to their land share that they were not cultivating but using as pasture for the 
cow. In mountainous Shamakhy, the lands traditionally used as pastures were located
in very scenic areas. These areas were targeted by some Baku oligarchs as resort sites. 
Therein arose conflicts between municipality heads’ desire to make money (and 
contacts with Baku officials) and villagers’ pasture needs. The lands were being leased 
for the official price of 15 dollars per year per hectare with 99-year contracts. I 
personally observed mushrooming white fences with “Private Property” signs closing 
off formerly collective pastures and forests, the same land that had been used for wild 
berry and nut gathering, and dairy grazing, giving food to both villagers and their 
animals since the Soviet period. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide a visual explanation.
The enclosures of the commons were especially harsh on mountain villages 
that were far from roads and that had very limited access to other income sources. The 
forests and meadows of these secluded areas were both more desirable as resort sites 
to the Baku investors and doubly important to the livelihoods of local villagers. 
Both the municipality officials and the investors’ middlemen presented the 
enclosures as non-negotiable, inevitable. A woman interviewee said:
When the men went to discuss the matter with the municipality head, he said 
that he is as helpless as we are. It is big people from Baku [meaning top state 
officials—S.R.] who want these lands, the top.
Key support to the enclosures, however ironically, came from within the communities 
themselves.
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Figure 4.1. These “undeveloped” mountain slopes are used as pastures for the 
cattle of local villagers. Photo courtesy of www.azerbaijan24.com.
Figure 4.2. This mountain slope has been “developed”: Completed “Ulu dag” 
(“Glorious/ancient mountain”) hotel, Ilisu region, Azerbaijan.
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In the mountainous Shamakhy village, the municipality head in favour of the resort 
development and the investor’s middlemen presented the process of enclosures as 
serving the interests of the villagers themselves. Future resorts and villas would 
provide cash-generating jobs for the village’s young. This issue divided the village, 
softening the opposition of families with young adults. This particular village was now 
populated mostly by elder families who had sent their adult children to jobs in Baku. 
The families of the elderly, whose adult children had migrated out of the village, 
would not benefit from the service jobs at the new villas. They needed more the 
subsistence from dairy animals and from the forest (nuts, berries, wild fruits). The 
animals and the forest’s gifts were crucial for their independent sustenance and 
allowed them to occasionally support their migrant offspring with fresh food gifts. An 
elderly woman—the same one who had turned down the cash offers for private carpet-
weaving because she was busy with subsistence farming on her land plot—used an 
expression that communicated the meaning of this process to their livelihoods: “They 
will slowly starve us to death.”
This fact, however, did not affect the pro-resort—that is, pro-job—stance of 
the younger adults and their families in the village. This group’s choice to support the 
“development” of common pastures into private resorts, knowing well that this 
encroached on their neighbors’ rights to the commons and meant gradual starvation 
for them, signified simultaneously: (1) the prioritizing of “self”-interest at the expense 
of others who were expected to look after themselves (akin to some individuals’ 
utilizing of the land-reforms bureaucracy to get better plots of land), and (2) the 
adoption of capitalocentrism (the valuation of cash-bringing activities over non-cash-
bringing ones). Interestingly, and this is very important, individual choices about 
economic activity—for example, preferring to work as a cash-wage guard in a would-
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be resort erected on common pastures—were inseparable from and had crucial 
repercussions for social relations, for a community’s well-being.
Capitalocentrism, Economic Self-Interest/Gain Motive, and an Implicit 
Conditioner of Human Action
The judgement dubbed “capitalocentrism” by J. K. Gibson-Graham—the valuation of 
cash-bringing activities over non-cash-bringing ones—is closely related to “self-
interest” or the “gain motive”—the idea that people seek to further their economic 
interests—a concept introduced by Adam Smith, and forming the basis of classical and 
neoclassical economic theory. Both rest on the implicit belief that money is 
interchangeable with “any object of desire.” This belief, essential to Smith’s theory as 
explained by historian William Reddy in Money and Liberty in Modern Europe 
(1987), is also the overlooked basis of capitalocentric valuation in all aspects of 
human life. Reddy (1987) writes:
Smith’s synthesis was the full-blown liberal illusion. Its ingredients were (1) 
the unlimited and easy substitutability of money for any other object of desire, 
and therefore (2) the universality of the underlying desire for “advantage” or 
gain; (3) the political neutrality of money exchanges, and therefore (4) the 
compatibility of free trade with personal liberty. Each of these ideas so neatly 
entailed the others, all so plausibly turned on the apparent truth of the first 
principle, that the theory seemed to sum up what the essence of money is. 
(P. 87)
Reddy noted that as beliefs, rather than empirical facts, the elements of the liberal 
illusion were hard to disprove.31 On the historical example of different contexts in 
                                                
31 He devoted Money and Liberty in Modern Europe to demonstrating the fallacy of these beliefs, 
specifically, the third—the political neutrality of monetary exchanges. Reddy pointed out that money 
meant fundamentally different things to the poor, for whom it signified the satisfaction of immediate 
bodily needs, and to the rich, who were free from these immediate pressures. The monetary exchanges 
between the two therefore were far from being politically neutral, but by their nature carried 
disciplining power over the poor. 
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early modern Europe, Reddy demonstrated how these beliefs—including the belief 
that people are guided by economic self-interest, “the universality of the underlying 
desire for ‘advantage’ or gain”—were tied to the use of money as the medium of 
exchange.
Karl Polanyi also demonstrated the historicity of the phenomenon of 
individuals seeking “advantage” or “gain,” but with another method. Based on the 
historical comparison of the guiding principles of human behaviour in different 
societal formations, in his collection of essays Primitive, Archaic, and Modern 
Economies (1968), he pointed out that the “universal” human desire for gain was 
specific only to “modern” or, more specifically, market economies. Motives distinctly 
different from the maximization of self-gain—like reciprocity, give-and-take—ruled 
the behaviour of the members of pre-modern societies, Polanyi pointed out. Selfish 
gain-maximization, therefore, was not a universal characteristic of the human race, but 
a historically specific product of a historically specific system called a market society. 
Polanyi’s insight allowed us to see, as Hannes Lacher (1999) explained,
that the pursuit of economic gain is itself the product of the way in which 
people gain access to their livelihood. Wherever profit-maximizing is a 
dominant form of social behaviour, we have to look at the political institutions 
which make the members of society market dependent, and which sustain the 
differentiated realm of the economy which seems to be operating according to 
an autonomous logic. Only where individuals are ultimately dependent on the 
market for their livelihood can the market become a social force which 
compels them to subordinate social values to the pursuit of profit. (P. 345)
This was because,
With the commodification of land, labor, and money, the livelihood of people 
became dependent on market incomes forcing them to behave according to the 
rationality of the market. (Lacher 1999:345)
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Neither Polanyi nor Reddy would have to work hard to convince female 
villagers in rural Azerbaijan—my interviewees—that individual self-maximization 
thinking was only special to a market society. These women had observed themselves 
change from one set of popular thinking and acting to another. The manifest greed of 
the manipulators of land reforms for better plots, and the tacit support of enclosures in 
hopes of cash employment, both justifying self-interest as a legitimate motive for 
action, were a break from the Soviet popular discourse in which an individual was said 
to gain value through service to his or her community (defined as the Soviet state). In 
the Soviet period this service to the community (i.e., the state) was the main criteria 
for measuring the value of acts, not their contribution to one’s own economic 
advancement. In fact, the latter form—thinking and acting to increase one’s financial 
position—were officially and communally criticized as denigrating, lowering an 
individual far below his or her potential (of service to the state/Soviet community).
Indeed, the story of the post-Soviet transition and the rise of self-interest in 
rural Azerbaijan both supports Reddy’s and Polanyi’s attempts to demonstrate gain-
seeking thought and behaviour as historical, a product of social structures, and 
challenges them to give full credit to the importance of historical individual choices.
The Soviet economy, which my interviewees remembered for kinder and more 
considerate relations among people, was “modern” (in the sense that it was 
industrialized), but it was not a market system. Although it traded with the global 
market economy, its internal organization would be accurately described as based on 
state/central planning, rather than market regulation. Antonio Sánchez-Andrés and 
José March-Poquet (2002) evaluated the USSR’s economy using Polanyi’s own
concept of “the commodification of land, labor, and money.” Polanyi had argued in 
The Great Transformation (1944/2001) that the commodification of land, labor, and 
money—their availability on the market for sale and treatment as commodities—was a 
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key precondition of a market economy/society.32 Sánchez-Andrés and March-Poquet 
(2002) explained how, despite the appearance of modern production with wage labor 
and cash circulation, the USSR’s economy operated with decommodified land, labor, 
and money:
1. Land had been massively collectivized in the 1930s, it was a state property:
The only possibilities for non-state owned property appeared in the form of 
individually used parcels that the rural population, and less extensively the 
urban population, were permitted to manage. The production so obtained was 
intended for self-consumption but, in certain cases, was sold, although not in a 
regular manner. That is, the exchange relations associated with land during the 
Soviet period, when they existed, were very marginal. (Sánchez-Andrés and 
March-Poquet 2002:710)
2. Labor was involved in the productive activity of the society, and was paid 
monetary incomes—wages. However, a majority of worker compensation was “in 
kind and not directly linked to their specific productive activity,” such as allocation of 
housing, social and community services, and so on.
3. Finally, money did not serve the functions of form of payment, standard of 
value, store of wealth, and means of exchange.33 In the USSR, and other centrally 
planned economies,
“the currency has played the part of ratification of previously established 
administrative decisions. In the first place, production objectives and supply 
plans were to the firms, and their production was assigned. In the second place, 
                                                
32 This, according to Polanyi (1944/2001), was the chief cause of the instability of a market society, 
because land, labor, and money could not be treated as commodities 
for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it 
would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness. 
Inevitably, society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took impaired the 
self-regulation of the market, disorganized industrial life, and thus endangered society in yet 
another way. It was this dilemma which forced the development of the market system into a 
definite groove. (P. 3) 
33 Categorized by Polanyi (1977:102–9).
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in accordance with the production plan, they were allocated some funds whose 
destination, regarding the supplier and the acquired input, appeared preset, 
with no changes being possible in this respect. Therefore, the currency served 
neither as a widespread form of payment nor of exchange. An extreme case of 
this inconvertibility appeared regarding inter-firm transactions that were 
carried out with bank transfers (not convertible into cash), while the 
transactions between firms and workers were carried out using cash. On the 
other hand, when completing the plan, the benefits (or losses) of the firms were 
absorbed by the state administration, with money not serving as a mechanism 
of accumulation . . . of wealth for the firms. It should also be pointed out that 
in terms of the administrative level of planning, the type of units considered 
was different, so that the currency did not carry out the function of unified 
countable unit” (Sánchez-Andrés and March-Poquet 2002:711–12).
The commodity (all-purpose) money that Polanyi discerned as a key characteristic of 
the market system had to simultaneously carry these functions (Polanyi 1957:264).
So, the Soviet system was devoid of the systemic characteristics of a market 
economy, which as Polanyi showed pressured a person to act according to “market 
logic” (Hannes 1999), and “disposed” of “the physical, psychological, and moral 
entity ‘man’” (Polanyi 1944/2001:76).
Yet, the exhibition of profit-oriented behaviour—especially in the 
manipulation of land reforms that so profoundly affected many rural communities in 
Azerbaijan, causing wounds still vividly remembered over 10 years later during my 
interviews—took place in the absence of the pressures that market dependency inflicts 
on one’s livelihood-making behaviour: In the mid-1990s significant portions of 
Azerbaijan’s economy, as in many other post-Soviet countries, were demonetised, 
forcing people off market exchange into subsistence production and social networks as 
a source of sustenance. What happened in Azerbaijan and its rural villagers very well 
fit Simon Clarke’s (1999) description of this phenomenon in Russia:
The demonetisation of the economy refers to the fact that the bulk of inter-
enterprise transactions are not settled in monetary form but through bilateral 
barter and barter chains, unofficial clearing systems and the use of various 
kinds of bills of exchange. It is important to be clear, however, that the 
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demonetisation of the economy is very uneven. The problem faced by 
households is particularly acute because, while demonetisation is reflected in 
the systemic and ever-increasing non-payment of wages and social benefits, 
retail trade is not demonetised, nor is the payment for housing, communal 
services, health, education and welfare: it is not possible for ordinary people to 
pay for their everyday needs either by offering barter goods or by issuing bills 
of exchange . . . Thus, while enterprises and organizations are able to live 
within a demonetised market economy, the only option facing workers who do 
not have money is withdrawal from the market altogether. (P. 115)
This meant, particularly in the countryside, growing one’s own food, calling on the 
help of family and friends, exchanging labor and produce—in Azerbaijan, just like in 
Russia. One of my interviewees in Shamakhy described exchanging a goat for a loaf 
of bread in the 1990s, when wheat and bread in the country were in short supply. 
Another (also in Shamakhy) described how she exchanged her wedding gifts—gold 
jewellery—for a sack of flour in the mid-1990s. Everyone interviewed described their 
household plots as the sustainer of their livelihoods, at the time of the interviews as 
well as in the difficult 1990s—during which the produce of the plots even helped to 
support urban relatives. At the time of the land reforms, masses of people in rural 
Azerbaijan depended on subsistence production and barter much more than on cash-
paying wage jobs.
It was the same “drawing in” of the economic activity in Russia that made 
Michael Burawoy point out the inapplicability of Polanyi’s description of the market
transformation to the social situation in post-Soviet Russia in “Transition without 
Transformation: Russia’s Involutionary Road to Capitalism” (2001). Burawoy argued 
that Russia has become a market society without the commodification of labor—“the 
transformation of society”—as well as without the transformation of production, and 
state. The social context here in the 1990s is, as Burawoy (2001) described,
remarkable not for the rise and fall of the market but for the absence of these 
three alternative significations of the nineteenth century great transformation—
the transformation of production, of society and of the state. The economy 
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undergoes neither a neoliberal revolution nor an institutional evolution but 
rather an economic involution, a market that sucks resources out of production, 
sending it into a spiralling contraction. Instead of a vibrant synergy between 
civil society and the state we find their mutual repulsion in which society turns 
in on itself—societal involution—and the federal state turns outwards to the 
global economy. (P. 8)34
How then, in rural Azerbaijan, in this context of non-marketized, subsistence-farming-
and social-network-based livelihood-making through the 1990s, did the gain motive 
and capitalocentrism take root, and proliferate? The picture of market-dependency 
producing a market (profit-oriented) mentality simply does not fit the historical 
realities of the rise of self-interest during the land reforms and communal 
disintegration in rural Azerbaijan.
Human Choice and Its Social Consequences
The gain-seeking behaviour of outstanding rural villagers during the land reforms that 
served to transmit self-focus and divided village communities took root in the absence 
of the Soviet discourse of “an-individual-gains-value-through-service-to-the-Soviet-
state-and-community” and its social enforcement mechanism (such as public shaming 
at school, work, and Party meetings). The public discourse context of these decisions, 
however, was not a complete value vacuum. In place of the Soviet ideology, an 
individual’s value was suggested through the Azerbaijanian nationalist discourse in 
the early years of the breakup from the Soviet Union (1991–93). This was in turn 
replaced by Heydar Aliyev’s invitation to market-based, individual-ability-led 
livelihood-making, where one’s worth was subtly suggested as the material results of 
this livelihood-making—since the material results of one’s livelihood-making were 
                                                
34 Page number quoted from the PDF version of this article, now available online through the Public 
Sociology Department at UC Berkeley: 
http://publicsociology.berkeley.edu/publications/producing/burawoy.pdf.
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seen as deriving from one’s acumen and industriousness, as discussed in chapter 3. 
Unlike the Soviet discourse, which, in the later decades of the USSR’s existence, was 
firmly held in place by established indoctrination through all levels of education, 
heavily censored media, and entertainment including arts production, and enforcement 
through public shaming, the human valuation ideas that the post-Soviet government 
put forward in the 1990s were mere suggestions, and their support structures were yet 
underdeveloped.
The fact that a good number of people chose self-maximizing behaviour with 
social consequences merely in the context of a subtle governmental suggestion and the 
absence of negative enforcement is not to be interpreted as the innate, universal 
selfishness of human beings that only needs to break free from social fetters. 
Sufficient to counter this interpretation is the example of Azerbaijan’s forty villages 
that did not accept land privatization—the state land offered free by the government—
but negotiated with the government and reorganized around distinct forms and degrees 
of cooperative or communal land use, an example that I will come to later in this 
chapter. So, rather than endorse the claims of the universal selfishness of human 
nature, the example of the land-reform-period greed contest and its toll on community 
strength invites us to give due credit to and conceptual space for the freedom of human 
choice and its significance for history even if at individual and local levels. The rise of 
self-interested behaviour in Azerbaijan was significant not only because it divided and 
paralyzed rural communities, but also because it ultimately legitimized and supported 
the market mechanisms of social organization with each individual heart that 
subscribed to it. Just as individual and local beliefs in the justice of the market 
structures, when acted upon, could serve to open up the locales for dependency on 
market structures (as shown in chapter 3), an individual’s belief in the legitimacy and 
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benefits of the “everybody-to-herself” mentality,35 when practiced, could promote and 
establish the structures of market dependence and real pressures for profit-oriented 
thinking.
This Azerbaijan study is not the only indicator of the need for a conceptual 
space for how individuals’ practiced beliefs about gain-maximization and the 
benevolence of the market serve to build, support, and deepen the market structures 
themselves. Many a detailed ethnography of the spread of the global market to a locale
points not to an omnipotent, larger-than-life force of globalization, but to individuals 
adapting to the new institutions while exhibiting adherence to or a positive acceptance 
of one or more aspects of market thinking—the belief in complete individual 
responsibility for making it, the positive value assigned to the increased consumption 
associated with an urbanized market economy.36
                                                
35 A modern name for inconsiderate greed.
36 The following are examples from very different contexts.
Carla Freeman’s High Tech and High Heels in the Global Economy (2000) is an ethnography 
of how Afro-Caribbean female workers of the global informatics industry in Barbados strive to 
distinguish themselves from factory workers through new modes of consumption (specifically of 
clothing and entertainment) and conscious imagemaking. Freeman argued that these women’s 
“enactment” of models of “professionalism,” motherhood, and modernised consumption in their jobs, 
family lives, appearances—the latter sought with trips that combine shopping and pleasure—essentially 
shape globalization. 
Farideh Heyat’s Azeri Women in Transition: Women in Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan
(2002) is based on the author’s interviews with different generations of urban professional women in 
Baku, and analyzes changing conceptions of femininity as these women enter the job market shaped by 
the presence of transnational oil corporations in Azerbaijan. Heyat describes how “local cultural 
expectations and Islamic beliefs were accommodated to different modernisation projects” using 
examples of individual and family decisions and conceptual adaptations.
Rhacel Parreñas in Illicit Flirtations: Labor, Migration, and Sex Trafficking in Tokyo (2011) 
unveils the realities of choice exercised by the category of workers most victimized in globalization 
literature and used interchangeably with human trafficking: the sex workers. Working in the bars of 
Tokyo side-by-side with Filipina hostesses serving drinks and singing karaoke, Parreñas gathered rich 
data to demonstrate how these women come to occupy their places by choice, in their minds mixing 
“business, body, and heart in complex ways,” each justifying their own mix in their own way.
Common to these very different works are descriptions of acceptance/internalization of one or more 
aspects of market society’s worldview by choice on the individual level—what some social scientists 
would call “a micro-level.” The phenomenon that really needs to be explained is the origins and 
massive proliferation of such choices, that not only “enact” globalization, as Carla Freeman argued, but 
profoundly legitimize it. 
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None of these is to say that the subjects in question are not vulnerable in many 
ways. These works are simply signals, implicit invitations to conceptually free the 
human facility of choice in studies of markets—local and global. It is crucial for 
critical social theory to give due consideration to this facility of choice. This facility 
on the part of the world population has been regarded as free and in need of constantly 
being won over by such diverse targets of critical social theory as the engines of 
market expansion, corporations and their leaders,37 and the Soviet state. Attesting to 
this is the former’s continuous use of media messages, advertisements, and ethical 
image-making strategies, all regularly evaluated and renewed, and the latter’s 
similarly continuous propagating of its worldview through media and education, 
following a citizen from cradle to grave, despite its uncontested control of national 
politics.
Ironically, it is often the critics—of both capitalism and the state socialist 
model of the USSR—devoted to human emancipation who fail to give adequate 
consideration to the facility of choice on the part of the exploited, which the exploiters 
always regard as alive and in need of addressing, as noted above. For example, in his 
account of the English enclosures, which although preceding Azerbaijan’s case by 
several centuries nevertheless had surprising similarities, David McNally in Another
World Is Possible: Globalization and Anti-Capitalism (2006) mentions how peasants 
rioted against the fencing-off the common lands, simply by tearing down the fences, 
and
Yet, through extortion, intrigue, violence, and manipulation, more and more 
English land was enclosed. (P. 92)
                                                
37 See Sklair (2001).
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Extortion and violence are more straightforward, but what types of “intrigues” and 
“manipulation” ensured that the peasants saw their lands enclosed? McNally (2006) 
notes:
As is so often the case, the privatizers and enclosers tried to present their battle 
not as the greedy and violent property grab it was, but as a great moral crusade 
that would lift the poor out of poverty and idleness. (P. 92)
We are given the example of this presentation from the language of a land surveyor of 
the time, but there the case ends. How—through which decisions, beliefs, acts, and 
their social repercussions—did the peasants tearing down the fences accept the role of 
“the poor” to be lifted “out of poverty and idleness”? This process is not addressed, or 
mentioned as an aspect to be addressed, by McNally.
Human Choice and Its Social Context: The Suggested Purpose of Human Life
Useful to understanding the range of human choice in a social context and to making 
sense of the effects of multifaceted culture, ideology, and discourse on locales and 
individuals is the basic question “What is the purpose of life
assumed/proposed/suggested by this social context?” This question is paramount, 
because human choices are not haphazard, but are given meaning by various historical 
forms of the answer to the question of what gives value to human actions and life. 
Every social formation proposes and includes, implicitly as in a market society or 
explicitly as in the USSR, a vision of the purpose of human life with a concomitant 
model/vision of an individual–community relationship. This meaning/purpose/aim of a 
human’s life suggested and disciplined by social structures, if accepted by human 
beings, is an insightful prism into historical choices. A given conception of the
purpose of human life cannot and does not answer all the specific moral and practical 
questions that individuals and communities have to face. But this conception 
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powerfully defines the boundaries of the space within which (or the direction in 
which) the answers are sought.
In the Soviet Union, the officially propagated purpose of human life was 
service to state socialism—presented as the road to communism, allegedly the perfect 
form of human society. Accepted by Soviet persons, this aim was a powerful engine of 
the Soviet state’s extraction of surplus from workers. The socially acceptable, 
suggested, and praised purpose of a Soviet citizen’s life was to serve the state’s efforts 
of communism with his or her specific skills, talents, and hard work. This was the first 
and foremost aim instilled in the education system and media that gave meaning to a 
Soviet human’s life. Understanding this would make it easy to see how so many 
people having so little in the way of material possessions went on to labor in difficult 
conditions, and often with cheer and songs, for a state that appropriated their labor for 
decades.38
The idea of one’s labor and industriousness serving not just one’s material 
well-being, but simultaneously, and ultimately, the well-being and freedom of the 
entire society (through communism building) was noble, but also carried a valuation 
of work very different from the capitalocentric valuation. A woman’s unpaid work in 
housekeeping and childrearing, for example, was declared an act of service to the state 
(Rueschemeyer 1981; Lapidus 1978; Buckley 1989; Ashwin 2002; Marody and Giza-
Poleszczuk 2000; Gal and Kligman 2000; Heyat 2002).
Popular attitudes towards wealth and “making it” were shaped by this belief in 
the purpose of human life. If Ivan had worked hard as a carpenter, and did not have a 
car, a big house, a truck full of savings—he did not have to feel like a failure for this, 
                                                
38 This Soviet behaviour puzzled Western social scientists, who talked about a state of mind specific to 
a Soviet citizen, culminating in books such as the Princeton professor Robert Tucker’s The Soviet 
Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (1972) analyzing “the thought patterns and 
ideological factors that together constituted the Soviet political mind” (back cover).
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as the purpose of life, to him and to the society, was not those material goods per se, 
but contributing to the socialist development—the building of communism, allegedly 
with more material goods and freedom for everyone. By this criteria, Ivan could still 
command high respect and dignity in his own eyes and in the eyes of the community,
despite not having put together savings for a rainy day, a car, and a house.
Secret peddlers, propagators of material goals, seekers of luxury were 
officially disdained as the infesters of mind and culture. Strict censorship of literary 
works, theatre plays, music—“food for thought”—at all levels of production served to 
maintain the consistency of the message: that the purpose of human life is the service 
to building communism and enjoying whatever simple pleasures are available along
the way.
This proclaimed goal of meaningful human life as the service to the building of 
communism under the stewardship of the socialist state was very vulnerable to the 
displays of luxurious consumption of state officials and enterprise managers. Such 
displays would invite official interrogation about the sources prior to the Gorbachev 
era and were either avoided or kept hidden in the circles of close family and friends.
From this prism, Gorbachev’s reforms were more fundamental than they are 
usually credited for being in altering the state ideology, and ultimately bringing about 
the fall of the USSR. The Gorbachev era allowed in immediate material comforts / 
expanded consumption as the goal of the Soviet state, and thus, implicitly, of human
life.39 Gorbachev’s was a socialist period with very capitalist aims. With the insertion 
of immediate expanded consumption as a goal of human activity into the social and 
                                                
39 Interestingly, the young of this social context—the Soviet generation born in the 1950s and 1960s—
had access to more material comforts than the cohorts of the 1940s, 1930s, and 1920, but were more 
disconcerted about a lack of material comforts.
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individual imagination, the debate became about means. And history spoke for the 
superiority of capitalism / the market mechanism for expanded consumption.
The purpose of human life as a struggle for material improvement was 
temporarily tamed in the context of nationalist narratives in the early 1990s. In the 
turbulent period 1991–94 in Azerbaijan torn by the ethnic, Azeri-Armenian conflict 
over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, service to the dignity of the nation, to the ethnic 
community, was the debated, proposed purpose of human life. With Aliyev’s advent, 
the restoration of political stability and market reforms, nationalism retreated, leaving 
the arena to “getting ahead” or “staying afloat.”
Yet, after the noble immaterial goal-striving and self-identifying as a builder, 
creator, innovator for the ultimate benefit of future generations and humankind, the 
task of heading towards more material consumption in Azerbaijan, as in the rest of the 
post-socialist space, could not fill the emptiness for many. This effect was massive, 
giving rise to an entirely new concept, “Soviet nostalgia,” and scholarly discussion 
around it among Western social scientists (Munro 2006; White 2010; Karbalevich 
2002; Nikolayenko 2008; Velikonja 2009). The “Soviet nostalgia” that puzzled 
outside observers was so widespread that it started to be discussed in business research 
circles for its applicability in advertising strategies (Holak, Matveev, and Havlena 
2007). What is very interesting is that the nostalgia was not for the material security of 
the socialist period, but for “immaterial” things such as the lost vision of the noble 
purpose of life in serving others and the future, of a relationship to one’s community 
and society that produced hope. As Velikonja (2009) noted:
In popular opinion, nostalgia for socialism is something fabricated, invented, 
and then imposed by different groups of people to achieve some goals: to open 
a new commercial niche, to attain political credit, to win popular support, to 
get artistic inspiration, and so on. Thus, many academic studies have examined 
only this instrumental side of the phenomenon, limiting it to the “industry of 
nostalgia” only. But research shows that nostalgia is in fact a retrospective 
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utopia, a wish and a hope for a safe world, a fair society, true friendships, 
mutual solidarity, and well-being in general, in short, for a perfect world. As 
such, it is less a subjective, arbitrary, ideological effort to recall the past as it is, 
an undetermined, undefined, amorphous wish to transcend the present. So 
nostalgia for socialism in fact does not relate exclusively and precisely to past 
times, regimes, values, relations, and so on as such, but it embodies a utopian 
hope that there must be a society that is better than the current one. (P. 535)
Another scholar, the anthropologist Alexei Yurchak (2006), wrote:
An undeniable constitutive part of today’s phenomenon of “post-Soviet 
nostalgia,” which is a complex post-Soviet construct, is the longing for the 
very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the 
reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state’s proclaimed goals—
and that were as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the 
feelings of dullness and alienation. A Russian philosopher wrote in 1995 that, 
from the vantage point of the first post-Soviet years, he had come to recognize 
that the grayness and fear of Soviet reality had been indivisibly linked with a 
very real optimism and warmth, with accompanying forms of “human 
happiness,” “comforts and well-being,” and “cordiality, successes and order” 
in a “well-furnished common space of living.” A Russian photographer, 
echoing the same realization, made a “banal confession” that for him 
personally the “crash of Communism” was also, in retrospect, the crash of 
something very personal, innocent, and full of hope, of the “passionate 
sincerity and genuineness” that marked childhood and youth. A critical 
examination of such retrospections is essential to an understanding of Soviet 
socialism. Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that 
“really existing socialism” acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and 
without understanding the creative and positive meanings with which they 
endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of 
the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways 
that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind 
of social system socialism was. (Pp. 8–9, emphasis added)
Very crucially, the post-Soviet transition was real humans’ efforts to come to terms 
with the suddenly declared absurdity of what they believed to be the purpose of their 
lives and with the new vision of the purpose of life that was suggested to them. And 
with the alternative of the market society, that new vision was certainly suggested. It 
was one in which the ultimate aim was to strive for one’s own well-being, for better 
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material conditions of life, as President Heydar Aliyev’s speeches40 suggested to the 
peasants of rural Azerbaijan. It was within this vision of the purpose of life that 
Smith’s liberal illusion discerned by Reddy (1987) , including “the unlimited and easy 
substitutability of money for any other object of desire,” could be sustained. (The 
“unlimited and easy substitutability of money” presupposes a certain type of desire; 
the communist society with its relationships that the Soviet human believed to be 
building could not be bought with money). The aspects of the “new mindset”
engulfing post-Soviet Azerbaijan that I have looked at so far—belief in the individual 
responsibility for “making it,” belief in the necessity of striving for the self’s material 
well-being even at the expense of others—presupposed, rested on the belief that 
“making it,” one’s own “material well-being,” were the desired end results, the 
purpose of life. People’s belief in this new purpose of life, suggested in President H. 
Aliyev’s speeches and practiced through the acts of the newly converted subscribers, 
was essential to globalizing capitalism. As Professor Leslie Sklair wrote in The 
Transnational Capitalist Class (2001) after having interviewed managers and 
executives from over eighty Fortune Global 500 corporations:
the globalization of the capitalist system reproduces itself through the profit-
driven culture-ideology of consumerism. This implies much more than the 
truism that capitalists want people to buy the goods and services they produce 
and market. Global capitalism thrives by persuading us that the meaning and 
value of our lives are to be found principally in what we possess, that we can 
never be totally satisfied with our possessions (the imperative of ever-changing 
fashion and style), and that the goods and services we consume are best 
provided by the free market, the generator of private profit that lies at the heart 
of capitalism. (P. 6, emphasis added)
Acceptance of this new meaning of the purpose of life on a large scale was essential to 
the expansion of global capitalism, and the post-Soviet space could be a rough 
                                                
40 Quoted in the previous chapter.
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battleground for the hearts and minds who were essentially free to choose and had the 
values of the socialist system in them. The historical process of the post-Soviet 
transition was shaped by people’s, families’, neighborhoods’, and locales’ responses to 
the new, suggested purpose of human life as much as it was shaped by particular 
politicians, governments, and transnational interests.
Azerbaijan’s countryside was at the heart of this struggle, as well as its 
decisive site for the country. Rural transformation, rural acceptance of the new 
purpose of life, of “culture-ideology” as Sklair (2001) called it, was critical to the 
country’s integration into the global market structures. Subsisting significantly on their 
backyards and commons, the rural population were not under the iron pressure to 
compete, unlike many of their urban fellows. The struggle for the dominant, legitimate
view of the purpose of life, the aspect of human agency and communal action, all 
stood out visibly and clearly in the study of the post-Soviet rural history here. Some 
have accepted the pursuit of material gain as the goal of life within the limits of 
neighborly dues and care for others. These were at a disadvantage and in perpetual 
moral pain from having to choose; some turned inward, not able to live what they 
believed in, nor ready to switch, paralyzed by indecisiveness. Others have accepted 
gain-seeking wholeheartedly. They were the historical driving force of the 
establishment of the market, materially and ideologically, in remote rural Azerbaijan. 
This is how very local, even individual, decisions were relevant to the expansion of 
global capitalism in Azerbaijan.
Ivanovka and Others
Ivanovka is the most famous of example of continuing collective land use in post-
Soviet Azerbaijan. This village is located in the Ismayilli region of Azerbaijan, in the 
north of the republic. The village is inhabited overwhelmingly by “molokans,” 
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descendants of ethnically Russian dissident Christians who broke away from the 
Russian Orthodox church and settled in Azerbaijan in the early 19th century as a part 
of Tsarist Russia’s policy of exiling the “heretics” to Caucasus. In the Soviet period 
the village was home to a collective farm–kolkhoz, which was so impoverished in 
1953 that “the cows were fed with straw from roofs and in the spring time they were 
taken out to pasture on the wagons because they could not walk by themselves” 
(Kashin 2007). This was the year that Nikolay Vasilyevich Nikitin, in his twenties, 
was chosen to be the chairman of the collective farm. Nikitin devoted himself to lifting 
up the farm and the village, and was described posthumously as a “thoughtful leader, 
understanding the needs of the villagers” (Mursalova 2005; Kashin 2007). Ivanovka’s 
kolkhoz—named after M. I. Kalinin—rose to be one of the model enterprises of the 
Republic and the USSR, yielding higher than average returns in all areas of its 
production—meat, milk, and produce alike. In the 1970s Nikitin managed to arrange a 
barter with Finland and Bulgaria: “in exchange for garlic the villagers received high-
quality imported furniture” (Mursalova 2005). Nikitin opened the grocery store 
“Ivanovka” in the center of the capital, Baku, supplied with the dairy products of the 
village collective: a place where Baku dwellers still line up to buy milk, butter, sour 
cream, and yogurt before it is gone until the next delivery. The community applied a 
concept of “collective” that extended beyond farm work: weddings and funerals alike 
have been the work of the entire community; and members who could not work on the 
collective, old and young alike, were given special care (Mursalova 2005). In the mid-
1980s the collective had 12 million dollars in its account in “Vneshekonombank” 
(Foreign Economic Bank) of the USSR (Kashin 2007). Nikitin himself has been
awarded the title “Hero of Socialist Labor,” and elected to the Supreme Council of the 
USSR. After the fall of the USSR, Nikitin continued to manage the kolkhoz. When 
privatization of land in Azerbaijan was debated in President Heydar Aliyev’s early 
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years of government, the village collective headed by Nikitin petitioned the president 
asking for its land not to be privatized, to be left to work as a collective farm and to 
organize their lives around it. The request was granted. The collective farm, named 
after N. Nikitin upon his death in 1994, continues today. Although not all leaders 
following Nikitin proved worthy of the legacy, the collective persevered and stands 
today—more than twenty years after the breakup of the Soviet system—as a close-knit 
and satisfied, predominantly molokan Russian community in Azerbaijan. In a 2011 
joint CNN–ANS TV video about Ivanovka, community members attributed their 
resilience to standing together through the difficulties of the 1990s. These statements 
of the Ivanovka members are from the transcription of the video:
Grigoriy Minnikov, kolkhoz dairy worker: During those times of hardships 
and war, it was difficult everywhere in Azerbaijan. Many villages, including 
those with Russian populations, decreased. We survived because we were 
together as one kolkhoz.
Oalina Sergeyeva: I worked in the kolhoz for 34 years. Thank God the 
kolkhoz gives everything free to its employees—bread, meat and dairy 
products.
Valeriy Krupskiy, kolhoz swine worker: I think the kolkhoz form of 
management has proven to be the right way. I have known other farmers 
whose businesses eventually disappeared. We have a mixed economy here. 
When there are problems with grain and vineyards, or swine or poultry or 
cattle, someone comes to our rescue. Of course when you are part of the 
kolhkoz, everyone enjoys the profit. (CNN World View, 2011)
The aim of this example here is not to argue the supremacy of the collective farm form 
of organizing agriculture. It is simply to show that worldviews and economies 
alternative to the “everyone is to himself/herself” framework could be and were 
chosen in the transition through historic individual and communal decisions. The 
example of Ivanovka is important because it demonstrates that individuals in and with 
communities could make choices: regarding the market as the best form of social 
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organization, regarding individual production as the best form of production, and, 
probably most importantly, regarding self-service as the purpose of a person’s life, 
with respect to the individual’s place in the community, social life, and the world.
Ivanovka is only the most famous, most publicized example demonstrating the 
facility of choice and the historical results of its exercise on the part of local 
communities and individual villagers in post-Soviet rural Azerbaijan. Some villages 
resisted the delineation of municiple lands: according to the Head of the SCLM, Qarib 
Mammadov, of the 2,607 village municipalities in Azerbaijan, 40 did not have the 
borders of municiple lands delineated and marked “for objective reasons” 
(Mammadov 2002:12). The “objective reasons”—according to the echoing
explanations coming from different sources such as lower-level SCLM officers, 
Shamakhy executive government officials, and a former municipality mayor in a 
Lenkeran village—were the villages’ resistance to the delineation and demarcation of 
their “common” municiple lands, for fear that this will result in land speculation of the 
commons by the municipality heads to come.
Others designed different forms and degrees of cooperative land use. In fact, I 
learned about Ivanovka from the head of the executive government of Shamakhy, who 
shared during the interview that a tiny minority of villages scattered around 
Azerbaijan collectively chose to pass on the individual use of the privatized land of 
their former collectives. Not all of these retained the kolkhoz structure. He gave 
examples of two alternatives, one in Shamakhy, that included collective care for the 
land, and collective use of and care for technology—that villagers agreed to keep 
rather than privatize—on privatized land.
All these attempts at alternatives rested on the mistrust in the idea that 
individual striving for material well-being is the right way to organize livelihood-
making and communal relations. Ultimately, the privatization of collective lands in 
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Azerbaijan and the transformation of the relationship to land was a struggle over the 
above idea, and the suggested new purpose of life. A story from the head of the 
executive government in Shamakhy will demonstrate this point.
This executive government official—the same one who first told me about 
Ivanovka and other villages experimenting with alternative organizations of land 
use—described breaking resistance to the land reforms in a village particularly hostile 
to them, in lower Shamakhy. This community had resisted privatization and 
individualization of their collective farmland, viewing this as an end to their 
community. Armed with garden tools, they drove away different government officials
who continued to attempt to implement the reforms in the village. The executive 
head’s predecessors regarded this village as a “hopeless” case, best left alone, “some 
saying that its land will never be privatized” (interviewee’s words), until he—my 
interviewee—was appointed to this position. He—who had also served as a kolkhoz 
manager in a different region under the Soviet Union—brought the village in with 
simple discussions, “found their language” (dilini tapmaq), and explained to them the 
benefits of the reforms. “You have to know how to talk to them, to reason with them 
[i.e., the peasants],” he said.
Common to the examples of continuing collective involvement in land and 
eventual succumbing to privatized, individual land use was the initial belief in the 
potential damage to the community, communal relations, and unity that would come 
from individual privatization. Such reservations on the part of the village communities 
must have been widespread—they were noted by all but one of the interviewees from 
the State Committee for Land and Mapping, the key implementers of the reforms. 
What the words of the interviewed head of the executive government in Shamakhy 
brilliantly demonstrated is that these reservations were broken not by a harsh stance
and threats, but by appealing to the villagers’ own interests in the benefits to come 
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from the land reforms. These benefits could only be explained by conceptually 
adopting material well-being as the key value/goal of life (versus community cohesion 
and community well-being) and giving historical examples of how privatization and 
market organization have proved to be superior roads to the new goal—just as 
President Heydar Aliyev did in his speeches directed to the peasants.
Ultimately, it was this adoption of material well-being as the key value and 
goal of life, and of an individualized and marketized path to it as the most successful 
one, that paved the way for Azerbaijan’s transformation into a market economy—
through the disintegration of rural communities—and for the eventual speculation in 
municipality (i.e., common) land-leasing in the name of more efficient, “profitable” 
use of land.
Community and Energy
Nowhere was the disintegration of Azerbaijan’s village communities more visible than 
in the rural utility provisioning problem. Although Azerbaijan became a net exporter 
of gas in 2007 with the startup of the Shahdeniz natural gas field (IFAD 2010), as a 
EurasiaNet journalist ironically observed, “people in most Azerbaijani villages live 
without gas and water, and enjoy only a few hours of electricity each day” (Effendi 
2011).
The provision of utilities to Azerbaijan’s rural areas deteriorated sharply after 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, with the utilities still a public sector. The World 
Bank’s “Poverty and Social Impact Analysis for Energy Sector Reform in Azerbaijan” 
(2003) pointed out:
In 1991, natural gas was delivered to 85% of households, but by 2000 was only 
supplied to the Absheron region [i.e., to the capital city Baku and its 
surrounding villages—S.R.].
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. . . [The] pipeline system suffered from under-investment and 
insufficient maintenance and its condition deteriorated significantly . . . Low 
collection rate and theft are other serious problems. (Pp. 9–10)
To paraphrase this in the language of my interviewees in all six villages, gas and water 
pipes and electricity delivery wires have been disassembled, cut, and sold on the black 
market by the local representatives of the same utility companies. The “theft” pointed 
out in the report above was very identifiable, easily investigate-able and stoppable, if 
there was a will. Yet the pillage of the public utility system had taken on a massive 
scale, well beyond the six villages I visited, and was documented as a national 
phenomenon in the World Bank report above. The reaction of the villages whose 
energy provisioning was pillaged is worth scrutiny. The very rich in the bigger 
villagers acquired generators, the poor went without electricity, and all switched to 
movable natural gas tanks/cylinders while collectively yearning for the comforts of the 
Soviet-era electricity, natural gas, and water supply. Despite the commonality of need 
and interest, there was no communal resolve and action to address a very local 
problem.
In the remote mountain villages, the villagers turned to the surrounding forests 
for winter fuel. Dependent as their livelihoods are on these forests for sustenance,
cutting down the trees for these villages meant cutting their own lifeline. In the 
mountain village of Lerik, an interviewee called on me with evident pain: “Look at 
these forests surrounding us.” We were sitting at a wood table in a small backyard in 
this village high on the slopes of Lerik mountains; wherever you turned your head 
from here you saw mountains covered in green with trees. “These forests are not what
they used to be,” the pain in the voice continued. “There used to be no patches in the 
green, so thick the forests were. We have cut and used them for fuel, year after year. 
Nothing much is left. People do not understand that they are cutting the tree branch on 
which they are sitting.” What could people do instead? What should they have done? 
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A hand movement brushed away the subject. Too complex. “There is no unity” was 
the short answer.
“There is no unity” (“Birlik yoxdur”) is the answer that is given interview after 
interview, village after village to the question about the utility problem. The same 
brushing-off hand movement is encountered too: too complex, no one to be blamed
specifically, yet everyone is responsible at once. Some deny responsibility: “I am just 
a woman, what can I do?” or “It is men’s job to step up and act.” Then, realizing
without a prompt that men’s inactivity needs to be accounted for, they add, “There is 
no unity.”
A little more information comes through during one interview in the large 
Lenkeran village, located near a busy highway. It is evening; we are sitting on the 
interviewee’s balcony, having tea and talking. Sounds of music and people talking into 
a microphone come through the air—there is a wedding in the village. The village has 
several thousand people, and my interviewee does not know whose wedding this is. 
She turns our open-ended conversation to the importance of people supporting each 
other during “xeyir-sher” (literally, “the good and the bad”)—the milestones of life, 
such as weddings, engagements, funerals. Suddenly the lights go off. The village is 
covered in darkness. The voices through the microphone and the music sounds have 
ceased. “They will send somebody to the electric station responsible to fix this,” my 
interviewee says, lighting a candle and referring to the wedding party. She continues 
to speak of the importance of relatives supporting each other through good and bad. 
As she had said, the lights come back, but go off again after about 15 minutes. The 
interviewee shakes her head: “They have not paid the man [i.e., the electric office 
responsible].” She is referring to the wedding organizers. “They should have settled 
this with him before starting the wedding. He is making them sorry for this on 
purpose.” I quietly think that the wedding organizers probably reasoned like me: why 
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should they pay for something that is their—and the entire village’s—due right: 
evening-time electricity? Yet, they and I seem to be wrong. Why is one person 
allowed to play in such a way with the electricity of an entire village? I have to ask. 
“Because we have no leaders,” says the 60-year-old interviewee. “We used to have 
leaders, our elderly (agsaqqallar), war41 veterans. Nobody dared to do such things to 
the village as long as they were alive. They would go right to the city center, 
demanding justice. Even after the new system came,42 nobody dared to play with us 
while they were alive. But they passed away, and the village was left without leaders 
after them (kend bashsiz qaldi). Nobody could take their place, everyone is thinking 
about filling their pocket nowadays. ” Then she adds, “And so anybody can do 
anything they want to us now. There is no unity.”
What happens when there is unity? Chukhuryurd utilities battle
Chukhuryurd is a highland Shamakhy village with about 1,500 inhabitants. It is 
located on the shores of a small mountain lake, and is surrounded by beautiful 
mountain scenery. The majority of its inhabitants used to be ethnic Russians who had 
migrated to this area during the reign of Tsar Peter I. After the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, many Russian inhabitants of the village migrated to the Russian Federation. 
Their properties were bought by ethnic Azeris, and the village’s ethno-social 
composition shifted to comprise nearly equal numbers of ethnic Azeri and ethnic 
Russian families. About a third of the village’s Azerbaijan-speaking population are 
seasonal residents: they move to the scenic village in spring, some for homesteading. 
These seasonal homesteaders buy a cow and a few chickens, tend to their land, and 
                                                
41 Referring to World War II.
42 Referring to the post-Socialist reform.
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after the autumn harvest, selling their dairy animals and excess harvest (if any), they 
move back to a big city—Baku or Sumgayit—to winter and to take cash-bringing jobs. 
One thing is clear: their move does not stem from a wintertime lack of heat and 
electricity, which has come to symbolize rural winters in Azerbaijan: “You should see 
this place in winter!” exclaims a seasonal resident during an interview. “There is 
probably no jollier place in rural Azerbaijan!” “This village has no problem with 
electricity, water, or heat supply,” I hear during an interview with another resident. 
“My house is old malakan43 house with Soviet-time hot water pipes in it. You come 
here in winter, and the house will be warm and snug. The supply and flow is better 
than in my Baku apartment. You sit inside in winter, from your cosy place look at the 
street [all houses in historic Chukhuryurd have a window facing a pebbled street—
S.R.], and you see adults and kids sledding and laughing, red from fresh air and joy. It 
is beautiful.”
Chukhuryurd’s winter comforts—the unceasing gas, hot water, and 
electricity—are not accidental gifts of providence. There have been attempts to pillage 
this village’s utility infrastructure as well, as was accomplished in most neighboring 
villages. But some men in the village—in a story that is now rarely remembered—just 
did not want to accept that this should be allowed to happen.
“The ethnic Russian community has really been at the forefront of this,” says 
an Azeri resident. “Some of them had migrated to Russia in the 1990s, but ended up 
returning. Others looked at their sisters and brothers who had taken the lead in 
migrating and had stayed in Russia, but missed Chukhuryurd and were never truly 
happy there. So they realized that they are going to stay here for the rest of their lives 
and they were not going to let anyone take their due rights just because he so wished.”
                                                
43 Rural ethnic Russians—descendants of the migrants settled here in Peter the Great’s time—are called 
malakan by themselves and by Azeris. 
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When utility officials tried to play with the village’s residents, promising to fix 
a problem but repeating supply cuts soon after, a group of men went straight to Baku. 
Some went directly to complain to the Ministry of Industry and Energy, others 
picketed in front of the Russian embassy (although they were not Russian passport 
holders). This—taking a trip to Baku—became their main strategy. Every single time 
the utility supply was cut without an obvious physical reason, a village group boarded 
the bus to Baku, bypassing local utility officials (whom they had by now established 
as dishonest and unreliable).
“Once, twice, thrice, soon local utility officials learned their lesson,” shared a 
seasonal resident, who did not participate in the trips personally. “They learned that 
trying to trick this village will result in a fist on your head (bashindan yumruq) from 
Baku.” Now when there are breaks in the utility supply for valid physical reasons, 
local utility officials try their best to fix them quickly.
Ethnic Russian residents of Chukhuryurd do not view the village’s post-Soviet 
history as a victory. An ethnic Russian female interviewee recalls how the men got 
together to go to Baku, but this does not erase all the issues that the villagers face in 
post-Soviet Azerbaijan. She is concerned about a number of issues: The quality of 
education in the village school is low. Almost all the teachers in the local school have 
second jobs/professions—beekeeper, carpenter, tailor—to ensure sufficient incomes. 
In busy periods for their second profession, they may not show up at school or may 
dismiss classes very early. There are also a lack of entertainment opportunities in the 
village, according to the interviewee, and life is quite boring, especially for teenagers 
and young adults.
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Conclusion
The land reforms were nearly completed by 2006. The appropriation of municiple 
lands by the oligarchs, described in an earlier chapter, as well as the interest and 
investments in the rural land by oligarchs in general, also started at about the same 
time, after the completion of the land reforms. Would the appropriation of municipal 
lands be as easy if the rural communities had felt and acted as a united group 
regarding their interests in land? I do not know the answer.
Interestingly, Azerbaijan’s oil-based reintegration into the global economy that 
created the new rich and all-powerful officials in the first place was not seen as the 
source of the villagers’ troubles. The villagers experienced these as stemming from
local specificities: the greed of local state officials and municipality heads, their 
villages’ geographic (isolated) and demographic (mostly elderly) position. In the 
individual scrambles for better pieces of formerly collective land within the 
framework of Azerbaijan’s land reforms, the discontent with the division was 
individualized, and rural communities fragmented. Those better able to navigate the 
reforms allied with government representatives within new rural social relations. 
Gendered disadvantages of navigating the reforms shaped and reproduced.
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CHAPTER 5:
RURAL MIGRATION AND THE BUILDING OF A MARKET SOCIETY
Post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s integration into the global market as a crude-oil supplier 
cannot be understood without considering the country’s massive rural outmigration. 
Rural migration was a negotiation of the new social order in globalizing Azerbaijan, 
not just because it eased the social tensions in the destitute countryside and supplied 
labor to the oil-capital Baku’s booming construction and service sectors. Crucially, 
rural migration in Azerbaijan both represented and perpetuated the spread of the new 
kind of “imaginaries” and values that underpinned the establishment and deepening of 
market institutions and relations in Azerbaijan.
In this chapter, I demonstrate how rural outmigration in post-Soviet 
Azerbaijan, while leaning on the legacy of the Soviet rural–urban migration, was 
nevertheless distinct, and how it entailed a moral transformation of migrants and of 
natal communities—through their relationships with the migrants—signifying new 
valuations of human work, life, and a new model for individual–community 
relationships, all indispensable to the spread of a market society.
Azerbaijan’s Rural Outmigration: Scale and Overview
Outmigration from rural Azerbaijan,44 after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and after 
the advent of the Aliyev regime specifically, is an elusive subject numerically. Expert 
estimations and official statistics go completely separate ways. Thus, for example, a 
well-known social scientist and the vice president of the Economic and Political 
Research Center in Azerbaijan, Hikmet Hajizade, argued that one million 
Azerbaijanians—about 25% of the labor force—left Azerbaijan in search of 
                                                
44 And from Azerbaijan in general.
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livelihoods with the implementation of Heydar Aliyev’s austerity policies after 1993 
(Hajizade 2003:359). Another analyst, Alec Rasizade (2002), himself an Azeri émigré
to the US, argued that Azerbaijan “suffered proportionally the largest decline in 
population of all former Soviet Republics” (P. 359). Joining the Russian researcher
Arsenyev, Rasizade (2002) argued that the current population of Azerbaijan “cannot 
possibly exceed 4 million”—half the official 8 million count—and that the official 
census of Azerbaijan was being fabricated to cover the population “exodus” (P. 359).
The official records of population movements walk a different way from 
experts’ statements and the common wisdom among Azeris. In fact, the Azerbaijan 
government did not officially acknowledge the existence of rural outmigration until 
2003. The official stance on migration from rural areas was that the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict of the early 1990s had left the state with a disrupted economic 
geography and almost one million internally displaced persons (migration.gov.az). 
Thus, Nagorno-Karabakh refugees were presented as the entirety of Azerbaijan’s 
internal migration problem.
Only in 2003, when President Heydar Aliyev’s son Ilham became president, 
was the existence of rural outmigration officially acknowledged. President Ilham 
Aliyev talked about “the prevention of the urbanization processes as a main priority 
for the development of economic policy,” and in his November 17, 2003, speech 
stressed “balanced and durable development of the regions” (i.e., rural areas) as one of 
the necessary components of economic policy (migration.gov.az). Shortly after, on 
February 11, 2004, the president approved the State Program on “Social-Economic 
Development of the Regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2004–2008).” This 
marked the period of acknowledgment of socio-economic distress in rural areas, and 
the period of official support to agricultural investment. The state introduced certain 
subsidies to encourage the cultivation of the now privatized land shares from former 
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collective farms. Private capital from Baku started flowing into the countryside for 
large-scale agricultural undertakings. By this time, outmigration was firmly 
established as a part of rural livelihoods.
During my field research, the presence and language of outmigration was one 
very pervasive and common issue that came through in almost all the interviews (the 
other such issue was the silence about land shares, the insignificance of land shares as 
a livelihood source). Everyone I talked to either had an immediate family member who 
had outmigrated or lamented the inability of her family members to emigrate. 
Residents of the large village in Lenkeran had connections to the Lenkerani networks 
established in Russia in the 1970s. So an overwhelming majority of migrants from this 
village were in Russia. Everywhere else Baku was equal to, if not ahead of Russia, as 
the destination of the outmigrants.
Differing reports of their outmigrant family members filled interviewee 
narratives during my research. Reported stories of migrated family members were 
different, but the fact that each and every interviewed person had a migrant family 
member seemed unifying to me.
In Shamakhy, one local woman narrated how relatives pitched in to buy a 
minibus for her husband, who took it to operate in Baku. Another narrated how her 
son working in Baku helped to pay the costs of his sister’s wedding. The third had her 
son, working in Baku, and his wife visiting and staying with her during the week of 
this interview. The fourth told how, of her three daughters, the one who had left for 
Baku was most in need of her mother’s help. The fifth complained that the absence of 
a joyful social life (youth gatherings, “dance parties as we used to have at the 
collective farm”) in the village makes her daughter look to her seasonal job in Baku as 
a way into a more stable and long-term migration to the capital. The sixth said that she 
is content with completing the wedding of her elder son, “who is now in Baku,” and is 
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worried now about “building a nest” (finding a bride, paying for the wedding and 
initial housing expenses) for her younger son. The seventh mentioned sending “a sack 
of wheat the other day to the kids in Baku.” The eighth, ninth, and tenth also talked 
about helping their (young adult) children, who had migrated to Baku, with occasional 
sacks of potatoes, forest nuts and fruits, containers of milk, or fresh-cut meat. The 
eleventh, a retired schoolteacher, narrated how their village school had 400 students 
when he was still working but has only 100 students now. In a different village, a 
concerned parent shared how entire grades in their village school have just one student 
or no students at all—“there are simply no kids of that age in the village anymore; the 
young are all now moving out because of the unemployment.” Local executive 
government officers’ narratives were also interwoven with the presence of 
outmigrants: a high-level local executive officer boasted of Shamakhy’s skilled 
carpenters, stone carvers, and architects, some of whom now “made a fortune building 
villas for ‘the very top’ in Baku and are highly sought after.” Another official talked 
about how some shops in Shamakhy town are funded by outmigrants to Russia and 
employ the migrants’ own relatives.
Shamakhy interviewees’ family members who had migrated to Baku were said 
to be working predominantly as construction workers, drivers, night guards, cleaners, 
and bread-factory workers. One woman’s son was a university instructor in Baku, and 
another’s daughter was a seasonal administrative assistant with a Chinese company. 
But it seemed that, overwhelmingly, the outflow of young labor from the villages of 
Shamakhy went right into the lines of the lower working class of the growing Baku. 
Massive construction projects in Baku seem to have created a demand for both 
unskilled and related skilled labor.
Rural migrants to Baku seem to maintain a double relationship with their 
family, essentially parents, in their home village. The migrants may or may not be able 
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to send money back home regularly. This depends on the type of work that they get in 
Baku. The parents in the village may be sending vegetables, forest fruits and nuts, 
milk and cheese. It is hard to say which way financial support works between rural 
migrants to Baku and those left behind in the countryside. Does it flow from Baku to 
the rural areas supporting lives there? Or does it flow from the remnants of the village 
to Baku, subsidizing the capital city’s new working class? The relationship is 
complex. For example, even if a migrant son and his wife living in Baku cannot send 
money to their parents in a mountain village, they provide a bridge through which the 
aging parents can access healthcare in Baku. The parents will get beds, a place to stay, 
and help around the city to find doctors. In case of emergencies such as surgeries and 
long-term therapy, the construction worker in Baku is more likely than the parent in 
the village to find money to borrow. It is more accurate to say that the family acts as a 
pooling and distribution unit than to assert a degree of urban-to-rural flow of cash 
from Baku.
The family as a pooling and distribution unit has been officially given the task 
of the social protection of its members by the state in the course of the market reforms.
Azerbaijan’s constitution, prepared under Heydar Aliyev in 1995, the first year of 
market reforms, states:
I. Everyone has the right for social protection. II. Most vulnerable persons 
must get support, in the first place, from members of their families. (Sections I 
and II of Article 38 “Right for social protection,” emphasis added45)
Thus, an important moral responsibility of society—social protection of the vulnerable 
and needy—is officially assigned to the institution of the family. In the wake of 
fundamental social transformation, this societal moral responsibility is not denied 
                                                
45 Available online at http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal/General/Constitution/doc/constitution_e.pdf.
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(because human beings are profoundly moral), but is redirected, its carrier redefined, 
in a very thoughtful way.46
Interestingly, outmigration helps acceptance of this redefinition. In the 
discussions of rural migrants, so different in their uniting move out, the making of 
rural livelihoods is treated as a family matter. Many interviewees explain their current 
livelihoods by their family specificities, their family members’ ability or inability to 
migrate.
Mrs. A has six sons who could support her even after tending to their own 
wives and children. Mrs. B, on the other hand, has three daughters and just one son, 
who is just trying to get on his own in Russia, so he can’t help much. Mrs. C’s 
husband was not entrepreneurial enough to leave the village, and had no relatives in 
Baku or Russia to “draw him out.” The social conditions behind the family’s 
difficulties, such as why a family cannot make a living from their land share despite 
hard work, and who is responsible for them, are absent altogether from the 
interviewees’ analyses of their livelihoods.
If the mass protests in Soviet Azerbaijan of the 1980s and early 1990s were 
directed explicitly against the Soviet state’s inability to improve the social conditions 
of livelihoods as expected, the rural outmigration of the late 1990s marks the 
relinquishing of these expectations and an acknowledgment of livelihoods as an 
individual family matter. The state’s responsibility for the conditions of rural 
livelihoods is diminished, importantly in the minds, although the state remains in 
charge of policies on trade, pricing, land, agriculture, and money in the context of 
which rural livelihoods have to be made.
                                                
46 In Azerbaijan with its strong family belonging / family culture, few would argue that family does not 
have a responsibility towards its vulnerable members. With family officially assigned this task, it is the 
willingness and ability of extended family to provide sustained support that becomes the source of 
resentment, not the state. 
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Rural Migration as a Negotiation of the New Social Order
The ability of rural residents to migrate in masses in a watchdog state is interesting. 
Azerbaijan’s government happens to be vigilant. Since Heydar Aliyev consolidated 
power in 1994, and started preparing for and implementing market reforms, local 
authorities have diligently watched the political leanings of rural residents, the 
delivery of opposition newspapers to rural areas, and any visitors to rural areas who 
might bring any ideological influence.47 Interestingly, the state, which has relentlessly 
controlled people coming to rural areas, has not shown the same interest in people 
leaving rural areas in massive numbers.
In Lenkeran, when I asked if the local government did anything about the 
outmigration, tried to prevent it, respondents answered, “That [preventing a man from 
leaving for Russia] would be ruling to the death of a family,” and “They themselves 
have relatives in Russia.” Several women said, “There would have been a revolution 
in this region long ago, if not for outmigration.” In Shamakhy, the responses were 
similar. “Why should they [the government] do anything about outmigration?” “They 
[the migrants] go to earn money and help their families, they are not doing anything 
bad. These regions would be dead without them.”
A local government officer in Shamakhy, in an attempt to underline the rapid 
development of the region, noted that some who had migrated to Russia “during 
massive outmigration in the 1990s” now have returned with some capital and opened 
stores in Shamakhy town, employing their “brothers, fathers, fathers-in-law.” The 
local executive official acknowledged that “outmigration was the only way out” for 
                                                
47 It is common knowledge among the non-profits in Azerbaijan that one cannot just have a charity or, 
worse yet, a civic education training event in the rural areas without the permission of local 
governments. Failure to do so has resulted in incarceration of more than one non-profit worker.
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some time, “as there were no jobs.” The government’s tacit agreement to “let” people 
migrate eased the political control of the countryside.
When males migrate in search of livelihoods, left behind are women, children, 
and the elderly. These are weaker members of society, less likely to stand up against 
any policy and the government.
The family left behind has less incentive to be politically active against the 
state and risk “catching its eye.” Moreover, having income from outside weakens the 
dependence on village resources, as well as the discontent with those resources. 
Crucially, having income from outside also lowers the stakes in the local economy. 
Outmigrants are viewed as an exit strategy, and the messy business of politics is left to 
those with more stakes in the local economy, those cultivating larger plots of lands, 
the local businessmen, and the local government.
Ironically, the migrants to Baku are only second-class dwellers, and hardly 
citizens in the participatory sense of the term. They both belong to the city and are 
foreigners. They don’t view themselves as having stakes in the city politics. They are 
in the capital to work in manual jobs, to earn a “piece of bread,” not to “stir the pot.” 
As long as their jobs are paying for their needs in Baku, they have no incentives to risk 
whatever little they are earning and may send their families. Their very ability to work 
at these jobs in the city is kept insecure through the policing of residence registration.
To legally work in Baku, one must be registered to an address in one of the 
administrative districts of the city. The same requirement exists in Russian cities, and 
most other post-Soviet republics as well, as a preserved leftover of the Soviet-era 
urbanization control policy. In Baku, as well as in Russia, there are two options for 
registration: temporary registration and permanent registration to a physical address. 
Temporary registration can be given upon providing documentation of a lease, and is 
granted only for a few months (usually three months). It must be continuously 
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renewed. Permanent registration requires ownership of, or strong entitlement48 to, 
residential property in the city. It is beyond the reach of most rural migrants.
The government body in charge of issuing residential registration is . . . the 
local police department. The police also issue all permits for and control any forms of 
demonstration and protest in the city. In this framework, the ability of rural 
outmigrants to earn their livelihoods—their “work permits,” so to speak—depends on 
their record/relationship with the city’s police departments. This record must be 
continuously earned, with checkpoints every three months for temporary residence 
registration, which thus keeps rural migrants in check, and insecure. If temporary 
registration is denied, rural outmigrants in Baku may work illegally—without 
contracts or any slim protection of the Labor Code. If registration is denied to 
Azerbaijan’s migrants in Russia, they may also face deportation if found working. 
Migrants in such conditions hide from the Russian police, who are notorious for 
randomly demanding to check registrations from people on the streets who look darker 
than Russians.49
Migrant workers from rural Azerbaijan earn their livelihoods in Baku and 
Russia in the shadow of their precarious position. Their insecurity in renewing their 
registration (“work permit”) and maintaining their ability to work and earn their bread 
dwarfs the fact that they lack rights to the social and unemployment benefits of their 
host locale as non-residents.
This mindset conditioned in this context is not numb to political realities; they 
just search for solutions to their own enveloped concerns. The migrants’ concerns, and 
political goals—dreamed or organized for—are those addressing their own limited 
                                                
48 As the husband, wife, or child of the residential property owner.
49 With episodes devoted to its activity by Azerbaijan’s popular televised youth humor club, Komanda 
KVN “Parni iz Baku.”
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rights and registration conditions, not the development policies (oil specialization) 
behind the stagnation of the countryside, and certainly not communal worries like the 
environment or, say, the condition of public health facilities in the city.
A senior scientist at the State Committee for Land and Mapping shared the 
following story during an interview. During small talk, the scientist complained of the 
environmental issues surrounding construction in Baku. Observing an oil spill in the 
park during Baku’s boulevard construction, he commented about this to the brigade 
working on the construction. The workers responded to him thus: “What can we do, 
ami [uncle], we are just workers here. We are just trying to get bread to our families.” 
The scientist complained to me with anguish: “These are just youth who have flown 
from the villages! How can they understand the significance of the pollution caused by 
these mega construction projects? What can they do about it even if they dislike it?” 
Indeed, by virtue of their circumstances these workers are voiceless and cannot act as
concerned citizens. Rural Azerbaijan’s supply of workers to the city industries, insofar 
as the salaries are sufficient, makes both the workers and the countryside docile. Yet 
what is said is still a very incomplete picture of rural outmigration in Azerbaijan. The 
socio-economic context and history of this process demands closer attention.
Historical Context of Azerbaijan’s Rural Outmigration
Better-paying construction, transport, and storage jobs concentrated in and around the 
oil industry center Baku were the context for the narratives I heard of peasants turned 
drivers, construction workers, and night guards in Baku. These employment 
opportunities manifested the changing social economy of the city, which itself 
reflected a peculiar feature of the global economy into which Azerbaijan was re-
integrating, now free from the structures of the USSR. After Azerbaijan opened its oil 
exploration and extraction to global companies in 1994 with what is officially referred 
129
to as the “Contract of the Century,”50 signed by President Aliyev, Baku became home 
to not only the branches of the transnational signatories of the contract51 but also to a 
number of transnational finance and consultancy firms including Ernst and Young, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Grant Thornton, Deloitte Consulting, Manpower, KPMG 
Consulting, Booz Allen Hamilton, Computer Sciences Corporation, Aon Consulting, 
and Computer Associates. A number of local innovative business solutions and service 
subcontracting companies—providing a range of services from hiring and housing to 
transportation and catering support—flourished, as well as luxury boutiques such as 
Versace and Armani, and various upscale entertainment facilities. The concentration 
of businesses created both well-paying jobs for educated Baku youth (Heyat 2002), 
integrating them effectively as white-collar workers into the global industry, and for 
the uneducated and unskilled of Baku and the countryside. Baku was reshaped into a 
cosmopolitan city connected directly to global work and entertainment, yet rooted in 
the labor of the local semi-skilled and unskilled.
Baku’s transformation reflected a process characterizing the global economy as 
a whole. One the one hand, with the globalization of production networks, cities 
worldwide have been shown to grow into place-based centers concentrating now-
outsourced functions of control, management, and servicing of the global firm (Sassen 
2007). Joining global production and finance activities directly, such global cities, 
together with export processing zones, have been argued to form a global network 
                                                
50 Formal name: Azeri, Chirag, and Deep-Water Gunashli International Contract No. 1.
51 A few months after the “Contract of the Century,” in 1995, a consortium known as the Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company (AIOC) was organized. Originally AIOC comprised BP (UK), 
Amoco (U.S.), LUKoil (Russia), Pennzoil (now Devon of U.S.), UNOCAL (U.S.), Statoil (Norway), 
McDermott (U.S.), Ramco (Scotland), TPAO (Turkey), Delta Nimir (now Amerada Hess of U.S.), and
SOCAR (Azerbaijan). Since then Exxon, now ExxonMobil (U.S.), ITOCHU (Japan), and INPEX 
(Japan) have joined the consortium. McDermott, Ramco, and LUKoil have since sold their shares. 
AIOC’s first president was Terry Adams (UK) of British Petroleum (BP), the company that operates the 
offshore oil platforms and the onshore Sangachal Terminal.
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through which the control, maintenance, and servicing of the world economy was 
reproduced, both depending on and shaping the new labor and migration flows (Sassen 
2007). Baku’s rise as a global city and a destination for rural migrants52 through its 
provision of jobs related to new construction projects reflected the city’s integration 
into the global production, consumption, and labor networks as the center of the 
country’s oil extraction transnationalized with Heydar Aliyev’s “Contract of the 
Century.”
On the other hand, the urbanization process that has reshaped Baku with 
Azerbaijan’s reorganization as a market economy and a global oil supplier has been a 
twin brother to the system of production for the market—capitalism, as David Harvey 
pointed out (2012:5–25). The rise of cities—which have always been a “class 
phenomenon,” according to Harvey, based on the appropriation of surplus from some 
for others—in capitalism has demonstrated a systemic scale and role. Capitalism is a 
system characterized by a perpetual search for profit: surplus value. To produce that 
surplus value, Harvey reminded us, capitalists have to produce surplus product and 
find markets and ways for its absorption. Capitalist development is destabilized not 
only by obstacles to profitable production but also by impediments to surplus 
absorption. Thus, if “there is not enough purchasing power in an existing market, then 
new markets must be found by expanding foreign trade, promoting new products and 
lifestyles, creating new credit instruments and debt-financed state expenditures” 
(Harvey 2012:6).53 Restructuring of cities, Harvey (2006, 2012) demonstrates with 
                                                
52 Predominantly from Azerbaijan’s own countryside. The flow of transnational migrants, importantly 
from Iran, Turkey, Georgia, Russian Federation’s Chechnya, Dagestan, and even as far as India and 
China, to Baku is a matter outside of the scope of the argument here.
53 Harvey (2012) pointed out that if
Capital cannot be profitably reinvested, accumulation stagnates or ceases, and capital is 
devalued (lost) and in some instances even physically destroyed. Devalueation can take a 
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historical examples of Paris in the mid-19th century and New York City at the 
beginning of the 20th, is at the heart of this process and transforms the cities as centers 
of surplus absorption. The process of the city restructuring itself serves surplus 
absorption through government’s investment in infrastructural development. Massive 
construction projects signifying the remaking of Baku and providing jobs to massive 
numbers of people from the city itself and the countryside were thus not a peculiarity 
but reflected choices made in Azerbaijan similar to those made about cities around the 
world, from China to the United Arab Emirates, which Harvey (2012) noted.
“The Construction projects of Baku” (Bakinin tikintileri) was already an
expression in common use after 2005, and was used by many interviewees of this 
study, from rural workers to the state officials in Baku itself, presupposing their 
listener’s familiarity with what was regarded as common knowledge: construction has 
defined the face of Baku in the last decade. It was also evident to a lesser degree 
throughout the country in the building of highways, and of new entertainment/resort 
facilities in rural town centers. Between 1995 and 2004, while the share of agriculture 
in GDP fell from 25.3% to 6.4%, the share of construction rose from 3.7% to 7.4%, 
surpassing agriculture (Table 5.1). 
                                                                                                                                            
number of forms. Surplus commodities can be devalued or destroyed, productive capacity and 
assets can be written down in value and left unemployed, or money itself can be devalued 
through inflation. And in a crisis, of course, labor stands to be devalued through massive 
unemployment. (P. 6)
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Table 5.1. Gross Domestic Product by Sector of the Economy (%)
Year Industry
Agriculture 
and forestry Construction
Transportation 
and 
communication
Net 
taxes
All other 
sectors
1995 27.3 25.3 3.7 17.4 7.7 18.6
1996 25.8 24.9 9.3 10.2 10.1 19.7
1997 25.3 20.0 11.7 10.5 7.4 25.1
1998 21.9 18.0 13.0 12.0 4.1 31.0
1999 28.2 18.2 10.9 10.7 4.0 28.0
2000 36.1 15.9 6.5 12.0 6.2 23.3
2001 37.6 14.7 5.8 10.1 7.8 24.0
2002 37.4 13.8 8.7 9.8 8.0 22.3
2003 37.2 12.3 11.2 10.0 7.6 21.7
2004 38.3 10.8 12.5 9.5 7.2 21.7
2005 49.4 8.6 9.4 7.4 7.6 17.6
2006 57.3 6.7 7.7 6.6 5.5 16.2
2007 59.5 6.4 6.7 7.3 6.6 13.5
2008 58.5 5.3 7.0 6.7 6.7 15.8
2009 50.0 6.4 7.4 8.5 7.6 20.1
Note. Source: State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Between 2004 and 2009, agriculture, hunting, and forestry’s combined share in the 
investment directed to fixed capital increased from 0.7 percent to 3.5 percent, from a 
little over 35 million to over 2 billion (State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, 
azstat.org/statinfo/construction/en/oo9.shtml). In comparison, the share of real estate 
activities in the investment to fixed capital had increased from 7.5 percent in 2004 to 
11 percent in 2009. The share of transport and communication in investment directed 
to fixed capital had risen from 8.7 percent in 2004 to 22.2 percent in 2009 (ibid.). 
While more money started flowing into agriculture, it was still dwarfed by the funds 
flowing into transport and real estate. The wages in agriculture, despite steady 
increase, were also the lowest in the country (Table 5.2).
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Table 5.2. Average Monthly Wages and Salaries of Employees by Sector of 
Economy (in Azeri Manats)
Year Industry
Agriculture, 
hunting and 
forestry Construction
Transport, 
storage and 
communication
1995 19.1 6.7 19.8 19.6
1996 29.2 7.6 33.4 30.1
1997 46.3 9.9 60.0 45.4
1998 55.4 8.8 88.3 58.2
1999 57.1 10.6 85.7 45.1
2000 87.2 13.8 83.3 58.5
2001 100.0 15.8 87.4 66.1
2002 113.6 18.0 109.0 73.7
2003 137.3 23.1 154.4 88.0
2004 187.0 29.8 218.2 113.2
2005 213.2 41.5 237.6 137.7
2006 260.9 52.5 298.7 175.4
2007 344.8 86.8 381.4 250.4
2008 424.5 114.7 406.1 329.4
2009 432.4 134.5 450.1 381.0
Note. Source: State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
These construction projects generated employment not just in construction itself but 
also in related sectors, for example in the production of building materials. 
Interestingly, as job opportunities in construction and related sectors lured the jobless 
from rural areas, the émigrés to Russia supported the boom with their private property 
purchases in Azerbaijan.
This description of the changing weight of agriculture and construction and 
services centered in the capital, Baku, is not to present the outmigration from 
Azerbaijan’s villages as the result of push–pull factors, whereby the lack of jobs and 
poverty in the rural areas pushed people out, and the opportunities in Baku lured them 
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in. As it has been argued (Sassen 2007; Cohen and Sirkeci 2011), the push–pull
framework conceals more than it reveals when explaining massive migrations. While
push–pull factors may explain why some people move, they cannot explain why many 
others do not. As Sassen (2007) pointed out, the question should be: “When does 
poverty become a push factor? . . . It takes a number of other conditions to turn 
poverty into a push factor, and even then only a small minority of poor and middle-
class people will likely attempt emigration. Emigration is not an undifferentiated 
escape from poverty and unemployment to prosperity” (P. 131). Important factors and 
history are concealed by using the push–pull framework as the conclusive explanation 
of migration:
First, the existence of social networks of migrants from the same destinations 
has been shown to be a potent trigger of migration around the world for centuries 
preceding our era (Sassen 2007; Cohen and Sirkeci 2011). The role of both Baku and 
various Russian cities as post-Soviet rural migrant destinations leans on the history of 
Soviet-era urbanization, with interlinked education policies. As a result of the Soviet 
“open to all” higher education policies in the context of the higher education 
institutions concentrated in city centers, infrastructure was created for a “lay rural 
student’s” access to this education (Zajda 1979). A student wishing to apply for 
colleges and universities could arrive in the city of the desired institution and would be 
directed from that institution to a relevant placement committee. The committee would 
place the student in a free student dormitory and provide entrance-exam details. 
Students would also be assisted with finding part-time jobs—which in the context of 
the USSR’s labor shortage were in good supply—subsidized food service, and in case 
of proven academic excellence, additional stipends. Despite its own set of problems 
and the slightly changing priorities with each Soviet ruler (Matthews 1982/2012), this
higher education placement-support system was the pride of and showcased by USSR 
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authorities as a manifestation of the universal accessibility of higher education. 
Accessing higher education, in this context, was seen as a matter of only the will and 
intellect of students; it was not (and still is not) uncommon for rural government 
officials to boast of the numbers of “akademiks”—professors—that have “come out” 
of that locale, people who have herded sheep and harvested cotton in their youth. 
Numerous Soviet films glorified the higher education placement system for the public, 
including the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic’s own, widely popular, romantic comedy 
Ahmad Hardadir? (Where Is Ahmad?) (1963).54
The system eased and supported the migration of rural youth to the USSR’s 
cities, simultaneously educating skilled labor and immediately supplying manual 
labor, both of which were needed by the state’s growing urban centers.55 This flow 
supported Soviet urbanization and created the social networks on which post-Soviet 
migrants would rely during their own rural–urban moves. For example, the post-Soviet 
flow of Lenkeran’s rural males to Russia, versus Baku, was linked to the fact that 
Russia was a strived-for, ambitious destination of many students from Lenkeran in the 
1980s, who settled there after receiving their diplomas,56 and after the breakup of the 
USSR provided “hold-on points” and initial placement support for the new post-Soviet 
wave of young males from Lenkeran.
Second, the Azeri migrant social networks in Russia are also demonstrative of 
what has been called “colonial history” (Sassen 2007). Besides education, a key 
                                                
54 The movie depicts how two rural youth—a young man and woman—leave their families in protest of 
an arranged marriage proposal by their parents and head to the capital, Baku, to pursue their education. 
The movie demonstrates the ease of these persons’ access to the higher education facilities and 
placement, the conditions of life in these facilities, “cheerful” manual work in the jobs that they take 
on—all romanticized as conditions under which the heroes of the movie fall in love with each other. 
55 Urbanization was regarded as both a necessary and a positive result of the Soviet industrialization by 
the USSR strand of Marxism (Morton and Stuart 1984).
56 And postgraduate degrees, as Lenkeran’s people narrate with pride.
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process establishing rural migrant networks from Azerbaijan, and the rest of the Soviet 
periphery, specifically in Moscow, was the USSR’s policy to establish the capital as a 
consumer goods haven of the state, to display the bounty of Soviet life as comparable 
to that of the West (Sahadeo 2011). As Sahadeo (2011) demonstrated, Moscow’s
strategic need to be presented as a capital of bounty, offering fresh flowers and fruits 
during the Russian winters, encouraged the formation of informal trade networks 
delivering and selling the produce of the sunny peripheral states in the Caucasus 
(including Azerbaijan) and Central Asia in Moscow. These late-Soviet-period trade 
networks flourished in the post-Soviet era, acting as migrant social networks for 
mostly uneducated rural labor from the post-Soviet periphery, with Azerbaijan in a 
leading position among them, supplying Moscow’s produce markets and contributing 
the popular Moscowite derogatory view of Azerbaijanians (as well as Georgians, 
Turkmens, Tajiks, and other ethnic non-Russians of the former USSR) as “blacks,” 
and as backward, uneducated bazaar people.
This derogatory classification and treatment, with the exception of the ethnic 
division and the “black” label, is a fact faced by rural labor migrants in Baku as well, 
and probably the key distinction between the Soviet and post-Soviet rural–urban 
migrations. Whereas the Soviet rural–urban migration embodied a verbalized welcome 
(to the fresh labor), prospects of increased education and social status, alongside the 
possibilities of more modernized consumption in the host city, the post-Soviet rural 
labor migration means derogatory, openly disrespectful, and harsh treatment by the 
host city officials and natives, in return for the possibilities of modernized 
consumption and uncertain prospects of (material, not educational) upward social 
mobility. Saskia Sassen (2007) observed this need to come to terms with pride and its 
results imbuing international migration:
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Critical is that many people have shown themselves willing to take undesirable 
jobs, including jobs below their educational and social stratum in their home 
country, and to live in extreme discomfort and under conditions they might not 
accept in their home country . . . [T]he bridging effects of globalization 
produce both material conditions and novel types of imaginaries that make 
emigration an option where not too long ago it was not. (P. 132)
The “imaginary” in Sassen’s usage is not a particular worldview, a historical 
framework of mind, but is simply interchangeable with “aspirations,” “desires deemed 
possible” (Sassen 2002, 2004, 2005). Then what type of imaginaries, what type of 
aspirations, take side with economic difficulties and imbue migration from rural 
Azerbaijan?
New Imaginaries and Rural Outmigration
Quality of life—defined by access to new forms of consumption, for instance, for the 
young to bars, entertainment centers, and the Internet—symbolizes the lifestyle that a 
rural home cannot offer and is one expressed aspiration. A EurasiaNet economic 
journalist observes:
Baku is packed with bars, nightclubs and discothèques, bowling clubs and 
entertainment centers attended equally by men and women. By contrast, not a 
single nightclub or discotheque exists outside of Azerbaijan’s capital.
“It is boring to live in the village,” complained 17-year-old Mobil 
Mammadov, a resident of the village of Asrik near the Armenian border. 
“There’s no Internet, newspapers are not delivered. We can only watch the 
state television channel, which is not interesting at all . . .”
Mammadov’s dream is for an Internet café to come to his village—the 
closest one is 25 kilometers away in the regional center of Tovuz. “I heard 
about the Internet from friends who use it in Baku,” he said. “It seems 
exciting.” (Ismayilov 2007)
An interview with a migrant male in Baku that I conducted in the pre-testing stage 
revealed similar comments: “There is no life in the village. People go to bed with 
dusk” (emphasis added).
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Entertainment is just one of the components of the desired “life” not offered in 
a rural village nor affordable with rural lifestyles. It represents a range of individual 
coveted experiences, from attending a modern cinema through dressing in modern 
ways among similarly dressed, that is, fashion-appreciating, people to eating out 
(Sahadeo 2011). What unifies various components of the desired life is their 
availability for consumption. “Quality of life” seems to be defined as being able to 
consume the latest offerings on the market.
By contrast—to underline the historicity of this new “quality of life”—in the 
USSR discourse (prior to Gorbachev) “quality of life” was officially presented and 
widely accepted as one’s use of his or her specific abilities to serve society, 
humankind, community—presented, of course, as service to the Soviet state. Living in 
the prescribed way, repeated the media and establishment including labor collective 
leaders, meant living with a clean conscience, a peaceful mind, and developing one’s 
potential as a human—a true quality of life.
In another historical contrast, the coveted elements in the post-Soviet vision of 
“quality of life” in Azerbaijan—the urban, modern consumption style, and immersion 
in the latest offerings of the entertainment industry—have been regarded as exactly the 
killer of quality of life by an increasing number of people in the US. Here, home to all 
the modern comforts yearned for by the Azeri youth interviewed by Ismayilov (2007), 
these very comforts—the entertainment industry, the urban consumption style—are 
scrutinized not just by critical scientists. This home to modern comforts, accessible 
with indebtedness (i.e., credit) to a wider range of people, is also peculiarly home to a 
growing number of diverse people leaving their modern, urban lifestyles for rural 
homesteads—called the Back-to-the-Land movement (Brown 2011; Jacob 1997)—in a
quest for a very differently defined quality of life, decades after the failure of the 
1970s hippie communes, which was said to prove the impossibility of alternative 
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livelihoods in the modern world. “Quality of life” in the new Back-to-the-Land 
movement’s redefinition is found in slow, mindful living, the feeling of union with
nature, and the peace of mind that comes from the knowledge of living sustainable 
livelihoods that do not jeopardize the planet’s ecology and future generations’ 
livelihoods (Jacob 1997).
The aim of these contrasting examples is to show that “quality of life”—
increasingly believed to be the expanded consumption of what the market has to offer 
in whatever area one fancies—is a historical construct tied to convictions of what life 
is about. The search for the same “quality of life” can lead some to a city, others to a 
rural homestead to grow their own food. The differences are tied to underlying 
different assumptions of what life is about—its purpose.
The “quality of life” increasingly imagined in post-Soviet rural Azerbaijan as 
access to the possibilities of consumption offered in the city reflects the spread of the 
belief that the purpose of life is to supply the self with comforts and pleasures. In 
contrast to the Soviet belief that comforts and pleasures are and should be by-products 
of purposeful human activity for the higher good, comforts in the post-Soviet context 
are viewed as ends in themselves. Subscription to this belief not only encourages 
migration to “where there is a better life” in terms of material comforts, but is what 
ultimately makes extended consumption in a market society possible.
The city’s role in the imaginaries of (commodified) comfort is special. 
Designed to be centers of consumption for a globalizing market society, cities offer a 
concentration of new forms of comforts, all in commodity form, and possibilities of 
consuming them through cash employment.
Harvey (2012) points out:
Quality of urban life has become a commodity for those with money, as has the 
city itself in a world where consumerism, tourism, cultural and knowledge 
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based industries, as well as perpetual resort to the economy of the spectacle, 
have become major aspects of urban political economy, even in India and 
China. The postmodernist penchant for encouraging the formation of market 
niches, both in urban lifestyle choices and in consumer habits, and cultural 
forms, surrounds the contemporary urban experience with an aura of freedom 
of choice in the market, provided you have the money and can protect yourself 
from the privatization of wealth redistribution through burgeoning criminal 
activity and predatory fraudulent practices (which have everywhere escalated). 
Shopping malls, multiplexes, and box stores proliferate . . . , as do fast-food 
and artisanal market places, boutique cultures and, as Sharon Zukin slyly 
notes, “pacification by cappuccino” . . . This is a world in which the neoliberal 
ethic of intense possessive individualism can become the template for human 
personality socialization. The impact is increasing individualistic isolation, 
anxiety, and neurosis in the midst of one of the greatest social achievements (at 
least judging by its enormous scale and all-embracing character) ever 
constructed in human history for the realization of our hearts’ desire. (P. 14)
Consumerism in the city is presented as art, of not only finding bargains, but of living 
with “taste,” with “style.” Only in this context can buying a cup of cappuccino from 
the global giant Starbucks be regarded as an expression of style.57 The innate human 
desire for a purposeful life is channeled to an illusion of creative expression through 
the consumption of (mass-produced) fashion, living necessities, housing, cars, 
entertainment, travel, food, and more. Buying into this presentation turns consumption 
from the satisfaction of material needs to an end in itself, an art form, a venue for 
creativity. The presentation is effective only because of the innate human yearning for 
a purposefully creative life, which the former channels to the coordination of one’s 
consumption of mass-produced items to represent “taste” or “style.” Ironically, what 
the system presents as “style” is devoid of the socially transformative quality that 
historical works of great art contained, and only serves to preserve the existing social 
hierarchy (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944). Buying into the city as a center of style and
                                                
57 Caricatured and subtly criticized in Korean pop-artist Psy’s world-famous video “Gangnam Style” 
(Fisher 2012).
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refinement thus represents a form of the enslavement of creative aspirations and 
energies of individuals in the capsule of consumerism.
Rural Outmigration as Moral Transformation
Rural outmigration is essentially a plunging of the masses into the idea of the purpose 
of life, as self-gratification (and its concomitant interpretation, consumption), as much 
as it is a movement of labor to supply the growing economy of Baku or Moscow. This 
plunging happens (1) through city-based exposure to the mediums of entertainment 
and mass media, or what Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer called “the culture 
industry” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944); and (2) through rural migrants’ 
transformation from semi-subsistence producers to consumers.
First, in the city, rural migrants are immersed in a life saturated with media, 
especially entertainment media, to a degree unmatched in rural Azerbaijan. The effect 
of screen media over the countryside is weak, despite its expanding reach, both 
because of practical obstacles, like the electricity shortages that characterize the rural 
areas, and because of the foreignness of life portrayed in the media and the difficulty 
of relating to it from (semi-subsistence) lifestyles as lived in the countryside. For a 
rural migrant to the city, immersion in the world of media—not just through direct 
viewing, but through billboards and its rule over fellow city dwellers—entails 
immersion in a new set of messages and values with respect to what life is about.
That the media immersion characterizing Baku city life entailed a moral 
transformation was suggested in an interview with an uneducated woman in a remote 
village high in the mountains of Lenkeran-Lerik. Her son was a recent migrant to 
Baku (together with his wife) and worked at “the constructions.” Discussing the 
difficulties of the rural migrant’s life in Baku, the woman mentioned not financial 
difficulties but the mindset of people surrounding them in Baku, with the following:
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These people in the city have mixed up what life is about. And all of this is due 
to those soap operas. People watch those soap operas and start thinking that 
this is what life is about.
A migrant has to evaluate his or her stance towards the new values she or he is 
suddenly surrounded with. Rural–urban migration is thus fundamentally a personal re-
evaluation of one’s worldview and aesthetic values in relationship to the new ones. 
How could surrounding oneself with soap operas, TV shows, and the admirers of this 
entertainment become a channel of moral transformation? Interestingly, a former 
kolkhoz’s manual laborer, the uneducated woman from a remote mountain, put her 
fingers on a process studied at length by the Frankfurt school theorists Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer.
Adorno and Horkheimer (1944) explained how “culture”—shaped by news 
media, entertainment, and government discourse together—can contour the 
intellectual-moral activity of humans. In a chapter called “The Culture Industry: 
Enlightenment as Mass Deception” in their book Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno 
and Horkheimer (1944) argued that different modern mediums of culture, “Films, 
radio and magazines”—(in our times globalized through the Internet as well)—“make 
up a system which is uniform as a whole and in every part.” Exposure to these 
mediums facilitates a powerful transmission of values, as well as a passive reception 
on the part of the viewer and internalization of the offered worldview:
The whole world is made to pass through the filter of the culture industry. The 
old experience of the movie-goer, who sees the world outside as an extension 
of the film he has just left (because the latter is intent upon reproducing the 
world of everyday perceptions), is now the producer’s guideline. The more 
intensely and flawlessly his techniques duplicate empirical objects, the easier it 
is today for the illusion to prevail that the outside world is the straightforward 
continuation of that presented on the screen. This purpose has been furthered 
by mechanical reproduction since the lightning takeover by the sound film.
Real life is becoming indistinguishable from the movies. The sound 
film, far surpassing the theatre of illusion, leaves no room for imagination or 
reflection on the part of the audience, who is unable to respond within the 
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structure of the film, yet deviate from its precise detail without losing the 
thread of the story; hence the film forces its victims to equate it directly with 
reality. The stunting of the mass-media consumer’s powers of imagination and 
spontaneity does not have to be traced back to any psychological mechanisms; 
he must ascribe the loss of those attributes to the objective nature of the 
products themselves, especially to the most characteristic of them, the sound 
film. They are so designed that quickness, powers of observation, and 
experience are undeniably needed to apprehend them at all; yet sustained 
thought is out of the question if the spectator is not to miss the relentless rush 
of facts.
Even though the effort required for his response is semi-automatic, no 
scope is left for the imagination. Those who are so absorbed by the world of 
the movie—by its images, gestures, and words—that they are unable to supply 
what really makes it a world, do not have to dwell on particular points of its 
mechanics during a screening. All the other films and products of the 
entertainment industry which they have seen have taught them what to expect; 
they react automatically.
The results, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, were, on the one hand, a 
homogenization of worldviews and aesthetic values (where differences are “illusory”), 
and, on the other hand, the intellectual passivity of individuals, whereas an 
individual’s task of connecting “the varied experiences of the senses to fundamental 
concepts” is performed by the culture industry instead.
What the culture industry says about the purpose of human life, then, is a 
paramount question for understanding the values and intellectual direction of a society 
basted in the culture industry. If the Soviet culture industry indoctrinated Soviet 
citizens in the idea that the USSR was the protector of each individual citizen and that 
serving it was the ultimate purpose giving meaning to life, post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s 
culture industry, operated by the profit motive, frees individuals from this moral debt 
to the state and points to self-gratification (in various forms) as the ultimate goal of 
one’s life.
This is not to say that rural migrant workers automatically become mindless 
consumers upon their exposure to urban life, with its culture industry. It is to underline 
some fundamental pressures exerted on the migrant laborers to redefine their role and 
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responsibilities in society, and the criteria for valuing one’s worth in society. These 
pressures and the corresponding soul-searching over the essential questions of a 
human’s relationship to society are a massive ongoing process, transcending 
Azerbaijan’s experience. Glimpses of this process are recorded in social science 
discussions under the topic of “identity formation,”58 a subject that has become an 
established subsection in migration studies.
Once feeding material comforts to the self—consumption—is viewed as the 
goal of life, the value of life itself becomes the ability to acquire/access these 
comforts. In his study of the experiences of migrant traders from southern ex-Soviet 
republics to Moscow, Sahadeo (2011) shares the following about his interviewee from 
a village in the outskirts of Baku:
Elnur Asadov’s time in Moscow “made [him] feel like a man.” After scraping 
by with his family in Baku, he reminisced about how “[i]n Moscow, money, 
women, and drink suddenly appeared for me.” After discussing how work 
dominated his life, Asadov shifted to a narrative that highlighted his ability to 
spread cash around at eating and drinking establishments. (Pp. 530–31)
Asadov’s words are indicative of his subscription to the new purpose of life and its 
valuation scale. When consumption becomes a criteria for evaluating one’s worth, 
then consumption—of whatever is fancied, from the Internet to eating out to drinking 
alcohol—becomes a factor in identity formation, making one feel “like a man,” like a 
woman, like a human.59
                                                
58 See for some examples the collection of essays in Elliott, Payne, and Ploesch (2007); also Parreñas
(2011) and Sahadeo (2011).
59 If Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) are correct in asserting that migration is not only about economics but 
equally about socio-cultural facts, then rural outmigration in Azerbaijan is both a reflection of the 
advent of the new purpose of life, and a powerful mechanism of perpetuating this idea, transmitting this 
new purpose of life back to the countryside. Acknowledging a “cultural” aspect of migration—tied to 
values and desires of the purpose of life as bettering one’s own position in this world, and to acquiring 
the expanded ability to consume—is not accusative. This acknowledgement is a conceptual necessity to 
understand both, (1) at the micro-level, the dilemmas and moral conundrums faced by the migrants in 
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Second, another facet of the moral transformation that rural outmigration 
represents is that entailed in procuring one’s livelihood from the market (versus from 
one’s backyard to a significant degree, as a rural livelihood-maker). When migrants 
enter labor market competition in the city, they are not just under pressure to serve 
their own interests to first survive. Coming to work in the city for rural migrants from 
remote villages is simultaneously a process of transforming from semi-subsistence 
(backyard gardener and dairy) producer to complete consumer.
Robert Reich (2009), a professor of public policy at the University of
California–Berkeley, points out that the reconstitution of individuals as consumers in 
relation to society is in conflict with their role as moral actors in society:
As moral actors, we care about the well-being of our neighbors and our 
communities. But as consumers we eagerly seek deals that may undermine the 
living standards of our neighbors and the neighborliness of our communities.
Reich points out that the ensuing moral conflict—which is systemic in a system of 
consumption—seems to be historically and massively avoided in two ways. First,
responsibility for the morally objectionable results of consumerist lifestyles—for 
ecology and for the lives of people far removed—is popularly assigned to producers 
and sellers rather than to consumers. (This logic is flawed, Reich points out, because 
producers and sellers respond to market demand and try to make a profit by cutting 
costs. Consumers carry an important share of the responsibility for the making of the 
market society.) Second, the very nature of the modern market mechanism—whereby 
places of production and consumption are far removed—“compartmentalizes” 
people’s market desires from their moral visions:
                                                                                                                                            
host locations, affecting their reaction to the oppressive regime (questioned, imagined, and theorized by 
Davis 2006; Goonewardena 2012; Liss 2012; Yiftachel 2012; and Harvey 2012); and (2) at the macro-
level, how these migrations can play into the establishment and deepening of the global market at 
large—a role beyond migrant reshaping of urban and rural labor markets. 
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When we buy from a seller who is the local franchisee of a giant retailer, and 
that giant retailer obtains the product through a distribution network that gets it 
from a manufacturer, and that manufacturer assembles specialized components 
from contractors who employ subcontractors all over the world, the ultimate 
social consequences of our purchase are so far removed from it that we can 
easily shield ourselves from moral responsibility. We simply don’t see the 
connection between our consumer choices and, for example, the child laboring 
in a poor nation or our neighbors losing their jobs and wages. (Reich 2009)
The nature of the market mechanism thus facilitates a dual morality, allowing “us to 
retain our moral ideals even when our market choices generate outcomes that would 
otherwise violate them” (Reich 2009). Is this similar to Gramsci’s (1971) observations 
of “the contradictory state of consciousness,” which “does not permit any action, any 
decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and political passivity” (P. 
333)60?
The process of soul-modification is so essential to the expansion of global 
marketization that it would be accurate to say that globalization is simultaneously a 
massive moral transformation—ongoing, contested, not predetermined, where all the 
power of human choice, individual and collective, is visible to an exploring eye. Rural 
migration in this context is an undervalued mechanism through which new ideas 
(about the purpose of human life as profit maximization and comfort seeking) travel to 
                                                
60 Gramsci (1971) wrote:
The active man in the mass has a practical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness 
of his practical activity, which nonetheless involves understanding the world in so far as it 
transforms it. His theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his
activity. One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one
contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites 
him with his fellow workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one 
superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed.
But this verbal conception is not without consequences. It holds together a specific social 
group, it influences moral conduct and the direction of will, with varying efficacy but often
powerfully enough to produce a situation in which the contradictory state of consciousness 
does not permit any action, any decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and 
political passivity. (P. 333, emphasis added)
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remote rural areas not yet integrated into the global networks of production and 
consumption by business and state interests.
Through migrant experiences and stories, people in migrants’ natal 
communities come into contact both with the narratives and effects of the “culture 
industry” and with the iron fist of market competition for a job. But the means-to-
ends-oriented market-rationality-shaped behaviour of the migrants in their natal 
communities is also an intimate channel through which the new moral vision of human 
life is communicated to locales and their inhabitants living with different consolidated 
worldviews. This process is an arena of contestation, as noted by two migration 
experts from the distinct disciplines of anthropology and geography:
Transnational migration brings global economic ideas to rural communities, 
and the impact of these ideas and ideals is not simple . . . 
Socially, transnational migration reorganizes sending communities and 
introduces debates over the meaning of tradition. Movers do not leave, but 
rather rethink and redefine their roles, and nonmigrants or nonmovers may not 
be particularly supportive. (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011:8)
Some ways in which this happens are demonstrated through two ethnographic 
examples below.
New Values about Human’s Role in Life Travel to the Countryside through 
Migrants
It is a hot and humid summer day in a Lenkeran village. There are seven cars, 
including three SUVs, parked in front of one of the houses. A passerby would notice 
much hassle and noise here. Women in colourful dresses hold large trays carefully
covered with shiny wrapping paper and secured with red bows. A woman in her 40s in 
a floral dress instructs the crowd to give way. A plastic crib, fully assembled, is loaded 
into one of the cars by two men. The procession is heading to another house in the 
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same village to give the presents in the trays and the crib to a young couple who have 
had their first baby. These are gifts from the young wife’s family delivered according 
to a local tradition literally called beshik aparmaq—”taking the crib.”
The overseer of the procession, the woman in the floral dress, happens to be 
the mother of the young wife. She is back from Russia just for this occasion. Eight 
years ago she left for Russia to follow her husband with her three daughters. Working 
difficult manual jobs at first, they eventually managed to open a grocery shop near a 
renovated large factory. The workers of the factory would buy bread and other needs 
on their way home from work, and “the business was good.” The girls (the oldest 
being 18 and the youngest 16 at the time of the interview) did all the housework and 
learned to cook very early. “They did everything, as I was in the shop until late in the 
evening,” the mother confides.
“The shop is mine, completely on my shoulders,” she says, both with pride and 
in a matter-of-fact way. “My husband moved to other business activities and I took 
over the shop.” When the business was good they started visiting Azerbaijan in 
summer, renovated their family home in the village, and looked into real estate in 
Baku. Last summer a distant relative, a young army officer stationed in northern 
Azerbaijan, proposed to their eldest daughter. With both families’ agreement the 
wedding was organized swiftly, gifts to the newlyweds given, and the bride’s family 
returned to Russia to their business. This year the mother with her younger daughters 
was back to see the baby, and to fulfill the motherly duty of “taking the crib”—
providing the young family with baby items and some monetary gift.
“Now I am working on [i.e., finding contacts and negotiating the price for—
S.R.] transferring the boy [the young husband] to [a military base in] Baku,” the 
mother says. “My poor girl is left alone in a town with no family around her while he 
is at work.” “I don’t have a lot of time here,” the mother says. “I have to plan 
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everything quickly. I had to organize this [“taking the crib” ceremony—S.R.] very 
fast. Got off the plane in Baku with the girls, went home [their Baku apartment], went 
shopping [for the crib and the gifts], finished in one day and came here. ” Relatives in 
Lenkeran, who are expected to give their own gifts to the young parents, were notified 
of her visit and the date of the ceremony in advance, by her calling from Russia. A 
suitable young man from their own distant family wanted to propose to her second 
daughter at this visit to Lenkeran, but her daughter declined, so the mother has no 
other wedding and responsibilities during this visit. “I have to go back,” the mother 
says. “I left everything—merchandise and money—to the sellers in the shop. The 
business is slow also.” The business is slow because the workers at the factory that her 
shop serves are “having a hard time themselves. They are deep in credit debt. Many 
bought flats in the new condos with credit [i.e., mortgage] and now cannot pay it. In 
the past several months, the situation is very stressful.”
This mother’s sister, herself a mother with two teenage children, has also come 
from Russia for the crib-taking procession. She will stay longer, though, because in 
her family the husband, who stayed in Russia, is the only one working. “It is very 
tough for Azerbaijanians in Russia,61 but I like it there,” this young woman says. “I 
have more freedom there than here in the village. I drive. My husband lets me do these 
things. He is proud of me doing them. Times are very difficult now, it is hard on him. 
But we will weather through this too.”
Not everyone in the crib procession ceremony is as optimistic. Take two other 
woman who have to make do with income opportunities available in Lenkeran. One 
has one unmarried son “who is just getting on his two feet.” She grows vegetables in 
her backyard, has one cow, receives a pension from the state, and has other “kids” 
                                                
61 Because of ethnic discrimination, legalities of immigrant residence.
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working in Baku. She compares her ways to the others’ livelihood strategies: “I could 
not go to Iran to trade like others do.62 You have to be able to verbally stand up to 
border officials, police, customs officers. I am not that kind of a woman.” The other 
woman’s husband does not have anybody in Russia who would host him, and “is not 
the kind who can take/give bribes and make money here.” He has rented out half of his 
backyard to a cellular company to install its receiver for a yearly payment of 1,000 
USD.
Gatherings like this crib-taking are a big expense for each of these families, as 
they are expected to contribute gifts in a “becoming” way. But participation in xeyir-
sher—literally, “the good and the bad” events of life, in weddings as well as in 
funerals—is important. I am told: “Xeyir-sherden qalmaq olmaz”—“you can’t stay 
outside of the good and the bad.” You cannot cut ties with relatives and community. 
This woman hopes that when her teenage sons grow, the relatives in Russia will not 
forget about their education.
The stories shared during this baby shower example carry signs of the 
changing nature of tradition in the relationship of émigrés with their relatives back in 
the village. Traditional principles of reciprocity among relations put pressure on stay-
behind relatives, for whom it is hard to reciprocate in an honourable, face-saving way 
with cash. The contributions of the émigrés to the relationship are expressed in cash or 
commodity form. Non-moving relatives’ in-kind and manual labor contributions to the 
relationship are devalued in the capitalocentric valuation prism of the émigrés to 
Russia. Non-moving relatives feel inadequate from not fulfilling, not being 
acknowledged as fulfilling, the traditional reciprocity in family obligations. In this 
feeling they border on accepting capitalocentrism themselves. The more that people 
                                                
62 Going to Iran to bring goods to sell in Lenkeran town is common in this village’s vicinity. This petty 
trade is dominated by women.
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around the poorer non-movers view the value of gifts in capitalocentric terms, the 
more the non-moving relative is viewed as inadequately fulfilling honourable 
reciprocity obligations, and the more social pressure she experiences to reciprocate 
properly or accept inadequacy as a relation—all based on capitalocentric valuation. In 
the process, many non-movers accept a capitalocentric valuation of things, labor, and 
life. The non-movers’ resentment of the inequality of material abilities—a personal, 
inward-oriented resentment—is a manifestation of the acceptance of capitalocentrism, 
as well as of the belief that one’s wealth is a product of one’s own ability and 
industriousness. Under the pressures of others with capitalocentric valuation criteria, 
poorer non-mover relatives are paralyzed between the message that they are 
inadequate and the feeling that the ongoing application of reciprocity is different from 
the past, and unjust. Indeed, something is different about the ongoing application of 
reciprocity—ongoing is a fundamental reinterpretation of the tradition. The poor non-
mover is feeling both the social disciplining effects of the new interpretation and the 
disconnect between the new practice of tradition and the old, when honour and 
responsibility depended on reciprocating in family relations in a socioeconomically 
much more egalitarian context.
Here is another example. The families who own a cow in the proximity of 
Lenkeran town know. Most days of the week a truck with the letters “PAL SUD” 
(PAL MILK) printed on it stops by their gates to buy the day’s milk for about 20 cents 
per liter. The milk is then taken to PAL SUD’s dairy processing factory in the region. 
The price PAL SUD offers is about 30 percent less than the price per litre at Lenkeran 
town’s “bazaar.” But most families do not have the time and transportation to take a 
few pails of extra milk to the bazaar every day. In this context, PAL SUD views itself 
as doing Lenkerani villagers a favour by providing them with a sale outlet right at their 
own door. According to many villagers, however, no one is doing anyone a favour; 
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PAL SUD is getting value nested in the villagers’ inability to get that extra value using 
their own resources.
PAL SUD is one branch of the PALMALI Group of Companies based in 
Turkey. PALMALI is actually a ship construction and management company. Today, 
with over 120 ships, it is one of the five largest flotillas in the world. The PALMALI 
group comprises tens of companies, including a news company, hotels, and more in 
Turkey. But what does a Turkish shipbuilding giant have to do with door-to-door milk 
purchases in rural Lenkeran?
The founder of the PALMALI Group, Mubariz Mansimov, is originally from 
the Lenkeran-Masalli area. A young Azerbaijani émigré to Turkey in the 1990s, he 
registered PALMALI in Istanbul in 1998, and was able to secure investments in his 
business. Focusing on oil tankers, PALMALI successfully competed with major 
shipping companies operating in the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, 
and the Baltic and the North seas. It secured its position as “one of the principal 
carriers of liquid hydrocarbons and of general cargoes going via landlocked waterways 
of Russia” (Azerbaijan Business Center report, 
http://www.abc.az/eng/b2b/category_59/238.html).
In 2002, PALMALI registered in Azerbaijan. PAL SUD was registered in 
2008, together with PALDAD—an ice cream plant also located in Lenkeran. 
Mansimov also invested in Lenkeran’s soccer club, re-built the sea port of Lenkeran, 
undertook a number of charity activities across Azerbaijan, and allocated funds to aid 
all Azerbaijanian students in Turkey. But if Mansimov views his dairy business in 
Lenkeran as a charity, the milk sellers to his company do not. With all due respect to 
Mansimov’s spending on the soccer club, sea port, and student fund, the milk sellers 
view Mansimov as business-minded first, someone whose milk purchase policies are 
not a charity. (They would be if the milk was not purchased for below-market prices at 
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the door.) Mansimov is the epitome of new thinking, separating personal attachment 
from work, keeping charity separate from business, even if business is done with those 
many times poorer. This is not so much a negative phenomenon for the milk sellers as 
it is a new phenomenon. The appropriateness of this new approach, ethically, is one 
subject of discussion among the milk sellers over glasses of tea on quiet afternoons.
Mansimov is just one of the most wealthy, famous, and charitable examples of 
émigré reinvestment in Azerbaijan. According to local executive government officers 
in Shamakhy, since 2003 many of the migrants from Shamakhy have returned to open 
businesses in towns and villages, which provide jobs to the migrants’ relatives and 
others. Besides being a boost to rural economic life, migrants’ involvement in their 
natal communities—whether or not in the form of investments—is an important 
channel through which the market mindset travels to the rural areas, where market 
competition does not travel so much as livelihoods are to an important degree based 
on subsistence production. Rural villagers encounter the manifestations of the new 
profit-maximizing mindset in personal and business relationships with the émigrés and 
urban migrants. In these contacts the migrants act and speak from the position of 
power granted by their access to cash income and freedom from communal obligations 
for livelihood-making. The relationships are based on “asymmetrical power,” to 
borrow a term from Reddy (1987). The unavoidable part of such encounters—the 
scrutiny and evaluation of the new outlook and profit-oriented priorities by non-
movers—takes place in this context of asymmetrical power relationships, where 
migrants’ “making it” is presented as the proof that the new mindset indeed “works,” 
is what the age demands. This scrutiny and evaluation of the existing values of life and 
related ways of thought from the contact with émigrés and migrants are processes of 
tension with much conflict and no pre-defined outcome, as Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) 
have pointed out.
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In these ways, rural migration is a channel through which ideas about the rules 
of the market, and the purpose of human life as self-service, enter remote rural 
communities through the “meso-level”—the “social universe” (Cohen and Sirkeci 
2011)—and suggest themselves as the right attitudes about life and living, backed by 
the power and authority of money, sometimes prior to the actual establishment of 
market institutions there, laying the ground for these very institutions.
Conclusion
Someone said during an interview, “Chorek haradan chixirsa veten oradir”—“The 
motherland is where your bread (income) is earned.” This was just a repetition of what 
has become a common saying in Azerbaijan. But this saying deserves elaboration, as it 
symbolizes a key mindset change in post-Soviet Azerbaijan.
The word “citizen” (vetendash) derives from the root word of “motherland” 
(veten) in the Azeri language. “Motherland” has always implied a state–citizen,
community–individual relationship model. In Soviet school textbooks, stories placed 
on children a host of responsibilities, veten, towards the motherland—from cleanliness 
and environmentalism through civic participation to improving the economy, ensuring 
the prosperity of the land, and protecting it in wartime.63 The reason for the 
responsibilities before the spatially bound veten—motherland was concretized. It was
expressed in the famous Azeri poet Abbas Sahhat’s renowned lines, written nearly 100 
years ago, and in the Soviet period, printed on the first page of first-grade alphabet 
books and memorized in schools:
Vetenim Verdi mene nanu-nemek, My Motherland has given me bread,
                                                
63 In some ways the Soviet-era usage of the term “motherland,” veten, was similar to the romanticized 
English usage of “community” to which an individual is seen as owing responsibilities.
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Veteni unutmaq mence ne demek?! What does it mean (how unacceptable it 
is) to forget Motherland?!
When the motherland “gave bread,” its owner took care of it, improved it, fought for 
it. Now, in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, if the motherland did not give “bread” (the desired 
level of life from production for the market), how did this change the expectations 
from the owner, “vetendash,” the citizen? The new saying in post-Soviet Azerbaijan 
expressed by my interviewee, “Chorek haradan chixirsa ora vetendir”—“Motherland 
is where your bread (income) is earned”—was a self-proclaimed abandonment of 
responsibilities towards the land. It symbolized an abandonment of interest in the 
affairs of the land and community that ceased to “give bread,” that could not provide 
livelihoods.
Ironically, the places where the “bread” is earned, the hosting locales, do not 
become a true motherland with which the rural outmigrants are in a give-and-take 
community relationship. In fact, the migrants’ embracing of the host locale as a true 
community to which they have rights and towards which they have obligations as
citizens and residents is systematically discouraged.
Crucial, however, is the need for an expression to come to terms with the 
responsibility towards a place, so engrained in Soviet discourse. The popularity of this 
saying represents the massive nature of the attempt to come to terms with the 
discrepancy of what one ought to do (in relationship to community) and what one is in 
fact doing. Unfortunately, the redefinition signifies the assertion of a consumerist 
relationship with land/homeland, whereas responsibility to a place—natural 
surroundings, hometown, village—is seen as dependent on one’s ability to 
continuously extract material income from that place.
With this saying, the responsibility towards the social-ecological well-being of 
the natal community is dismissed. The citizenship responsibility to the place that does 
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provide material income, on the other hand, is discouraged/curbed by the institutions 
of legal and political control, so the migrant says. In this way, the migrant may make 
moral peace with not taking responsibility. Yet this need to make peace gives her or 
him up: the migrant is a human, a fundamentally moral being, whose nature is not 
selfish, but designed for responsibility towards others. It is because of this nature that 
the culture industry cannot “take a vacation” and is in constant need of shaping moral 
preferences, while the surveillance institutions must continuously keep their check on 
a system based on moral irresponsibility and carelessness, if they are to continue to 
exist.
This is also why questioning and dissecting the ways in which individuals, 
communities, and masses come to terms with the new role assigned to human beings is 
so important—global marketization fundamentally rests/depends on these historical 
coming to terms.
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CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSION
In “Engaging the global countryside: globalization, hybridity and the reconstitution of 
rural place”, projecting the globalization processes forward, Woods (2007:492-494) 
discerns 10 characteristics of the ‘global countryside’ in the time to come:
1. Distancing of consumption from production, dependency of primary and 
secondary sector economic activity on elongated commodity networks;
2. Transnational corporate concentration and integration;
3. Both supplier and employer of migrant labor;
4. Increasing globalization of rural resorts;
5. Increasing “non-national property investment, for both commercial and 
residential purposes”;
6. Commodification of nature,   “finding new opportunities for the commercial 
exploitation of natural resources”;
7. “Inscription of the global countryside with the marks of globalization”: “the 
large-scale destruction of the primary forest, planting of the secondary 
commercial forest and the expansion of pastoral farming and scrubland, the 
opening of new oilfields and mines, the introduction of more commercially 
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attractive crop varieties, and the proliferation of the symbols of global 
consumer culture in the environment of small towns”;
8. Social polarization of rural communities;
9. Increasing perception among “the residents of the global countryside that 
political authority has been scaled up beyond their reach”;
10. Constant contestation of the global countryside. 
Woods pointed out that,
“[T]here are no rural localities that can be labeled at present as ‘global 
countryside’ in quite the same way as London and New York are described as 
‘global cities’. Yet, it is possible to anticipate the characteristics of this 
imagined space by projecting forward actually existing globalization processes 
and, in doing so, to create a framework for identifying the partial articulation 
of the ‘global countryside’ in real, present-day rural localities” (2007:492).
My reader will recognize some of the above characteristics of the ‘global countryside’ 
developing in the post-Soviet transformation of rural Azerbaijan: separation of 
consumption from production (as more and more rural laborers relied on wages for 
subsistence), dependence on migration, introduction of rural resorts,  commodification 
of nature, spread of the symbols of global consumer culture, and social polarization. 
What this case study suggests, however, is the inseparability of these processes from 
the massive moral transformation of rural communities and individuals. 
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In his article “The Subject and Power,” the French philosopher and social scientist 
Michel Foucault (1982) observed that the modern state and social institutions, carrying
out historically unforeseen scales of individualization and totalization, wield 
disciplining power similar to the “pastoral power” exerted over Europe’s populations 
for centuries, “over a millennium”: this power “implies a knowledge of the conscience 
and an ability to direct it”(Pp. 783–85). With the diminishing role of the religious 
institutions in the organization of social life after the Enlightenment, pastoral power 
has not disappeared, argued Foucault (1982), but has changed form and “spread out 
into the whole social body” and “found support in a multitude of institutions” (P. 784). 
Now, however, it offered “salvation” not in the next world, but
rather ensuring it in this world. And in this context, the world “salvation” takes 
on different meanings: health, well-being (that is sufficient wealth, standard of 
living), security, protection against accidents. (Foucault 1982:784)
Modernity had eliminated religion from the organization of the state and social life, 
but not from the search for a purpose in human life. Instead, we have observed the 
historical rise of the new direction and mechanisms addressing, channeling, routing 
the universal human ability to make connection between things, relating our lives and 
choices to those around us, to the ideas and ideals of what ought to be.
The problem with the “globalization story”–type studies is not that they paint 
an overpowering picture of social structures that rule the world. Rather, this 
conceptual overpowering of structures takes place—and the historical link between 
structures and agents is lost from view—when human beings are regarded as primarily 
material beings, rather than as profoundly moral beings within a given historical 
context. This is an approach that E. P. Thompson warned against in “The Moral 
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Economy of the English Crowd” (1971), arguing that it would result in 
historical reification.64
The market system and its materially successful65 history carries with it a 
belief not only in the supremacy of the market of organization if unhindered by the 
state (Polanyi 1944/2001). Rather, the belief that the market is the best of social 
organizations itself rests on a set of beliefs about the purpose and role of a human in 
community and society. In post-Soviet rural Azerbaijan, spreading the belief that a 
human’s purpose during lifetime is simply to enjoy material comforts has furthered the 
market system as much as market institutions, specifically labor market competition, 
have furthered self-oriented profit maximization.
Human Choice and the History of the Expanding Global Market
The peculiar thing about beliefs is that they cannot be imposed. They can only be 
suggested, their outward manifestation supported or disciplined; yet the beliefs 
themselves ultimately have to be accepted by the living “subjects” of history to give 
power and legitimacy to a given social order. “Subjects”—people—can be 
bathed/immersed in historical convictions about an individual’s purpose in and 
relationship with community, through education, broader socialization, life 
experiences; yet external forces’ ability to “rule” over individual convictions is not the 
same as social institutions’ ability to physically constrain a body. In this fact lies the 
                                                
64 Thompson based his argument on his analysis of the food riots in 18th-century industrializing 
England, demonstrating how these were less about looting for consumption than about reacting to the 
violations of the established notions and beliefs about legitimate economic practices within an agreed-
upon, consensual model of individual–community relationship. Millers’, bakers’, and middlemen’s
profit-maximizing behaviour at times of dearth became a target of popular attacks, because this 
behaviour contradicted the established, legitimate notions of individual–community relationship: the 
millers and bakers were supposed/expected to serve the community, not use the community for 
individual profit maximization.
65 Success here defined very narrowly as technological advances.
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essential openness of history, the possibility for variations and social change.66 Indeed, 
the view of the world history as built by “real, living individuals”—a view laid out by 
Marx, according to Derek Sayer (1987:83–112)—can only be held if we conceptually
allow living individuals the freedom to choose their beliefs and to act on them.
The conciliation of the term historical “freedom of human choice” with critical 
social science—where it raises bitter responses—is necessary. The role of human 
choice in history has been a porous, vulnerable aspect of critical social theory. 
Arguing against rational choice theory, critical social theorists have committed to 
illuminating the ways in which the social conditions the individual. Yet, the 
commitment to rescuing humanism, the historicity of human “nature,” from rational 
choice theory’s assertions of homogenizing, innate, “natural” selfishness has been a 
challenging terrain on which to maintain the real historicity of human dispositions, the 
dialectical relations between historical human choices and the social context in which 
they were made, and which they in turn make. There is a fine line between studying 
how social structures suggest human choices and asserting that these structures define 
                                                
66 Nested in this freedom of choice is also the seeming separation between the unifying, “law-like” 
characteristics of a social order and the observed freedom/fluidity/relative autonomy of the “thought-
world” and “life-world,” a contradiction occupying critical theorists of social structures. In Spaces of 
Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographic Development (2006), Harvey noted that 
such separation in the theoretical works of Frankfurt school scholar Jürgen Habermas was an effort to 
allow for the freedom of human predispositions within the confines of social structures:
Habermas turns to Husserl’s concept of “the lifeworld” understood as that sphere of both non-
human and human thought and action outside of the economic, technical and bureaucratic 
rationality given in the concepts of capital and the state. In Habermas’s case, there is a 
manifest desire to retain a humanism in which personal passions and concerns, individual 
moral and aesthetic judgements, communicative ethics and dialogue carry their own distinctive 
and autonomous meanings. Formulations of this type guard a space against the overwhelming 
power of “capital logic” theory and the seemingly anti-humanistic stance which that logic 
dictates. (Pp. 81–82)
Sympathetic to the aims, Harvey (2006) nevertheless criticized the conceptualization urging that the 
“enquiry must center on the dialectical relations between abstractions and concrete events” (P. 82). 
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human choices.67 The distinction is crucial, and arguments approaching the latter 
stance risk closing off the theoretical space for transformative action and social 
change, infusing the theories themselves with logical and political contradictions. One 
such assertion is that “Human predispositions are products of these individuals’ place 
in social hierarchy,” which has probably found most explicit expression in the works 
of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, an ardent critic of rational choice theory 
himself. But human dispositions are not simply a product of individuals’ place in 
social hierarchy, even if life activities associated with that position can be taken to 
mean the lens through which one makes sense of the world. From a middle-class 
entrepreneurial background can come both an individual who committed his life to 
arguing that market institutions endanger the natural and human substance of society 
(Polanyi) and an individual who believed unhindered markets to be the panacea for a 
nation’s ills and who committed all her powers to deregulating market institutions and 
restoring the power of the “‘captains’ of industry and finance” in the nation, even if 
this meant crushing the autonomy of a nation’s municipalities (Thatcher, as described 
by Harvey 2006).
The uneasiness with seriously and critically probing into human choice in the 
historical making of the global market does a disservice to the transforming potential 
of the studies of globalization.
Accepting the role of human choice in the mass acceptance of market ideology, 
carrying a particular—selfish—view of the purpose and role of an individual in 
society, is not an embarrassing hint at the inevitable ugly truth of human character.68 It 
                                                
67 The latter may seem (only seem) true where principal tenets of an established order exist with 
legitimacy.
68 If anything could be argued to characterize human “nature,” that would have been its propensity for 
compassion, persistent examples of which in our times—of human society’s deepening immersion in 
the globalizing culture industry’s messages of “serve yourself”—are nothing short of miraculous.
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is an invitation to study the appeals and tactics with which market logic can be 
chosen/subscribed to as a guide for individual action, the effects of such a subscription 
for communal cohesion and collective resistance.
Human choices at all levels of social hierarchy have a bearing on how a society 
turns out. These choices are suggested—powerfully, but still only suggested, not 
defined, determined—by the historical social norms. A useful prism reflecting the 
totality of these norms is not particular food habits, dress, ethnic design, or reciprocity 
arrangements, but the underlying idea of the purpose of human life, and a human’s 
role in and responsibility to her surroundings—nature and community. Indeed, these 
later conceptions in a society shape exhibitions of art, culture, and food.
The troubling duality/multiplicity of the globalizing market—its simultaneous 
homogenization and differentiation—reflects the spread of a particular view of the 
purpose of human life in relation to social and natural surroundings. Historical 
differentiations represent different ways of reinterpreting tradition and coming to 
terms with the newly suggested model of human purpose and the human’s role. While 
varying manifestations represent different ways of coming to terms, the homogeneity, 
regretfully, represents coming to terms, making peace, with the new role of a human 
being in life: under the facade of different manifestations is a homogenization of the 
idea of human priorities as profit maximization and comfort seeking, best served by 
market institutions. Thus, reciprocity relations in a Lenkeran village continue, but their 
meaning for individuals and their role in the communal cohesion have dramatically 
changed. Or, for example, Islamic finance institutions springing up from Iran to the 
United Arab Emirates seem a continuation of a century-long tradition, are in essence 
far removed from the tenets of financial help in historical Muslim practice and in 
effect provide ways of reconciling one’s verbal commitment to a Muslim economy 
while investing in a capitalist economy. The examples of historical coming to terms 
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with the traditional moral commitments and the morality of the human purpose as 
serving self through market mechanisms are rife with conflicts. Resting on 
fundamentally different notions of the individual–community relationship, inherited 
moral commitments and market morality cannot in essence be reconciled.
The global market-based system has been noted for its inherent contradictions, 
in very different ways by Polanyi (1944/2001) and Harvey (2003). Another 
contradiction that the spread of this system carries could be the moral-conceptual 
conflict experienced on a massive scale with populations’ subscription to the idea that 
serving self—searching for material comforts first and even at the detriment of 
others—is a legitimate goal of life, while the responsibility to community and natural 
surroundings is secondary, marginal, a hobby or charity. This conflict may be critical 
to the reproduction and deepening of the market institutions globally as it paralyzes 
people, putting them in the state of “moral and political passivity” that Gramsci 
mentioned, turning “people” into “masses” manipulated in the manner described in 
much of the globalization theory.
Where Do We Go from Here?
It may be that the resistance to globalization requires seriously acknowledging and 
addressing the moral, individual support of the system that has currently acquired 
mass character. Necessary also are theoretical and ethical discussions of the purpose of 
human life and the human relationship to nature and community, some form of general 
guidelines for the discussions of these—as a part of the “meaningful mechanisms of 
social solidarity” that Harvey (2011) urged us to construct. Lack of these will leave 
mental and moral spaces to be filled with the visions that neoliberalism and market
society supplies, perpetuating the passivity that Gramsci observed.
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